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Abstract

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND WHITE-COLLAR CRIME:
AN EXAMINATION OF BROKERAGE-FAILURE AND ITS LINK TO PONZI SCHEMES
By Marie L. Springer
Advisor Jeremy: Porter, PhD.

The purpose of this study is to provide an understanding of federal level Ponzi schemes,
the perpetrators of the schemes and the relationship to the financial crisis of 2007 to 2010. The
Ponzi schemes have been classified into two overall types of frauds, those that are intentional
frauds those that are accidental frauds. The Accidental frauds are schemes that develop when a
legitimate business fails, they fall into two specific typologies: Brokerage-failure; Businessfailure. The intentional schemes are a variety of typologies such as False-brokerages, intentional
confidence schemes, affinity frauds and cybercurrency frauds. The data quantifies characteristics
of the schemes and examines them before, during and after the time period of the financial crisis.
The overall study timeframe includes cases from 1973-2016.
The primary research focus attempts to determine if there was a relationship between the
financial crisis (2007-2010) and Ponzi schemes. The study seeks to determine if there was a
greater amount of intentional Ponzi schemes being exposed during the financial crisis and if a
greater number of Brokerage-failure schemes began during the financial crisis.
The data were collected from federal agency legal documents that designated the cases as
Ponzi schemes. The schemes were coded using federal civil and criminal documents for each
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case. Each Ponzi scheme was coded for critical characteristics. The perpetrators of each scheme
were also coded for critical characteristics.
Key findings indicate that there was not a greater quantity of Brokerage-failure schemes
that formed during the financial crisis. However, many intentional schemes were exposed during
the financial crisis of 2007-2010. The study also finds that there were a greater number of
intentional schemes that took place during the financial crisis and that overall most schemes are
intentional, not accidental frauds. Additionally, the demographics for perpetrators shows that the
majority are over 50 years of age and predominantly White-males, in keeping with most studies
on White-collar crime perpetrators.
In conclusion, the study provides an overall perspective on Ponzi schemes and Ponzi
perpetrators never before quantified to this degree. It establishes typologies of Ponzi schemes,
quantifies those schemes, and establishes data on the perpetrators of this specific type of whitecollar crime.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Focus
In 2009, it became very clear with the extreme amounts of money lost and the length of time of

the Bernard Madoff and Allen Stanford Ponzi scheme cases that this type of fraudulent scheme
needed to be addressed legally and academically. There has been no formal quantitative
academic study of this specific type of white-collar crime. As such, this study looks at one type
of white-collar crime: the Ponzi scheme. This study specifically quantifies and describes Ponzi
schemes and Ponzi scheme perpetrators.
Framing White-Collar Crime
White-collar crimes in general, have great need of serious academic study. White-collar
crime definitions vary but the premise in most definitions is similar, in that it usually includes the
high socioeconomic status of the offender and the environment being that of what is generally a
legitimate profession. White-collar crime is often defined by the offender: generally, the
perpetrator is considered of high socioeconomic status. It is also classified by legal offenses
such as mail-fraud, wire-fraud, financial statement fraud, fraud in general and tax evasion.
((Benson & Simpson, 2015). White-collar crime differentiates from common or street crime by
having multiple victims, often times in the thousands. Most research looks at case studies
qualitatively, (Bazoian-Phelps & Rhodes, 2012; Kotz2014; Frankel,2012; Chilton, 2011),
because identifying and quantifying white-collar cases is highly work intensive.
White-collar crime is often times differentiated by subcategories of corporate crimes,
financial crimes and environmental crimes. Corporate crimes are those where the entire
corporation commits a crime such as Enron, WorldCom or the investment banks. The
1

corporation is a large organization with hundreds of employees and many executives, as opposed
to the great many incorporated entities that are corporations but have only a few employees and
executives, as in the case of Ponzi schemes. Many major investment banks receive criminal
judgments as well as civil penalties frequently, for a variety of crimes and securities violations.
(Tillman, Pontell & Black, 2018). Financial crimes are those primarily in financial markets,
including those such in mortgage, real-estate and insurance entities. Finally, environmental
crimes are those revolving around the environment such as toxic leaks and water contamination.
Environmental crimes are generally committed by a corporation and have serious financial and
health implications.
Theoretical Perspectives
This study takes a multipronged approach using theories from several disciplines. The
study itself takes Herbert Edelhertz’s offense based approach, (Edelhertz,1970), studying Ponzi
schemes as the unit of analysis. Secondly, and equally as significant is Hyman Minsky’s theory
of financial instability, (Minsky 1992), that orders the relationship between the economy and
regulation. This study takes Minsky’s theory one step further to examine how the economic
trends might relate specifically to Ponzi schemes. In this case, specifically addressing how the
deregulation triggered the financial crisis and how Ponzi schemes occurred and were exposed
around the time of the financial crisis. Minsky’s theory of financial instability and the
application of regulation and its effect on financial markets is addressed throughout the work in
relationship to the macro level. The micro level primarily considers social science strain theory
and psychological theories to explain individual levels of behavior.

2

Implications
The purpose of this research is to examine the characteristics of Ponzi schemes and Ponzi
perpetrators in an effort to help legislators understand if the enabling laws are allowing these
types of schemes to occur, or if they provide law enforcement with the laws needed to be
effective enforcers, and regulators to monitor, investigate and punish for fraud. If indeed the
reduction of regulations increases economic growth, and with economic growth comes
discretionary income, and with discretionary investing comes frauds; it is likely that with the
next phase of deregulation we may see an increase in Ponzi schemes. With the next financial
decline, we will then see the Ponzi schemes exposed.
Statement of the Problem
During the financial crisis of 2007-2010 the United States saw many Ponzi schemes come
to public attention as they collapsed. What became evident in the financial crisis of 2007-20101
was that many companies thought to be legitimate were actually Ponzi schemes. Ponzi schemes
are dependent on new investors to keep the Ponzi scheme afloat. In the financial crisis people no
longer had discretionary income to invest; they were not investing in legitimate or illegitimate
entities. With no new investors, the Ponzi schemes collapsed. Additionally, many Ponzi
schemes failed because of the economic decline and because investors withdrew their money out
of their investments. Many investors found their funds were gone, either lost in the market or
had been used illegitimately by the individuals with whom they had invested. These schemes
were primarily intentional frauds conceived of as scams from the beginning. What has not been

The onset of the financial used here is “early 2007” as determined by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011, p.
213. The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis considers the onset of the financial crisis February of 2007. (Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis). The ending period of 2010 is adapted from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
financial crisis timeline.
1
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documented in the general media or academic research are the Ponzi schemes that developed out
of the financial failure as accidental frauds. Hence, this research will examine once legitimate
brokerages, or other types of businesses, that began to fail with the financial crisis and turned
into Ponzi schemes as a last-ditch effort to keep the business functioning.
Deregulation and the Financial Crisis
This section examines the regulatory origins of the financial crisis and the deregulation
that enabled fraud. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, (FCIC, 2011), determined that the
primary causes of the 2007-2010 financial crisis were avoidable. It was not chance, but in fact
regulatory decisions were at the root of the massive failure. (FCIC2011). The Commission
determined there were several contributing factors to the financial crisis that are discussed in the
following paragraphs.2
The Banking Act of 1933 established the Federal Deposit Insurance Company(FDIC).
This was to protect the average person’s finances through bank deposits. At the time of the
financial crisis each individual was insured up to $100,000; as a result of Dodd-Frank Act of
2010, the amount is now guaranteed up to $250,000 per individual, per bank and type of account.
(FDIC 2010).
Once the commercial banks and investment banks were legally allowed to merge as a
result of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, then investment banks had access to the average
commercial banking clients’ funds. The investment bankers knew that each of those accounts
were insured by the government for up to $250,000, so that if the investment bankers used those

1.

These were determined as causes of the financial crisis by the majority of the commissioners. Four of ten
commissioners dissented finding other contributing factors. This summary of the findings does not
contradict the dissenter’s argument.
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funds and endured losses, the government would reimburse depositors’ funds. The investment
bankers knew they could use the commercial bank deposits for risky investments because they
knew the government would bear most of the risk, replenishing any losses to the average banking
client if the investment failed.
Investment bank lobbyists pushed for deregulation until it was achieved with the
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, also known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 had established a divide between commercial banks and investment
banks, so that the average citizen’s funds would be separate from the investing banks funds.
Alan Greenspan was the chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1987-2006. Greenspan
followed libertarian economics theory and felt that the market would govern itself. His advice
influenced President Clinton’s support for the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, and its
replacement by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. However, the market was not allowed to
govern itself. When the financial crisis peaked, the investment bankers that had made bad
decisions and behaved irresponsibly were bailed out by the government instead of being allowed
to fail. In the end, Greenspan stated at congressional hearings that he “was wrong.” (H.R.110209, the Financial Crisis.).
Ben Bernanke, who became chairman of the Federal Reserve in 2006, stated that he felt
the financial crisis could not have been anticipated in his comments to the Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission. Yet Brooksley Born, who had been the chairwoman of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission from 1996-1999, warned at that time that the deregulation of
commercial and investment banking and the mortgage derivatives would allow widespread abuse
and massive financial failure. (H.R. Testimony, Brooksley Born, 1998). Born was right but no
one listened to her until it was too late; just as no one listened to Harry Markopolos when he
5

tried to tell the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that Bernard Madoff was running a
Ponzi scheme. (Markopolos, 2010). When there are large profits to be made, we tend to hear
what we want to be the truth instead of what is the truth. Just as the American people were
duped with deregulation, that it would improve the economy; Ponzi scheme victims were duped
by the scheme perpetrators; everyone believed what they wanted to be the truth.
The availability of credit enabled the housing boom. Lenders made profits on interest,
mortgage brokers made their fees, brokers selling the mortgage backed securities made their
fees, everyone down the line was making profits; no one had anything to gain from exposing the
flaws in the system. Excessive borrowing, risky investments and lack of transparency enabled
the mortgage boom that led to the financial collapse. To reflect on routine activity theory,
(Cohen and Felson 1979), there was opportunity created by deregulation, suitable targets created
by easy credit, and a lack of oversight allowing the fraudulent mortgages, allowing the financial
risks and allowing the failed due diligence.
Due diligence requires that lenders and mortgage brokers ascertain the validity of
mortgage applicant’s earning ability and credit scores. (FCIC,2011). During this time mortgage
brokers held a blind-eye, not checking on the credit worthiness of borrowers. In many cases,
there was no due diligence performed. Likewise, the investment entities that bundled the
mortgages did not perform due diligence, or they performed due diligence on only a few
mortgages within a bundle. Those marketing the mortgage securities as derivatives also did not
perform due diligence with regard to the quality of the mortgages they had securitized; it was a
massive failure of due diligence on all levels, there was virtually no due diligence taking place.
The government was functioning under the assumption that the financial market would
police itself. Those in federal agencies charged with oversight and monitoring of financial
6

markets may have wanted to be more aggressive, but with the repeal of Glass-Steagall they had
little in the way of regulation or administrative support to be aggressive enforcers. It was
expected that the financial industry, specifically the investment banks, the insurance companies
and mortgage lenders would adequately supervise employees and manage for risks. The top
investment banks were expected to manage for risk, meaning they were expected to not take on
more risk than they could cover financially. The FCIC determined that the investment banks
were negligent in managing risk and failed in due diligence. (FCIC, 2011). In other words, the
market did not police itself but instead ran amok.
Mortgage lending practices and securitization of the subprime mortgages were prime
causes of a cotton-candy like economy: all sugar and air, no substantive nutritional value.
Homes were over-valued, there was no substance to their worth. Securitization is the “process of
distributing risk by aggregating debt instruments in a pool, then issuing new securities backed by
the pool.” (Downes and Goodman, 2014). The housing bubble was fueled by subprime
mortgages. The sub-prime and creative mortgage products were bundled into groups in order to
distribute risk, then issued on securities markets. The risk was then passed on to investors.
As the mortgage industry boomed dramatically, mortgage frauds also increased several
times over. Authorities on state and federal level, as well as private sector investigators, could
not keep up with the need for due diligence and verification of loan documentation. Those
charged with performing due diligence for the derivatives market securitizing the bundles of
mortgages could not keep up with the volume of mortgages. They tried to verify documentation
on at least 30% of mortgages in the bundles, but they could not keep up; the number of
mortgages with verification of individual documents was woefully low. By 2006 the mortgages
with low or no documentation made up “27% of all mortgages.” (FCIC, 2011, p. 165).
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The FCIC considered the over-the-counter derivatives a major factor in the collapse.
(FCIC, 2011, p. xxiv). Derivative instruments are securities that are based on the performance of
underlying assets, such as mortgage securities. This often includes speculation using futures and
options, meaning betting on future values. The underlying security is the financial instrument by
which the security gets its value; in bundled mortgages, the individual mortgage is the
underlying debt instrument that is bundled into a group of mortgages that is then a derivative.
Over-the-counter refers to derivatives or securities that are not traded through the New York
Stock exchange or through the American Stock exchange. Over-the-counter markets are
overseen by of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a private-sector securities
industry self-regulating entity. FINRA also provides the testing and licensing of stock brokers,
investment advisors and such.3 There were minimal legal requirements for federal agencies to
monitor the over-the-counter financial instruments that encompassed the subprime mortgage
derivatives.
The ratings agencies are private sector entities with responsibility to monitor financial
markets; these entities also failed in their responsibilities during the financial boom prior to
2007. These nationally recognized statistical rating organizations, (NRSROs, hereafter referred
to as ratings agencies), includes three major ratings agencies: Moody’s; Standard and Poor’s, and
Fitch, all failed to do their job. Senate hearings, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
Report, and finally the SEC all determined that the ratings agencies failed to properly rate
commercial mortgage-backed securities, thereby enhancing the likelihood of investing in what
were actually risky financial instruments. Standard and Poor’s was penalized $1.375 billion for

3

See appendix C for a list of series exam titles.
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its part in the financial crisis by the Department of Justice (DOJ). Moody’s was penalized $864
million for its part in the financial crisis failure by the DOJ, in January, 2017. The ratings agency
DBRS agreed to a $6 million penalty in 2015 for failing to provide appropriate ratings on
mortgage backed securities.4
The ratings agencies are private sector entities that were established in the early part of
the twentieth century to provide ratings on securities and other financial instruments. These
entities are funded by fees from the companies whose financial products they rate. The
companies pay a fee to be rated by the ratings agencies. If a company does not like the rating
they receive they may not be willing to pay a fee to be rated by that agency again; a clear conflict
of interest embedded in the process.
The legislation governing the ratings agencies has changed over time. Credit Ratings
Agency Reform Act of 2006 prohibited the SEC from regulating the ratings agencies’ methods
of rating companies. This Act enabled the SEC to monitor processes and record keeping
practices, but not to interfere with the rating process. After the financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank
Act addressed conflicts of interest with regard to sales and marketing by ratings agencies to the
companies they rate. It also required disclosure of methodologies of ratings methods and the
data used to formulate the ratings.
This section has provided an explanation of Ponzi schemes, suggesting that the financial
crisis exposed many intentional Ponzi schemes. It is also suggested that the financial crisis may
have caused some schemes to develop in response to the economic failure. Also explained were
the financial crisis, the regulatory practices and the decisions that contributed to the financial

4

As of this writing, Fitch Ratings Inc. has not been charged by the Department of Justice, per PACER.
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crisis. As the study goes forward it will reflect on regulations, and financial events in relationship
to Ponzi schemes.
Motive for the Research
The motive for this research is to define and quantify types of Ponzi schemes, and to
determine if there was a significant number of Ponzi schemes being exposed during the time
period of 2007-2010. The years of 2007-2010, the financial crisis, is the focus time period of the
entire study period of 1973-2016. It is thought that there were more Brokerage-failure schemes
during this time period than other types of Ponzi schemes. The significance is that Brokeragefailure Ponzi schemes developed from legitimate businesses and as a result of economic failure
becoming Ponzi schemes, whereas the other types of Ponzi schemes were initiated as unlawful
entities from the very beginning. One result of this research is that it will help regulatory and
law enforcement agencies to determine if current legislation is adequate. Achieving a better
understanding of the nature of Ponzi schemes, especially those that may have been triggered by
the financial decline, may help to prevent Brokerage-failures in future economic downturns from
turning into Ponzi schemes in future economic down trends.
Parameters of the Research
The financial crisis of 2007-2010, the focus time period, saw a dramatic increase in the
identification of Ponzi schemes. Many were Ponzi schemes that had existed for many years,
even decades; then the financial crisis caused their collapse and they were exposed. Some
schemes had only begun with the financial crisis. One specific type of fraudulent scheme, I refer
to as the: Brokerage-failure schemes. These schemes began with the financial crisis. As the stock
market fell, once legitimate brokerages lost their client's money. In an attempt to stay afloat,
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these brokerages hid the losses, fraudulently misrepresenting their ability to pay back investors,
an identifying characteristics of Ponzi schemes. These failed brokerages then sought new
investors to fund payouts to existing clients. First, this study identified those Ponzi schemes that
were functioning as legitimate brokerages, advisers or hedge funds prior to the financial collapse,
and then became Ponzi schemes during the financial crisis. These types of schemes were
compared to the intentional Ponzi schemes taking place during the same time period, that were
not registered brokerages, dealers or investment advisers.
The Ponzi schemes in this study were designated as such by the investigations conducted
by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodities and Futures Trade
Commission (CFTC), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and subsequently
determined to be Ponzi schemes by federal administrative judges, or in federal criminal trials.
This study hypothesizes herein, that there were more Ponzi schemes in the 2007-2010-time
frame that are a result of legitimate stock brokers and traders suffering financial losses, who then
borrowed from newer clients to replace the losses of older clients, (Brokerage-failure Ponzi
schemes), than other types of Ponzi schemes in the 2007-2010-time frame. These financial
losses were caused by the financial crisis between the years of 2007-2010, the focus time period.
Some brokers gambled that they would have successful trades and would then be able to replace
the lost funds. The “good trades” never came to pass. These once legitimate brokerages then
became Ponzi schemes which led to the firms’ spiral downward to the point of total collapse.
This study seeks to measure all Ponzi schemes brought to civil or criminal action, on the federal
level, from January 1973 until May 31th, 2016, and to compare the quantities and types of Ponzi
schemes originating prior to the financial crisis, to those that took place during the crisis. These
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schemes were compared from the time they were documented to have originated until the time
they were documented as ending.
Prior to this study it was not known how many, or what percentage of all Ponzi schemes,
are Brokerage-failure schemes. Nor has any prior study systematically categorized all known
Ponzi schemes. It is likely that only a few within regulatory agencies and the financial industry
are aware that there are differences in the quantity of some types of Ponzi schemes depending on
the financial market. Industry professionals, such as those in the regulatory agencies, have
experienced what they believe are more Brokerage-failure Ponzi schemes than other types of
Ponzi schemes, but this has never been determined quantitatively.
This study will examine characteristics of all Ponzi schemes to gain a better
understanding of the varied manifestations of these schemes. This secondary analysis explores
characteristics of all the Ponzi schemes in the data set for differences and similarities. The third
aspect of this study looks at civil and criminal punishments for Ponzi schemes. This will allow
an examination of demographic characteristics of Ponzi scheme perpetrators, as well as
sentencing data, including prison sentences. Ponzi perpetrators tend to be older criminals with
varying prison sentences. Those convicted also receive heavy civil financial penalties.
It is hoped that the findings of this research will enable the Securities Exchange
Commission, the Commodities and Futures Trading Commission and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to monitor for types of Ponzi schemes and to manage their resources more
effectively. This methodology can also open the door for academic research on fraud crimes
using multidisciplinary approaches.
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Research Questions
1) Did Brokerage-failure Ponzi schemes occur at a greater rate than intentional Ponzi schemes
during the financial crisis of 2007-2010? This question will be addressed with descriptive
statistics and analysis of the known population of federal level Ponzi schemes. Chi-square
and crosstabs will determine the association to the time frame of the financial crisis 20072010.

2) Are Brokerage-failure Ponzi schemes different from intentional Ponzi schemes in terms of
the rate of occurrence during the study time frame of 1973-2016? This question will be
addressed with descriptive statistics for the pooled sample and the sample split by Ponzi
scheme type. Chi-square and crosstabs were performed to determine the association to the
time frame before the financial crisis and from the onset of the financial crisis.

3) How do the characteristics at the individual-level (perpetrator-level) variables differ in
relationship to all Ponzi schemes in the study time frame of 1973-2016, Ponzi schemes before
the financial crisis, before 2007, and schemes that began from 2007 to 2016? This question
will be answered with descriptive statistics (split and pooled) and bivariate tools using an
individual level data set that includes information on demographics, finances of the scheme,
and punishment.

Chapter one addresses the problem of Ponzi schemes, the financial crisis and
deregulation. Chapter two provides a framework for white-collar crime and then discusses Ponzi
schemes in literature and then discusses significant Ponzi schemes in history reflecting on
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economic, regulatory and technological trends. Chapter three discusses characteristics of Ponzi
schemes and identifies the typology of Ponzi schemes that has emerged through this research.
Criminological, psychological and economic theories that reflect on Ponzi schemes and Ponzi
perpetrators are discussed in Chapter four. Chapter four discusses the meso-macro-micro levels
perspectives of looking at the topic in terms of the meso-level being the Ponzi schemes, the
macro-level being the financial crisis and finally the micro-level looks at the perpetrators and
victims. Chapter five explains the methodology of the study and the variables used in this
research. In Chapter six the analysis of data and the findings are discussed. The seventh and
final chapter discusses the limitations, ethical considerations, conclusion and continuing
research.
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Chapter 2 Literature Review
White-Collar Crime
The definition of exactly what white-collar crime is has changed over the decades since
the term was first coined in the 1930s. White-collar crime is generally thought of as a nonviolent crime that uses some form of deception to perpetrate a financial crime. (Downes and
Goodman, 2010). The term “white-collar” symbolizes the socioeconomic level of the
perpetrators indicating professionals and corporate executives who would be likely to wear suits
and ties to work as opposed to those in the trades, who are symbolized by the term: “blue-collar,”
the attire these professions are thought to wear to work. The term “white-collar crime” was
initially coined by Edwin Sutherland in 1939, (1983), defined as: “as a crime committed by a
person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation.” (Sutherland,
1983, p. 7). This study defines the term of white-collar criminals to include those who present
themselves as being of a high social status and respectability, using the rewards of their frauds to
present the image of high socioeconomic status, in order to perpetrate the Ponzi schemes.
More recent writings on white-collar crime are beginning to differentiate between
corporate crimes such as Enron, Tyco and WorldCom and other white-collar crimes such as
environmental crimes, and financial statement frauds. (Simpson2002; Rosoff, Pontell, Tillman,
2014; Benson & Simpson 2015). Corporate crimes take place within an organizational context,
where the organization itself has a hierarchy and many employees. (Simpson2002). All whitecollar crimes are financial crimes, however, only some are financial-industry based crimes such
as banking or involving the investment markets. There is a need for typologies that clarify
white-collar crimes by offense, by victims, by perpetrators and by the organization. In the cases
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of the large banks being held criminally responsible as well as the ratings agencies, no
perpetrator goes to prison, only monetary penalties are imposed.5 In white-collar crime research
there is a need to look at white-collar entities convicted of criminal charges, such as with the
major corporation crimes, but no one faces a criminal sentence, no individual is held accountable
personally.

Before Edwin Sutherland coined the term “White-collar crime,” there were those

who used the term: “White-collar Bandits.” (Kenner, 1926; Johnson 1929), and Charles Frasca,
an investment broker. (Frasca, 1931, p. 3).6 Frasca describes this type of criminal in 1931, they
are: “Wolves dressed in sheep’s clothing, possessing a pleasing personality, are interesting
conversationalists, suave manners and are neat dressers always trying to convey their positions of
importance in the business world.” (Frasca, 1931 p. 3). This describes White-collar criminals
and Ponzi perpetrators today. That same image of success used in 1931 is the mechanism used
to attract the investor-victims in the twenty-first century. Frasca was an investment broker who
wrote about stock swindlers in 1931, eleven years after Charles Ponzi. Frasca had begun his
career as a broker in a company that was a common type of stock market fraud at the time. The
scheme hired young inexperienced men and taught them to sell stocks. They received a few
weeks of training, then were required to sell stocks to their family and friends, the basics of what
we now call affinity fraud. These investments may have been high risk or fraudulent. Many
Ponzi schemes use the same method: the family members and friends are the first victims of
Ponzi perpetrators in many cases. Frasca realized the fraud and organized the Stock Holders

5

J.P. Morgan; Deutsche Bank; Citibank; Bank of America to name a few.

6

Kenner; Johnson and Frasca are from: Fraud and Swindles Collection. [collection of published and
unpublished works on subjects relating to fraud and swindles, broadly defined]. Special Collections,
Lloyd Sealy Library, John Jay College of Criminal Justice/CUNY, New York City.
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Protective Committee, to inform investors about frauds. His career became fighting stock
market fraud.
Even before Frasca, was E.A. Ross, a sociologist who used the term: “Criminaloids” to
label what we now refer to as white-collar criminals. Ross described a type of criminal who
presents himself as quite respectable, who carries out his crimes using deception from an “office
chair” (Ross, 1907, p. 37). The types of crimes we now consider corporate or white-collar have
gone on for centuries, although the actions may not have been criminal at the time because the
laws came into effect after many frauds or corporate manipulations had taken place.
Criminological Theory in White-collar Crime
Sociologists and psychologists have often attempted to explain white-collar crime in
terms of commonly recognized theories such as strain theory or social control theory. Edwin
Sutherland (1947), introduced the concept of white-collar crime in the 1939. Sutherland
theorizes that all individuals have associations or social connections. Friends and family are
considered the most important social relationships. Sutherland is suggesting that the closer
relationships are, the less likely they are to be victimized by white-collar criminals. In Ponzi
schemes, it is the family and friends who are most likely to be the first victims. Weisburd, et al.
(1991), have taken into account technological advances and added the middle-class with their
definition of white-collar crime, including fraud and embezzlement. Michael Gottfredson's and
Travis Hirschi's white-collar crime theories explain that the social environment of the corporate
world does not support or encourage-crime. They suggest that their theory of white-collar crime
contradicts other theories of white-collar crime. Gottfredson and Hirschi suggest that most
authors consider white-collar crime to have social origins similar to other types of crime. Their
theory: “explicitly predicts lack of social support for most white-collar crimes, since they are
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both contrary to general social norms and against the interests of the organization itself.” (1991,
p. 200). This proposed study will disagree with Gottfredson and Hirschi, suggesting that affinity
fraud Ponzi schemes are one type of fraud perpetrated through social supports, making use of
social norms within affiliations to build the trust necessary to carry out the fraud.
Henry Pontell and Tomson Nguyen are contemporary analysts on white-collar crime
whose work has addressed the financial crisis, mortgage origination fraud, and Ponzi schemes to
some degree. In their 2010 paper: Mortgage origination and the global economic crisis, Henry
Pontell and Tomson Nguyen describe the fraudulent methods used in the sub-prime mortgage
frauds that contributed to the financial crisis. Pontell and Nguyen discuss the deregulation that
took place during the 1980s, allowing the savings and loan crisis, noting that it is similar to the
deregulation that enabled the financial crisis of 2007 to occur. One of the more significant
observations of Pontell and Nguyen is that there is no national standard for oversight and
licensing of mortgage professionals. The state requirements vary considerably, with few states
requiring a criminal background check. This allows career fraud perpetrators to move from state
to state. Pontell’s main point is that the lack of regulation allowed for not just the mortgage
brokers to produce sub-prime mortgages but also for investment banks to bundle the bad
mortgages and to sell them in derivative markets. (Nguyen & Pontell, 2010).
Robert Merton originated strain theory in 1938 with his paper: “Social structure and
anomie.” Merton discusses anomie and how social structures require individuals to conform to
society. Merton discusses social conformity and strain theory as the need for the individual to
adapt to their culture’s demands. In relation to white-collar crimes in this discussion, the strain
or pressure is the need to succeed professionally and to participate in capitalism and the
American Dream. Merton (1938) and Sutherland (1947), both reflect on strain theory to explain
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crime. Both use strain theory to explain what is basically criminal behavior, as being related to
social classes. Their theories generally reflect on street crimes more so than on white-collar
crimes. The basic concept suggests that when individual feel social strains, frustration, anger
they are motivated to commit crimes. Langton and Piquero (2007) updated strain theory
concepts applying it to white-collar crime. This study will discuss how social strain theory may
apply to Brokerage-failure schemes.
The concept of the American Dream came about from James Truslow Adams in 1931.
Adams was a historian. Adams: “the American Dream, that dream of a land in which life should
be better and richer and fuller for every man, with opportunity for each according to his ability or
achievement.” (Adams, 1931, p. 404). This was published after the stock market crash of 1929
and in the middle of the Great Depression. Adams explains that the lure of financial success
called the American Dream inspired many people to come to the United States from all over the
world. It also inspired those who were less scrupulous to achieve the American Dream illegally.
Not so coincidentally, this is the same year, 1931, when Charles Frasca published his book on
stock swindlers using the term: “White Collar Bandits.” The Depression was in full swing; the
law and social scientists were trying to catch up.
Steven Messner and Richard Rosenfeld (2013), related the American Dream to whitecollar crime. Their theory is that Americans are ingrained with the belief that they must be
financially successful to fit into society. Messner and Rosenfeld discuss Strain theory as well as
other criminological theories in their book: Crime and the American Dream. These authors
discuss the desire to achieve and maintain the American dream of prosperity. Actions in Ponzi
schemes that could be explained by strain theory would be the accidental frauds that turn to
Ponzi schemes rather than admit failure, and that intentional schemes that are based on greed to
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begin with. These actions demonstrate the need to achieve status or maintain a high
socioeconomic status. It would also apply to most perpetrators who use their victim’s money to
present themselves as being financially successful.
Robert Agnew generally describes General Strain theory, in that individuals commit
crimes out of loss fear of loss; failure to achieve goals, or as a result of some negative conditions.
(Agnew, 2006). In the case of Ponzi perpetrators, this would manifest in Brokerage-failure
schemes. This is seen when the legitimate brokers experience severe financial market losses.
The actual loss of client’s funds in failed trades means the loss of their clients, the loss of their
business and the loss of their status and professional reputation. If a broker or adviser cannot
prove gains they cannot bring in new clients, nor can they maintain current clients. Failed trades
would cause the kind of pressure that would motivate a broker or adviser to turn to a Ponzi
scheme to stay in business. (See Gambler’s Fallacy, p. 144). This same theory would apply
towards Business-failure schemes, when the legitimate business fails then turns to a Ponzi
scheme to stay afloat.
Donald Cressey (1953) specifically refers to crimes due to economic reversals. His 1953
study uses the term “embezzlement” to cover a variety of crimes that now fall under the cover of
white-collar crimes. Cressey discusses what he calls: “non-shareable” problems in financial trust
situations. (Cressey, 1953, p. 44). Cressey explains that some crimes result out of “business
reversals.” (Cressey, 1953, p. 44). Cressey explains the “fear of loss of status” (Cressey, 1953, p.
42), and others blaming them for losses, indicative of strain theory. In the case studies referring
specifically to business reversals, one interviewee explains that business people are “risk takers”
that they are “over-confident.” (Cressey, 1953, pgs., 48 & 49)). These “business reversals” in
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Cressey’s terminology, are the same situations discussed in this study referred to as accidental
frauds.
Affinity fraud crimes cross social barriers. Sometimes the victims are the upper
socioeconomic classes, as in Bernard Madoff's scheme. Other schemes victimize the lower
socioeconomic classes such as those affecting newly immigrated populations and those affecting
blue-collar victims, such as law-enforcement officers and bus-drivers. Affinity fraud affects all
socioeconomic levels. The one common denominator in affinity fraud is that perpetrators of
Ponzi schemes present themselves as being of a high socioeconomic status, generally using their
victim’s money to carry out the image of being wealthy individuals. The fraud would not
succeed if they presented themselves as being from a humbler economic stature; thereby
appearing to be unskilled investors. Agnew (2002) uses strain theory to apply it to middle-class
individuals who have not achieved the desired success they feel they should have, fitting into the
upper socioeconomic levels. He describes this as a type of strain that would influence some to
commit a crime. (Agnew 2002, p.340). Agnew goes on to identify a kind of strain that
specifically addresses those who commit crimes because of “failure to achieve core goals that are
not the result of conventional socialization and that are easily achieved through crime.” (Agnew
2002, p.343). Basically, Agnew is saying that when individuals have not achieved the kind of
success they think they should have, by standard means such as education and social
connections, they find they can achieve the goals through crimes realized, in part by projecting
the image of success. This aspect of general strain theory explains the motivation of the Ponzi
scheme perpetrators to commit fraud.
Similarly, Abraham Maslow’s conception of belongingness, a foundational element in his
Hierarchy of Needs, posits the need to feel part of a group, as a powerful motivator, which would
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explain how the victims are so easily victimized from within a group of people they trust.
(Maslow, 1943). Criminal justice theorists have looked at white-collar crime, but have not
specifically addressed Ponzi schemes.
Rational choice theory is often applied to street level crime; in this paper, it is being
applied to white-collar crimes and more specifically herein to intentional Ponzi schemes.
Rational choice theory in this context basically implies that the Ponzi perpetrators rationally
calculate their schemes by reasoning that the rewards would outweigh the risks of getting caught.
There is some support in literature that lends itself to the application of this theoretical
perspective to intentional Ponzi schemes. The intentional Ponzi schemes are amazingly intricate
schemes that are very well thought out and planned in most cases.
Sally Simpson and Raymond Paternoster, (2008) have established these three elements as
indicative of rational choice theory from Clarke and Cornish, (1985) then applied them to
corporate crimes:
1. “The decision of the would-be offenders to commit a crime is a rational
decision that is affected by the perceived costs and benefits of their actions.”
2. “Rational choice models of offending should be crime-specific since the kind
of information both needed and employed by offenders varies considerably
across crimes.”
3. “Decisions to offend in a specific instance are affected by the immediate
contextual characteristics of the crime.”
(Paternoster and Simpson 2008; Clarke and Cornish 1985)
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Paternoster and Simpson define corporate crime as: “illegal acts undertaken by
corporations or their representatives to further the goals of the organization.” (Clarke and Felson
eds.; Paternoster and Simpson, pg.37). Paternoster and Simpson apply this theory to their study
on corporate entities, specifically. Their study supports the offense based approach to whitecollar crime. In the end, their study of rational choice/deterrence theory found that deterrence
mechanisms were not effective in preventing corporate crime. It is the same with Ponzi
perpetrators, they believe they are too smart to get caught and that they are intelligent enough to
maneuver around regulations, regulators and law enforcement. Bernard Madoff stated, after the
fact, that he knew he would get caught one day.
Routine activity approach (Cohen and Felson, 1979) generally supports the theme that
acts of crime occur when there is an offender, a suitable target and the absence of a capable
guardian against crime. Intentional Ponzi schemes are planned and rationalized; the perpetrator
weighs the risks against the rewards. In accidental Ponzi schemes, the business person turned
perpetrator has a business running, and in the routine of running that business or brokerage, it
fails. They have clients or bring in clients, who are the willing but oblivious victims. When the
business or brokerage has been functioning legitimately for some time there is no perception of
wrong doing hence no need of oversight or no need of appropriate guardianship. Possibly,
routine activity theory could be applied to the accidental frauds; this is a future research
possibility. Jacqueline and Michael Drew (2010), speaks of routine-activity theory in
relationship to Ponzi schemes, in that there is a more than willing offender, vulnerable victims
and a lack of effective authority to prevent the scheme from taking place. This study looks at
financial and regulatory influences as well as the individual actions of perpetrators.
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The majority of Ponzi schemes were incorporated, but there are generally a small number
of employees, therefore the organizational quality of Ponzi schemes cannot be compared to
larger white-collar schemes such as Enron or WorldCom.
Ponzi Schemes in Literature
Little has been written academically on Ponzi schemes as a form of white-collar crime,
with no academic literature or research that quantifies this specific form of fraud. Both the
financial crisis, and the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme are well documented and have extensively
been researched and documented, but not Ponzi schemes as a whole. Several individual Ponzi
schemes have been the subject of books, although not academically studied. Since the existing
research is qualitative and characterized by mass market books on individual cases, there is a
need for this research.
The criminological context of looking at Ponzi schemes would look at the perpetrators
and victims. It would seem that in the intentional, affinity fraud and feeder-fund Ponzi schemes
we would see rational choice theory and more specifically game theory as in any kind of crime.
The perpetrators of these frauds calculate very carefully how to con their victims. Their
expertise in producing fraudulent documents speaks of the skill with which they plan a
convincing scheme.
Current literature does not discuss or differentiate between different types or variations of
Ponzi schemes; it is an issue that has not been studied or acknowledged, hence the need herein.
Tamar Frankel (2012) has been a leading academic on Ponzi schemes. Frankel is the one
academic that acknowledges and distinguishes between intentional con-artists and those who
start out as legitimate businesses that then evolve into confidence scams. Her writings
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concentrate on how the public feels towards such perpetrators. Frankel’s basic premise is that
the public has an appreciation of a full-fledged con artist but feel more violated by a legitimate
business turned Ponzi scheme. She qualifies Madoff as an example of this kind of fraud, in that
it had the basics of a legitimate business to cover his fraud. (Frankel, 2012, p. 161). Madoff’s
scheme was running for many years prior to the financial crisis and falls in the category of
Brokerage-failure and affinity frauds that were exposed because of the financial crisis. (Lewis,
2011). Madoff's scheme did not turn into a Ponzi scheme as the result of the financial crisis, it
was a Ponzi scheme for approximately eighteen years prior to the financial crisis.
Frankel discusses that the fraudsters and their victims have much in common, both are
motivated by greed. The Ponzi perpetrators know this, and this is how they justify taking
advantage of people. (2013, p. 137). In her discussion of the nature of Ponzi perpetrators her
context is that these fraudsters intended to defraud their victims from the beginning. This paper
proposes that there is one kind of Ponzi scheme that starts out as a legitimate investment business
then becomes a Ponzi scheme as a result of a bad financial market. The perpetrator’s original
intent was to make profits for investors, and then things spiraled out of control, for the broker or
dealer in these businesses. These businesses were not started with the intent to defraud as were
other Ponzi schemes. The literature presented here addresses all aspects of Ponzi schemes and
aspects of the financial crisis that relate to Ponzi schemes, as well as the regulations that are
thought to have contributed to the financial decline.
The study of fraud in general is multidisciplinary. Far more has been published in legal
publications than in social science journals on Ponzi schemes. Ponzi schemes are addressed on
both the civil and criminal levels within the legal system. Federal law enforcement and civil
regulation, such as the banking industry and financial markets are involved. Securities attorneys
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and litigation attorneys, must know how to get the best results for their clients who have lost
funds to schemes as well as to protect them in clawbacks.7 The private sector must try to prevent
Ponzi schemes as well as to manage for risk prevention.
Attorney Kathy Bazoian Phelps and his Honor Judge Steven Rhodes literally wrote the
book on Ponzi schemes: The Ponzi Book (2012). This book covers Ponzi cases, the laws
involved and explanations of the mechanics of the cases. The point of the book is to help those in
the legal profession “unravel” Ponzi schemes. This legal resource text provides a wealth of
information for those in the legal profession. However, it is not a social science study and does
not have quantification, nor a social science theoretical perspectives of Ponzi schemes. This
wealth of information details individual cases discussing the intricacies of the bankruptcies,
disgorgements, restitution and evidence in the individual Ponzi cases. It is well noted that Phelps
also maintains a blog with updates on Ponzi cases.
In some Ponzi schemes, books have been written by former employees of the
perpetrators, or victims of Ponzi schemes. While these books present fascinating insights into
the methods of manipulation and persuasive techniques used by the Ponzi perpetrators, they are
biased and sensational. People who have been treated badly by a perpetrator cannot be objective.
The lack of professional academic rigor made these sources unsuitable for inclusion in this
analysis.

Clawbacks are the process of taking back and redistributing the interest from earlier investors to later victiminvestors.
7
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Ponzi Schemes as White-collar Crime
In many cases, those who commit Ponzi schemes are white-collar, in that the perpetrators
are attorneys, certified public accountants, and stock brokers; those whom we refer to as
“professionals” in that their occupation requires a specific education and licensing. Many others
who commit Ponzi schemes are not professionals or from what society considers a higher
socioeconomic status, but instead present themselves as such, in order to perpetrate the
fraudulent scheme. They use their victim’s money to present themselves as being very
successful in order to attract other victims. In a few cases, the perpetrators are blue-collar
preying on others who are blue-collar. The victims are all socioeconomic levels, but the
perpetrators are always, or present themselves as, financially successful; no one is going to
consider investing with someone who appears to be struggling financially. The appearance of
white-collar success is part of the methodology of the schemes. Often times the perpetrators are
using their victim’s money to give themselves the image of being financially successful, thereby
appearing to be white-collar in socioeconomic status. The Ponzi scheme perpetrators are
generally middle-aged or older, adding to the appearance of respectability.
Generally, white-collar crime research incorporates the environment or setting, as a
defining factor establishing the crime to be “white-collar,” e.g. the offense(s) occurred in a large
corporate setting. This study defines white-collar crime as having five elements:
1. The offender
2. The offenses
3. The environment
4. Multiple victims
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5. Victim’s losses of over $100,000.
White-collar criminals are described in literature as having a high socioeconomic status;
this study defines the offender as having a high social status that might be achieved through
family wealth or connections, but more commonly using the mechanism of appearing to be of
high socioeconomic status as a mechanism for perpetrating the crime, as is common in Ponzi
schemes and other forms of fraud. The offender/perpetrator based level requires that the
perpetrator present themselves as financially successful and sophisticated in business and
investments to perpetrate the crime.
In Ponzi schemes, the white-collar criminal may create their own socioeconomic status to
perpetrate the crime, they also create the business entity, or the environment, to carry out the
crime. This differs from what is generally thought of other white-collar crimes in that the
offense takes place through an already established corporation.
Anyone can buy a high-quality suit, a fake Rolex watch and can lease luxury vehicles to
give the appearance of success. Anyone can say they have gone to Wharton Business School,
anyone can say they are a successful stock broker, that does not make it the truth. The
appearance of success is what enables the offender to perpetrate the fraud. Appearing successful
often times includes legitimately attained credentials such as series licenses8, or being a licensed
real-estate broker or insurance agent. These are all exams anyone can study for and take until
they pass. Law degrees and CPA credentials are not so easily falsified; many Ponzi perpetrators

Series licenses are required for working in the financial industry trades. These licenses require exams that cover the
laws of carrying out financial market trades. See Appendix C.
8
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legitimately have these credentials. Frasca’s description of “White-collar-bandits” is an accurate
description of Ponzi scheme perpetrators. (Frasca, 1931, p, 3)
This study defines the offense based aspect of a white-collar definition as those laws and
regulations with which the offenders are charged. Most Ponzi perpetrators are charged with mail
fraud yet not all of those who commit mail fraud are white-collar criminals. Some perpetrators
are charged with racketeering, yet not all who are charged under the RICO Act are considered
white-collar crimes. Money laundering is another common charge in Ponzi schemes, yet those
charged with money laundering are in all socioeconomic levels. Some cases are out and out
theft: the perpetrator promises one thing then quite simply takes the victim’s money. This is theft
by deception; yet not all theft by deception is classified as white-collar. While a Ponzi scheme is
a type of fraudulent scheme, it is not a law that is broken, it is the offenses that the perpetrators
are charged with that defines a white-collar crime, those violations and laws are listed in
Appendix D.
Generally, white-collar crimes are considered as being perpetrated through a corporation
or large business, such as Enron or WorldCom. (Benson & Simpson 2015). These types of
white-collar crime are commonly referred to as corporate crimes. The corporate environment
creates the opportunity to carry out the crime. In accidental frauds, the environment-business is
already established and functioning legitimately prior to the Ponzi scheme. However, in
intentional Ponzi schemes, the environment is created. The perpetrator founds the business with
the intent of carrying out a Ponzi scheme. This may mean that they establish professional
credentials such a being a securities or commodities broker with the intent to commit fraud.
They may be working in the real-estate industry legitimately then find a way to commit fraud.
Ponzi perpetrators are generally entrepreneurs. The perpetrators must have some understanding
29

of how a specific type of business is run in order to conceive the fraud. The perpetrators often
self-designate themselves as chief executive officers (CEO) of their own corporation or chief
financial officers (CFO) or the president of the company. Such titles are the norm in the
corporate form of an organization, and both the titles and actual incorporation are adopted in
order to present fraudulent businesses as legitimate. Some schemes, such as those operated by
Madoff, Stanford, and Petters built large corporations that were fraudulent, but were large
enterprises.
This offense based study looks at one type of white-collar crime: the Ponzi scheme. This
type of fraud includes many laws and regulations that are violated such as mail fraud and wire
fraud, as well as such regulatory violations as failing to register as a brokerage, or investment
adviser, or a commodity broker. Thus, this study defines white-collar crime in terms of requiring
all four parts: offense based, offender based, and environment based and adds a forth criteria that
includes the amount of money taken must be over $100,000. The offense is defined within
publicly available federal agency documents, and designated to be Ponzi schemes within the
wording of the text in these documents. The offenders are defined as being of high
socioeconomic status or more commonly presenting themselves as such; the environment
requirement is that the crime takes place in what is a corporation or a business entity that
presents itself as a legitimate business.
For Ponzi schemes to function there must be multiple victims; the more victims the
greater the longevity of the scheme. Often times white-collar crimes are considered minor or
victimless crimes because there is not always a face to face encounter between the perpetrator
and the victims. (Nash, Bouchard, Malm, 2017). There is little research on the victims of whitecollar crimes. In most Ponzi cases, the victims have a face to face encounter with the
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perpetrator(s). However, when the victim-investor is a pension fund that has invested with a
hedge fund that is a Ponzi scheme, there are many faceless victims. Enron’s crime victimized
the entire state of California as it caused rolling power-outages across the state. One scheme had
eight victims, each one was a pension fund, each pension fund had countless individuals who had
paid into the pension plan.
The amount of money taken should be considered in determining a crime to be a whitecollar offense. Most Ponzi schemes brought to action on the federal level are generally over
$100,000, usually at least a $1,000,000. Often times other crimes considered white-collar, such
as embezzlement, take much smaller amounts of money; this study requires that the amount of
funds taken need to be considered in defining the crime. Grand larceny is defined as anything
over one hundred dollars. Someone selling a fake Rolex watch, but saying it is a real Rolex
watch, is theft by deception and out-and-out fraud, but the amount of money involved is too
small to be considered a white-collar crime.
This section has looked at white-collar crime definitions and theories, concepts and then
redefined white-collar crime as it relates to Ponzi schemes. Going forward, this in-depth study
of Ponzi schemes, qualitatively and quantitatively examines white-collar crimes both on the
offender level and the offense level in order to better understand the offenders and the
opportunities to carry out this specific type of white-collar crimes.
Significant Ponzi Schemes in History
There have been many scams and scandals that have been highlighted in the general
media and that have found their way into the history books. The cases discussed here are but a
few. It is important to understand that no single economic or regulatory event would be the only
contributing factor to Ponzi schemes. Prior to Charles Ponzi, in 1920, these types of frauds were
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simply called “swindles” or “robbing Peter to pay Paul.” The term “Ponzi” was not commonly
used, so, these types of frauds are not easily found in earlier legal documents. Now, the specific
type of fraudulent scheme where the funds of later investors are used to pay the interest and
principal to earlier investors is specifically called a Ponzi scheme. The following cases were
chosen for the availability of information and the time period that the scheme had taken place,
with an effort to find documentation of at least one scheme per decade. In the decades of the
1940s and 1950s there were virtually no Ponzi schemes in the major media.
In the time period immediately after WWII, there were probably relatively few schemes
simply because money was less available to much of the population. The war was a time of
rationing and war bonds, there was not much in the way of discretionary income for investing.
What excess income there may have been probably would have gone to purchase war bonds.
Before WWII, the country was still recovering from the Great Depression, entering the war
triggered the financial rebound from the Great Depression. It is likely that Ponzi schemes took
place, but they may not have been called Ponzi schemes, making it difficult to find them in court
documents and media. Federal agencies have virtually no documents available through websites
for cases that happened before 1973.9 Hard copies of documents are stored through federal
archive sites.
Efforts to access some documents from twentieth century decades through the FOIA
process was generally met with patience on the part of SEC employees. At times, accessing the
documents was quite a challenge in that the documents were stored in hard copy in file boxes in
large storage rooms, not easily retrieved. Prior to the Public Access Court Electronic Records
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Per conversations with PACER employees and federal agency webmasters.
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(PACER) system, accessing federal court documents was a costly and timely effort. Federal
websites have improved throughout this five-year research process, enabling access to more
cases and documents.
It would be ideal to find enough information to look at economic trends and Ponzi
schemes for at least the past 150 years, but the information is not available. Instead this
historical analysis using available case studies looks at the schemes that are known, qualitatively,
to discuss the economic conditions at the time period of each scheme and the nature of the fraud
committed. The following cases are represented here because they were outstanding in the
media, providing information about the cases. They are by no means the only cases, just those
available for study because they are well known and in the press. Most cases have at least one
book published on them, if not several books.
The primary securities laws now in place were enacted in 1933 and 1934, primarily in
response to the Great Depression. Prior to these Acts, most states had “blue sky laws,” enacted
in the early decades of the twentieth century. These laws were titled as such because of the
intent to keep the unscrupulous from selling investors all but the blue sky; confidence scheme
perpetrators were quite willing to sell anything, with no laws preventing them from doing so.
Before the Great Depression of 1929, laissez-faire economic principles were the norm. (Kelly,
1988). It was not yet evident that there was a need for strong federal securities regulation.
Before the Great Depression it was thought that securities regulation was a state level law matter.
The collapse of the stock market in 1929, combined with a few Ponzi schemes and other types of
financial frauds, made it clear that Congress had to establish federal securities laws. Hence, we
now have the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which established
the Securities and Exchange Commission, a federal regulatory agency.
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The methods used to carry out Ponzi schemes have adapted as technology changes, and in
relation to economic and political events occurring throughout time. The following Ponzi scheme
cases discuss the nature of the fraud, as well as the economic and technological conditions of the
time period of each scheme. Earlier Ponzi schemes did not last long, generally less than a year.
These are Ponzi schemes that are known; there are undoubtedly many more that were not
covered in the press.
Economic, political and technological circumstances play a part in the schemes, such as
the OPEC oil embargo in the 1980s, and technological advancements in the 1990s. Peggy
Stines’ scheme in the 1980s was based on the silver used in processing photography film. Now,
with digital photography, the scheme might be based in home printing equipment. We did not
see major regulatory changes until there were massive financial declines affecting the entire
nation’s economy such as the Great Depression of 1929 and the Financial-Crisis/Great Recession
of 2007. Just as technology has influenced recent schemes being based in cybercurrency and
Uber, earlier schemes were also based on the technology of the day. The following schemes are
discussed with emphasis on the economics of the time, if it is relevant, and the technology that
related to the fraud. The economic aspect is discussed because people only have discretionary
funds for investing during positive economic trends and, because it is indicative of boom
economies illustrating Hyman Minsky’s theory of financial Instability. Secondly, the discussion
of technology is a result of information that has come out with this study: that the means and
manner of the fraud are influenced by the technologies of the day.
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Sarah Howe 1880 Ladies Deposit Company
During the latter part of the nineteenth century women were basically seen as fragile,
gullible and not capable of handling their own financial affairs. Women were perceived as likely
to be a victim of fraud, not a perpetrator of fraud. It was in 1869 that the women's suffrage
movement formed organizations to begin to fight for the right of women to vote. The Civil War
had just taken place between 1861 and 1865. Women, as they had throughout history to that
time, took on the work of the men who had left for war. Women found they could manage their
finances and do the physical labor of the men. In the post-Civil war reconstruction period, the
economy in the North was growing; women had their own money and wanted to manage it
themselves.
In 1878 Sarah Howe established the Ladies Deposit Company in Boston. This was a
bank run by women, for women depositors. This bank guaranteed women 80% interest per year.
(Robb, 2012). This was an attractive opportunity for women who generally worked as domestic
servants, seamstresses and school teachers. This was an affinity fraud in that it sought only
women as investors and was run by a woman. Howe only accepted funds from single women;
those who were widows and spinsters were ideal targets. The bank attracted women who wanted
to be self-sufficient. As with all Ponzi schemes, Howe did not actually invest the money given
to her in interest paying loans or other businesses, instead she provided interest payments by
paying earlier investors with later investor’s funds. The general sentiment of the times was that
the business would fail, not because it was thought to be a fraud but because women were
intellectually incapable of running a financial institution. (Robb, 2012 p. 448).
In this time period, (late 1800s), women were thought to be unsophisticated in the arena
of financial matters and incapable of managing their own money. Women had little access to
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education that imparted financial sophistication and competency. As is typical in Ponzi schemes,
the most vulnerable are preyed upon: in this case women who were widowed or spinsters and
otherwise single, with no male protector to oversee their finances. When Howe’s scheme
collapsed in 1880, more than 800 women lost approximately $250,000. (Robb, 2012 p. 447).
Other victims were likely too ashamed to come forward, revealing their naivete and
victimization. (Robb, 2012).
Howe was sentenced to three years in prison. When Howe was released in 1884 she
started another bank on the same principles, yet another Ponzi scheme. Two years later this
scheme also collapsed, but this time she disappeared so she was not tried or convicted again.
She died five years later, a pauper. (Robb, 2012, p. 455).
Ulysses S. Grant and Ferdinand Ward 1884
Ferdinand Ward was the son of a Protestant pastor and missionary. His scheme took place
in the early 1880s. He had befriended the son of former President Ulysses S. Grant, eventually
establishing a business partnership with former President Grant himself (President 1869-1877).
This business venture, collapsed in 1884 leaving Grant virtually broke.
Grant and his son Buck returned to New York City in 1881. Buck Grant, former President
Grant’s son, convinced his father to partner in an investment firm with his friend Ferdinand
Ward. The company was called Grant & Ward, Bankers and Brokers. The Grants trusted Ward.
Ward had experience on Wall Street having worked there in the New York Produce
Exchange. Ward eventually worked his way into stock and bond markets. The method of the
scheme was legitimate investing where the investors would buy stocks, that were then used as
collateral for loans to buy more stocks. Ward borrowed against his client’s accounts. This is
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paramount to using other people’s property as collateral for a loan. In the end clients were paid
with later client’s contributions. Whether this scheme was an intentional fraud or whether it was
a legitimate business that failed, thus becoming a Ponzi scheme cannot be determined. But it
bears similarity to those schemes that failed during the 2007 financial crisis.
Civil War had taken place from 1861-1865. The Transcontinental Railroad had been
completed in 1869. There had been a financial panic in 1873, during Grant’s term as President.
During this time, the New York Stock exchange was closed for ten days. This panic was the
precursor to the depression between 1873 and 1879. This depression was said to be caused by the
bankruptcy of Jay Cooke and Co. in 1873, a banking entity that backed railroads. The stock
market had plunged in 1879 then began to rebound in 1880. The stocks values began to rise in
1881; shortly thereafter Ward convinced the Grants to become partners. In 1883, the stock
market began a decline, by 1884 there was again a market panic. In the end, the Grants had lost
everything. Ward had used the Grants for their name and connections. (Ward 2013).
William Miller and the Franklin Syndicate 1899
In 1899 William Miller established the Franklin Syndicate, initially running it out of his
candy store in Brooklyn. At first, he worked with a few people he knew in his bible study class,
promising them 10% per week or 520% per year. This business entity was incorporated but
there was no board of directors or stated type of business. This scheme was an intentional Ponzi
scheme with no indication of a proposed or alleged investment mechanism. As with all Ponzi
schemes, Miller gladly paid early investors their promised interest and returned the principal to
any investor who requested it. Prompt payment built the trust needed to make the scheme work.
He started his scheme with people he knew in his church group, making it initially a faith-based
affinity fraud. Once word got out, the scheme expanded to anyone willing to invest. Miller’s
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scheme lasted only a year. Miller was a young man, only 21 when he started his scheme. Miller
had a partner who was a professional con artist, named “Schlessinger.” Schlessinger was smart
enough to abscond with his share, disappearing in Europe, leaving Miller with the full financial
responsibility. Miller received a ten-year sentence that was commuted to five years. (Oltman
2014). The economics of the times were comparatively good; not quite as good as the boom
economy prior to the financial crisis of 2007, but good. Many people were immigrating to the
United States; agriculture was increasing; the United States was a very inviting place with
economic opportunities.
Charles Ponzi 1920
The term we now use for the specific type of fraud being studied comes from Charles
Ponzi and his 1920 fraud scheme. This form of fraud was termed a swindle at that time. Since
that time, this type of fraud scheme is now called a Ponzi scheme. Ponzi’s scheme only went on
for about 6 months. His scheme was discovered and exposed by journalist William McMasters.
The memoir of McMaster’s interactions with Charles Ponzi is now a manuscript archived at John
Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York.10
William Henry McMasters was a journalist working independently, initially hired as a
press agent for Charles Ponzi. He had taken notes on his experiences with Charles Ponzi
throughout a three-week period in 1920. Within a few hours of talking with Charles Ponzi,
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Fraud and Swindles Collection. [collection of published and unpublished works on subjects relating to
fraud and swindles, broadly defined]. Special Collections, Lloyd Sealy Library, John Jay College of
Criminal Justice/CUNY, New York City.
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McMasters quickly knew that what Ponzi said he was doing was impossible. McMasters kept
the discussions going with Ponzi, which affirmed his suspicions that Ponzi was carrying out a
fraud. McMasters took his suspicions to the local district attorney as well as the state attorney
general. In the manuscript, McMasters talks about Charles Ponzi having a phobia about money,
stating that “no sane person would do what he is doing.” (McMasters pgs. 145-146). McMasters
thought that Ponzi was mentally ill, because Ponzi did not seem to grasp that what he was doing
was wrong, and that Ponzi had an obsession with money. (McMasters, 1962). McMasters wrote
the memoir beginning in the 1920s, but finished just before his death in 1962.
Charles Ponzi’s scheme lasted a few months, less than one year. His scheme promised a
50% profit in forty-five days. The basis of the scheme was foreign stamps. He told people the
profits were made by the value differences in foreign stamps, similar to the foreign currency
markets. However, Ponzi did not purchase even one foreign stamp; his scheme was an
intentional fraud from the onset. Many of Ponzi’s victims were other Italians, making this also
an affinity fraud, but eventually expanding to anyone. Ponzi’s scheme primarily took place in
the Boston area, eventually moving to New York and New Jersey.
Charles Ponzi had previous convictions for which he served prison terms. Ponzi had been
imprisoned in Canada for forging a check. After Ponzi was released, he helped some Italian
immigrants come into the United States from Canada illegally. He was caught smuggling
undocumented people into the country. The immigrants told the truth about what was happening
and they were freed. Ponzi lied and said he was just helping a friend and was sentenced to yet
another prison sentence in the United States. Once he served the federal sentence in Atlanta, he
made his way up to Boston where he began his Ponzi scheme in 1920.
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When World War I began, the U.S. was in a recession. The war was being fought in
Europe; Europeans were buying their supplies for the war from the United States. This caused a
financial boom between 1914 and 1918 in the United States, until we entered the war in 1917.
(National Bureau of Economic Research). In 1919, the economic conditions in the United States
were “healthy”; an environment that allowed people discretionary funds, enabling them to make
investments. (Frasca, 1931, p. 9). The United States established “Liberty bonds,” these were war
bonds in support of the war effort. (Zuckoff 2006) (Ponzi, 2009) (McMasters, 1962).
Leo Koretz 1921-1923
The first automobiles began to be available in 1908. As ownership of vehicles became
more common, there was a need for petroleum products. The early 1920s brought the first oil
based Ponzi scheme: Leo Koretz seized the opportunity. His $2 million scheme purported to be
based in land he allegedly owned in Panama. At the time, the Panama Canal was being
constructed, Koretz convinced his clients that they were investing in Panamanian oil wells.
Koretz’s scheme began to fail in the end of 1923. He began doling out cash to family members,
telling them not to put it into bank accounts. One investor had gone down to Panama to see the
oil fields that Koretz had touted to his investors victims. There were none to be found. The land
on Koertz’s fraudulent surveyor’s map belonged to someone else, who knew nothing of Leo
Koretz. The intentional scheme was exposed. Koretz received a prison sentence of six years; he
died within two months from the complications of diabetes. (Jobb,2015).
From 1919 until 1923, “oil and mining stocks were at their highest boom” said Charles
Frasca in his book: Stock swindlers and their methods. (Frasca, 1931, p. 108). During this
period of time automobiles were becoming very common, creating a demand for petroleum
products. With any new technology, the fraud perpetrators were quick to follow. This all
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contributed to the financial boom of this time period and also contributed to many frauds based
on oil and mining.
Ivar Kreuger 1930
Ivar Kreuger was called the match king. Kreuger developed a business producing
matches in the early part of the twentieth century. The economics of the time were good when
Krueger came to the United States from Sweden, in 1922, just after WWI. The country was
undergoing an economic boom that characterized as the roaring twenties. Kreuger had come to
the United States to make money; the economy was booming at that time.
Matches were still a staple in the early part of the twentieth century. Kreuger developed
match factories throughout Europe and the United States; he was the match king. Kreuger
wanted a world monopoly on match production. While Krueger had several legitimate businesses
throughout Europe and the United States, he was heavily in debt and not capable of paying his
expenses. He devised a scheme to bring in funds by purporting to be a financier to Europe’s
governments using a method of: “convertible gold debentures” based on a twenty-year
maturation with a 6.5% interest rate paid at maturity; technically what is known as a bond.
(Portnoy p. 42). The convertible part meant the bonds could be exchanged for shares. However,
rather than the funds being used to fund loans to European governments as investors and banks
were told, the funds were used to pay off previous debts. Kreuger’s scheme was a Businessfailure scheme of the largest magnitude, international in scope. Kreuger had cooked his many
sets of books, many times, in order to give the appearance of solvency.
The stock market crashed in 1929 putting an end to the roaring twenties. By 1930,
Kreuger was having financial difficulties, and falsifying the profits. Kreuger was also neglecting
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to report liabilities in his financial reporting. When he realized his difficulties, he had a printer
in Europe print counterfeit Italian treasury bills. Krueger had begun moving around shares from
his European companies in different countries, he was shuffling the money between companies.
(Portnoy, 2009). In 1933, when Kreuger’s empire was clearly collapsing and he was about to be
found out, he committed suicide.
Robert Trippet et al. and Home-Stake oil 1964-1974
Robert Trippet began his scheme in the Tulsa Oklahoma area in 1964. By 1974 he had
taken $130 million. The Home-Stake scheme was based on oil-well drilling securities and was
an intentional fraud. Trippet’s victims were America’s rich and famous, bankers and prominent
politicians such as Senator Jacob Javits and several stars: Jack Benny, Liza Minelli, Andy
Williams, Bob Dylan; these were the same types of victims as in Bernard Madoff’s scheme.
Trippet’s scheme took investors to see oil rigs that may or may not have been his. He showed
investors painted pipelines that investors were told were his oil pipelines but were actually water
pipes for agriculture that belonged to someone else.
The political and economic conditions of the time would have enhanced the attractiveness
of an oil based investment scheme. In 1973, there was an oil embargo instituted by the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The Yom Kippur War of 1973 had
triggered the OPEC countries to reject selling oil to the United States because it had sided with
Israel.
James Donahue Hedged Investments Associates and Broker Services 1980s
Donahue began his investment firm, Hedged Investments, in the late 1970s. He invested
in stock options and experienced massive losses. He falsely informed his investors that there
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were profits. Investors were allowed to withdraw from their accounts assuming that there were
actual profits earned. The funds were actually the contributions of new investors. His intentional
fraud scheme began in 1984 and continued until it collapsed in 1990. Donahue was an
unregistered investment adviser and a broker dealer. Donahue’s scheme took in $316 million.
This scheme would be classified as a false-brokerage, in that he was not properly registered with
the SEC but still carried out the practices of an investment adviser. (SEC). This scheme was
going on during the savings and loan crisis. At the time investors were taking their funds from
savings accounts and putting the funds into higher interest money market funds. It is not known
if Donahue marketed his financial entity as a money market account. Money market accounts
were the newest, trendiest investment tool of the time, everyone wanted in one.
Peggy D. Stines 1980s
Peggy Stines began a Ponzi scheme in 1981 that continued until 1984. This scheme was
based on the extraction of silver from photograph processing. Stines had no actual silver
extraction business entity; her fraudulent scheme was intentional. She took advantage of more
than a thousand victims, taking in more than $17 million. Peggy Stines received a sentence of 99
years, the highest sentence of any female involved in a Ponzi scheme, she was approximately 44
years old when sentenced. Her husband was also involved but he received a lesser sentence.
Peggy was released after serving ten years of her 99-year sentence, her husband Donald served
only four years. Peggy was the primary; her husband was charged with tax evasion and
contempt for refusing to divulge where the money had been secreted. (SEC 1982-1984). Stines
scheme was perpetrated using the technology of the times. The scheme was not related to the
economic current of the time period.
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A Note on the 1990s
Prior to the 1990s, the stock market crash of 1987: Black Monday, occurred on October
19, 1987. The crash lasted only a few months and was preceded by a bull market throughout
1987. There was a period featuring inflation, a high rate of growth, corporate mergers and
insider trading; insider trading manipulated the market. A panic among institutional investment
managers caused a mass sell-off of securities. The Federal Reserve responded by making funds
available to banks. In response, the largest banks doubled their lending to securities investment
institutions. This set a precedent for future financial crises. The 1987 crash was short-lived and
the Ponzi schemes in existence, at the time, did not collapse but instead all continued to function
well into the 1990s, some did not fail until the financial crisis of 2007.
The Ponzi schemes in the 1990s were frequently technology based frauds. This was an
era before cell phones were common place; there were many schemes that revolved around pay
phones. The Department of Justice ended the AT&T monopoly in the 1980s. In the early 1990s
mobile phones were in the beginning of use, and there were very large car phones. The era of
non-phone company ownership of pay phones was short-lived but while it existed there were
several Ponzi schemes based in pay phones. In these schemes, investors thought they were
investing in ownership of pay phones and that they would receive a percentage of the revenues
paid into the phones by users. Similar to most Ponzi schemes, there was no actual purchase of
pay phones; the funds were only used for Ponzi payments to other investors. As cell phones
became quite common in the 21st century, pay phones became obsolete. As technology changes
the methods of the Ponzi schemes adapt.
The 1990s ushered in the dot-com era and the great hype before Y2K. A few successful
dot-coms of the 1990s were: Google began in 1996; Amazon began in 1994; eBay began in
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1995. But there were many startups and many failures, some were legitimate business ventures
some were scams. Many of the emerging technologies were overvalued; eventually the stock
values declined leading to the tech-wreck. Y2K was the concern that at midnight in the year
2000, there would be massive technological failures because of computer programming qualities.
The world changed from the twentieth century to the twenty-first century with a snore; the
worries were unfounded.
Patrick Bennett 1990s
Prior to Bernard Madoff's scheme, Patrick Bennett's scheme was the biggest in history.
His scheme took place from 1990-1996 in the Syracuse region of New York. He is on record for
taking $570 million in his leasing scheme. Patrick Bennett was sentenced to 30 years. The
Bennett family ran a legitimate business for many decades. This scheme is classified as an
intentional scheme; the family business was doing well. Bennett had taken over certain aspects
of the family business and did not let his parents know what he was doing. The basis for his
scheme was business equipment leasing. He told investors they were buying office equipment
and then receiving a portion of the interest in the leasing of the equipment. However, he had
several investors pay for the same piece of equipment, meaning each piece was purchased
several times over and the interest paid to the investors were Ponzi payments.
There was a recession in the early 1990s that lasted until March of 1991. The 1990s
were the beginning of the technology boom, that fostered a healthy economy for most of the
1990 decade. Patrick Bennett was sentenced to thirty years, his brother Michael received a
twenty-two-year sentence.
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Allen Stanford 2009
Robert Allen Stanford (herein: Stanford), began his many businesses on the Island of
Montserrat in 1985 in the British West Indies, and then moved to Antigua in 1990, establishing
the Stanford International Bank Ltd., known as “SIBL.” Establishing his businesses offshore
enabled Stanford to avoid many American banking laws that would have brought him to the
attention of United States authorities sooner.
Stanford had at least 130 business entities, some may have been legitimate businesses.
The primary business was the sale of securities of the Stanford International Bank Ltd. (SIBL),
his international bank. Investors bought securities or certificates of deposit that were to be
investments in the bank. The interest paid on these securities and certificates of deposit issued
for SIBL were Ponzi payments paid to early investors from the funds received from later
investors. Stanford’s scheme was intentional; however, he continues to appeal his case, believing
he did nothing wrong and that his bank and other businesses would have survived had authorities
not closed his businesses.
Stanford had registered with the SEC as an investment adviser in 1995. (Kotz 2014). At
the time, Allen Stanford was sentenced in 2012, he had at least twenty-nine accounts in other
countries. Authorities had tried to reclaim the money from these accounts in other countries.
(DOJ P.R. June 14, 2012). His scheme included banks in Venezuela and Ecuador, many people
in these countries also lost money through placing their funds in his banks. In Antigua, he had
his own newspaper so that he could control the press coverage of his activities. He had also
owned a cricket team and made sure there was press coverage of his largess.
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SEC employee Julie Preuitt knew than Stanford was running a Ponzi scheme as early as
1997. Preuitt tried to convince her superiors of this in 1997, 1998, 2002 and 2004, yet each time
the case was turned down for a formal investigation. Stanford used the proof of multiple
informal examinations by the SEC with no finding of fault as proof that he was legitimate. (Kotz,
2014).
David Kotz was the SEC’s Inspector General at this time. He investigated the SEC
failures in both the Madoff and Stanford cases. In Kotz's Inspector's General report on the
failure of the Fort Worth SEC office to investigate Stanford, it was determined that a former
head of enforcement, Spencer Barasch, rejected the Stanford case for formal investigation
multiple times. After he left the SEC Barasch tried to work for Stanford on several occasions.
Barasch settled criminal and civil charges that he inappropriately represented Stanford, with the
Department of Justice accepting a fine of $50,000.
Kotz found that the Fort Worth SEC office prioritized the quantity of prosecuted cases
over quality, meaning the Stanford case would be very time intensive to bring to action, taking
away man-power from bringing a greater quantity of action in the time it would take to bring
down Stanford. Stanford’s scheme was offshore and multinational and he at least three business
entities in the U.S., these types of schemes are very manpower intensive to investigate.
On June 19, 2009, Stanford, Laura Pendergast-Holt, Gilbert Lopez, Mark Kuhrt and
Leroy King were federally indicted on charges related to the Ponzi scheme. Pendergast-Holt was
convicted and sentenced to three years. Gilbert Lopez and Mark Kuhrt were each sentenced to
twenty years in federal prison. James Davis was Stanford's college friend and business partner;
he aided authorities in the investigation and was sentenced to five years. (DOJ, 2015). As of
April 17, 2017, the Eastern Caribbean Supreme of Antigua and Barbuda ruled in favor of
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extraditing Leroy King, an Antigua citizen, to the United States to face criminal charges.
(Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, ANUHCV 2012/0220). King was the chief financial
regulator for Antigua and Barbuda, whose actions enabled Stanford’s scheme. Stanford’s scheme
is intentional, his business entities and their many practices were knowingly fraudulent.
FBI had an ongoing case involving Stanford. It was thought that Stanford's banks were
being used for money laundering operations for other illegal enterprises. Stanford had businesses
and branches of his bank on several Caribbean islands as well as in Venezuela. For a time, the
SEC deferred to the FBI because of these other money laundering investigations. Once the
Madoff scheme came to be public knowledge the SEC decided they needed to bring Stanford to
civil action.
Scott Rothstein 2005-2009
Scott Rothstein’s $1.2 billion scheme is documented as having taken place from 20052009. (FBI 2010). His scheme was operated out of his Florida law firm: Rothstein, Rosenfeldt
and Adler. His scheme was based in promissory notes on non-existent loans, which were alleged
to support business financing. His scheme made use of false on-line accounts that his victims
could access, completely updated with false information. (FBI June 2010). Twenty-two
individuals were sentenced in Rothstein’s scheme, the majority of whom were attorneys in his
law firm. His firm did practice law, but in the end, the law firm failed because of the Ponzi
scheme. This scheme took place during the boom economy of the mid-2000 decade. Rothstein’s
scheme was in financing business enterprises. This scheme is significant not just for the amount
of money taken but in the fact that this was a law firm and so many of those convicted were
attorneys. Rothstein was convicted of racketeering, money laundering, mail and wire fraud. This
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scheme was intentional; it was not a Ponzi scheme out of failed business but in addition to a
successful law practice.
Two sources report that Rothstein is in the inmate witness protection program in an
undisclosed federal facility. (McMahon, 2016; Malkus,2013). Rothstein does not appear in the
Bureau of Prison inmate locater. Allegedly, his cooperation with authorities somehow earned
being in witness protection. Both sources report that he had interactions with organized crime.
However, after Rothstein’s plea agreement he and his wife hid assets, a violation of his plea
agreement. His wife Kemberly was sentenced for hiding assets.
Bernard Madoff 1990-2008
At this writing, the Madoff case is the scheme of all schemes. There are at least four
movies and seven books written on Bernard Madoff, his scheme, and family members, as of June
2017. His scheme began in the early 1990s, to the best knowledge court records could
document. Madoff had gone to law school but never finished; his brother Peter was an attorney,
and is now disbarred. The Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, (BLMIS), was set up as an
Investment Adviser, that also managed client’s investments. Specifically, they told investors that
they would be investing their funds in securities; this was never done, however. The original
amount taken was stated in federal documents as $65 billion with about 8,000 victims. At this
writing, the final amount taken is still variable, as is the known quantity of victims. Through
claw backs and disgorgement, the funds have been reclaimed and distributed to the victims, the
process is ongoing, therefore a reliable final count on the amount taken and number of victims is
not available.
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Madoff’s business entity was a registered broker-dealer; Bernard Madoff was the primary
agent. The entity was formed in 2001, but he had been practicing as an investment adviser for
many years prior. Madoff himself had passed the series 63-uniform securities agent exam
(1997); the series 55- limited representative equity trader, (2000); and the series 1- registered
representative exam (1960). For coding purposes, the business entity is a broker-dealer
registered with the SEC, Madoff is a registered broker.
Madoff is Jewish; his victims were primarily Jewish; his scheme is considered an affinity
fraud. The business entity never actually invested the client’s funds. In his sentencing
memorandum, he explained that he was not good at trading initially and he thought that he would
eventually make up for losses with good trades that never materialized; his was a Brokeragefailure scheme. It was not intentionally planned as a Ponzi scheme, it was originally intended as
an investment firm. It failed as a result of the financial crisis and was exposed; it did not begin
during the financial crisis.
Madoff’s scheme became known in December 2008, through his own admission. His
scheme was one of many that was exposed during the financial crisis. Madoff could no longer
bring in enough clients to satisfy the guaranteed returns of all of his investors, now victims. It
was Bernard Madoff’s massive fraud that brought this type of fraud to the forefront of public
attention.
Government Response and Regulatory History
The purpose of financial laws, congressional Acts, and regulatory agencies is to protect
the financial markets, to keep the American economy stable and to prevent crimes. Economist
Hyman Minsky theorizes that the nation’s financial instability and the government regulations
influence economic fluctuations. This study examines Ponzi schemes reflecting on how
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government actions in the form of Acts and regulations have evolved with economic trends. The
financial crisis, sometimes called the Great Recession, herein will be called the Financial Crisis.
In response to the Great Depression, (1929-1939), laws were enacted, agencies created
and regulations were put into place to control financial markets. The laissez-faire government
oversight during the boom economy in the “Roaring twenties” was seen as a cause of the
depression. Congress responded with legislation to prevent economic catastrophes caused by
unfettered financial markets from happening again. This is the basis for economist Minsky’s
theory of financial instability. (Minsky 1992).
There were market panics and a few mild recessions throughout the decades since GlassSteagall and the Security Acts of 1933. For the most part, the economy was relatively stable
until the Glass-Steagall Act was repealed by the Financial Modernization Act of 1999.
Presidents Reagan and Clinton both favored libertarian economic principles that held
government should not interfere with financial markets. This philosophy paved the way for the
enactment of the financial Modernization Act of 1999. Even before Glass-Steagall and the
Securities Acts of 1933, there were Congressional Acts and a Supreme Court decision attempting
to prevent and control fraud and other financial crimes. The following is a chronological
description of regulatory Acts, and how they relate to current Ponzi schemes and economic
trends.

•

The Mail Fraud Act of 1872
The first legislation to be passed in reaction to fraud was the Federal Mail Fraud Act of
1872. The laissez-faire economics practices of the United States in the nineteenth century
enabled a wide variety of frauds. The postal service enabled frauds to take place from a
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distance. To stem the tide of increasing frauds perpetrated through the postal service,
Congress established the Mail Fraud Act of 1872, making it a federal offense to commit
fraud through the United State Postal Service. The United States Postal Service
Investigative Agents (USPS), are the second longest established federal investigative unit,
to that of the United States Federal Marshals. The United States Postal Service is
involved in most investigations because they perpetrators often use the mail to carry out
their frauds; in some cases, the USPS is the agency that first identifies the fraud.

•

Taxing Illegal Gains
In 1927, the Supreme Court ruled that earnings from boot legging and other criminal
activities had to be reported and that the perpetrators were required to pay taxes on
illegally gained funds. This opened the door for prosecutions and enabled federal
authorities to prosecute based on tax evasion, when they could not prove other criminal
activity. If individuals were legally earning money, they would have documentation to
prove the funds were legally obtained. Today, many fraud perpetrators are caught
through fraudulent tax documents. At times, it is the Internal Revenue Service, (IRS) that
identifies the fraud scheme; the IRS is involved in many investigations.

•

The Banking Act of 1933, also known as the Glass-Steagall Act
The Banking Act of 1933 more commonly known as Glass-Steagall, was established in
response to the 1929 stock market crash. It was thought that one of the primary reasons
for the crash was risky financial transactions between commercial banks and speculating
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in the stock market.11 Hence, the intent of this act was a legal block between commercial
banks and investment banks. This prevented investment banks from using commercial
depositor’s funds for investments. Thus, if the financial institution made a bad investment
and lost money, the average bank client did not lose their funds. This, and the
empowering of the Federal Reserve Bank ended the era of laissez-faire economics in
America.

•

Securities Act of 1933
This Act primarily had two purposes: To require that potential investors receive
information about securities being offered for public sale and to enact laws that prevent
fraud and deception in securities investing. Most Ponzi perpetrators are charged under
one or more of sections in the Securities Act.

•

Securities Exchange Act of 1934
This Act established the Securities and Exchange Commission enabling this federal
agency to monitor, regulate and take legal actions in securities markets. This was
amended in 1964.

•

The Commodities and Futures Exchange Act of 1936
This Act authorized the Commodities Futures Exchange Commission, allowing it to
develop regulations, and to regulate commodities and futures markets. Those perpetrators

Banking Act of 1933, Public law 73-66 73rd Congress 1933: “To provide for the safer and more effective use of
the assets of banks, to regulate interbank control, to prevent the undue diversion of funds into speculative operations,
and for other purposes.”
11
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using foreign currency or commodities are charged with violations under this Act.

•

The Investment Company Act of 1940
This Act defined and classified investment companies and it determined reporting and
auditing requirements for investment companies. Those entities that fit the definition of
an investment company are required to register with the SEC. These entities must
maintain a portion of their assets for investors who want to take their funds. This means
a certain percentage must be held in cash so that investors can take their principal as they
request. This Act also requires that investment companies disclose their investing
policies and practices to their investors. In short, this means they cannot say they are
investing in one thing while they are really investing in a riskier venture. The one
shortcoming of this Act is that 3 (c) (1) allowed that entities with under 100 investors
were not required to register; this allowed hedge-funds to avoid registering and
monitoring to some degree. This loophole was closed in 2005.

•

Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950
This Act insured that member depository institutions depositor’s funds would be
protected. Should a bank fail, the customer’s deposits in the bank would be guaranteed by
the United States Government through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC). This Act was to prevent the runs on banks that occurred during the Great
Depression when people wanted to get their money out before the financial institution
became insolvent. During the Great Depression, fully functioning financial institutions
collapsed because their customers panicked and pulled out their funds en masse; even a
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solvent bank could go under, since its loan portfolio could not be liquidated fast enough
to pay all the depositors demanding their money.

•

Fraud by Wire, Radio or Television: The Wire Fraud Act of 1952
With electricity, phones, radios and televisions commonly available by the 1950s, frauds
committed using phone lines, television and radio became a problem. Congress
responded with the Wire Fraud Act of 1952. Together with the Mail Fraud Act, the
majority of charges filed against Ponzi perpetrators fall under these two Acts. The
technology developed with time, the frauds adapted to the technology, then Congress
developed laws to combat the frauds. Crimes using the internet fall under the jurisdiction
of the Wire Fraud Act. Ponzi perpetrators all use phones, and now, usually the internet as
well, allowing the majority of perpetrators to be charged under the Wire Fraud Act.

•

Community Reinvestment Act of 1977
The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 was established to encourage banks to
support loans in low-income and moderate-income neighborhoods. Before this Act, it
was very difficult for lower income families to get mortgages. The Federal National
Mortgage Association, more commonly known as Fanny Mae, was established in 1938 to
help supply affordable home-loans. The Federal Home Mortgage Corporation, more
commonly known as Freddie Mac, was established in 1970 for the same purpose. Both
buy loans on the secondary markets, but the primary difference in the two entities is that
Fannie Mae buys loans from commercial bankers and Freddie Mac buys loans from
smaller banks. Today, they are both shareholder owned, functioning under congressional
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charters, meaning government sponsored entities, owned by stock holders. The Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission report concluded that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
mortgages endured losses just as the entire mortgage market did, but their mortgages did
not default as severely as the rest of the mortgage markets. (FCIC, 2011, p. xxvi). The
FCIC determined that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were followers in the losses, not the
leaders of the losses: not a contributing cause to the financial crisis. Regardless, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac were put into conservatorship by Congress in September of 2008.

•

Federal Deposit Insurance Improvement Act of 1991
In the 1980s The United States experienced the savings and loan crisis. Money markets
had appeared as an investment product in the late 1970s. When money-market funds
became available, people removed their money from savings accounts and put the funds
in money market accounts where they could earn higher interest rates. The interest rates
on savings and loans were regulated by the federal government, but money market
interest rates were unregulated; people earned greater interest in money market accounts.
The interest rates being paid were high and the underlying assets were tied to loans with
low interest rates; the thrifts did not have the cash flow available to supply the demand of
those removing their funds from the savings accounts. This was one contributing cause of
many savings and loans collapses in the 1980s.
The federal government intervened in these bank failures with bail-outs; this is
when the term “too big to fail” was first used. (FCIC 2011, p. 37). This Act was designed
to limit the use of taxpayer funds to rescue financial institutions. The economic principle
of moral hazard suggests that when one entity knows that another entity will take
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responsibility for their financial mistakes, the original entity is not punished for its
failure, but instead rewarded. If financial institutions make bad decisions and the federal
government bails them out, it only encourages financial institutions to make bad financial
decisions. Pontell also refers to this as “gambling resurrection” meaning the savings and
loans knew the federal government would bail them out if they failed, so they took on
risky investments in the hope of success. (Pontell 2005).

•

Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999
This Act was enacted in 1999 and is also referred to as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act for
its authors. It repealed the Glass-Steagall Act, allowing financial institutions to integrate
functions. The most significant aspect of this Act is that it allowed financial holding
companies to be established within financial institutions. This enabled large financial
institution to spread their risk over several subsidiaries. It opened the door for investing
in the subprime-mortgage derivatives that were the primary cause of the financial
collapse. More simply, it allowed investment banks and commercial-retail banks to merge
their practices.

•

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is also known as the Public Company Accounting
Reform and Investor Protection Act in the Senate, and the Corporate and Auditing
Accountability and Responsibility Act in the House of Representatives. It was enacted in
reaction primarily to the illegal actions of Enron, and Arthur Andersen accounting failure
of the Enron audits. Enron and WorldCom filed for bankruptcy in 2001 and 2002. In
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both cases, the companies used improper accounting to cover up losses; that amounted to
billions of dollars. The Congress reacted to Enron, WorldCom and Arthur Anderson’s
failure with Sarbanes-Oxley to require integrity in public corporations and accounting
practices.

•

Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006
Prior to the financial crisis, Congress had established the Credit Rating Reform Act. This
Act required the SEC to establish guidelines for the ratings agencies so that their ratings
have validity. The problem with the ratings agencies is that it is the companies they rate
who pay a fee to be rated, to the ratings agencies; a conflict of interest. The ratings
agencies failed to give honest ratings prior to the financial collapse, contributing to a
false sense of security among investors. With the 2006 Act, ratings agencies are required
to report on marketing practices, to disclose rating methodologies and honest disclosure
of performance statistics. More simply they are required to provide credible reports and
to be forthright about the relationship with the companies they rate. This was enacted
prior to the financial crisis, yet ratings agencies still failed to provide credible ratings of
mortgage backed securities.

•

Fraud Enforcement Recovery Act of 2009
This Act was in response to the many frauds, specifically mortgage frauds, and the major
Ponzi schemes that had taken place. The Bernard Madoff and Allan Stanford schemes
took in billions from victims, leaving the impression that regulations were ineffective and
the federal agencies were not fulfilling their responsibilities. This Act provided federal
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agencies with more legal tools and funding for staffing to aggressively investigate
financial crimes. This Act made it a federal crime to over-value real estate property. It
redefined the term “financial institution” to include mortgage businesses.

•

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Act also known as: The Financial
Stability Act of 2010
This Act echoes Minsky’s theory of financial instability in its name. This Act is in
response to the financial collapse after a boom economy, resulting in government
intervention. This Act ushered in a new era of a wide range of regulations affecting all
aspects of financial markets and banking industries. The Act itself is 2,300 pages,
containing 400 complex financial industry rules in response to the financial crisis. To
note just a few:
•

There are greater reporting requirements of asset-backed securities. Securitizers are
required to perform due diligence and provide a report to investors.

•

The Act establishes the Financial Stability Oversight Council, which has the
responsibility of accountability within the financial industry and to identify threats to
financial industries.

•

The Volcker rule restricts banks and holding companies from certain activities related
to proprietary funds, hedge funds and covered funds and equity funds. Banking
holding companies cannot participate in proprietary trading, and cannot own or be in
partnership with hedge funds. Limits on proprietary trading means that bank holding
companies cannot be the principal of a company that trades in securities, derivatives
or commodities.
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•

Ratings agencies are required to submit reports to the SEC, including the
methodologies and data that are used to determine ratings. Each agency must have
internal controls and a separation between marketing and ratings functions. These
agencies must have board members who are independent, two of which must be users
of ratings agencies ratings. The members should not only come from the companies
being rated.
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Financial Crises and Legislation Timeline Table 1
Financial Event

Year
Legislation
1872
Mail Fraud Act of 1872
Panic of 1907
1906-1907
Post-World War I
1918-1919
Great Depression
1929-1939
1929
Uniform Sale of Securities Act
1933
Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933
1933
Securities Act of 1933
1934
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
1936
Commodities Exchange Act
1938
Maloney Act
1939
Trust Indenture Act of 1939
1940
Investment Company Act
Post-World War II
1945
1950
Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950
1952
Wire Fraud Act
Post Korean War
1953-1954
1956
Uniform Securities Act
Recession
1960-1961
1964
Amendments to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act
Recession
1969-1970
1970
Securities Investor Protection Act
OPEC oil embargo
1973-1975
1974
Commodities Futures Exchange Act
1977
Community Reinvestment Act
Iranian Oil Embargo
1980-1982
1983
Insider Trading Sanctions Act
1990
Market Reform Act
Savings and Loan Crisis 1990-1991
1991
Federal Deposit Improvement Act
1999
Financial Services Reform/Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
Tech-wreck/Y2K
2000-2002
2002
Sarbanes-Oxley Act
2006
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act
Financial Crisis
2007-2010
2009
Fraud Enforcement Recovery Act
2010
Dodd-Frank Act
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Legal and Financial Regulatory Framework
Defining what a Ponzi scheme is and who is a registered broker or adviser comes down to
statutory law. The relevant federal laws are listed in Appendix D. These laws determine who is
required to be registered and not registered among federal and state agencies and they are very
clear. For legitimate trading and money managing businesses there are strict reporting
requirements. The confidence scams that feign legitimate businesses are not investing anyone’s
money, rendering them impossible to monitor by regulatory agencies, as they would with
registered brokerages. Any person carrying out financial investing actions with other people’s
money and managing more than one hundred million dollars in funds must be registered with the
SEC or the CFTC. Each state has its own specific requirements regarding registration with the
SEC. Some states, such as New York, require those entities, or persons, managing above
twenty-five million dollars in funds to register with the SEC; each state has its own numeric
value requiring registration with the SEC. In many Ponzi schemes the perpetrators were not
registered. This information is stated in SEC and CFTC documents.12 Registration will
determine which of the entities, determined by federal law enforcement to be Ponzi schemes, had
been legitimately functioning investments businesses. The United States Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 states:
Section 3(a) (4) (A) of the Act generally defines a "broker" broadly as
“any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account
of others.”
All “financial planners, money managers and investment consultants are regulated as
‘investment advisers’ in the Unites States under the U.S. Investment Advisers Act of
1940.” As such, they are required to register with the SEC. (SEC).
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines the Broker-dealer:

12

This information is standard in all SEC and CFTC complaints; citing them all would be impossible.
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Section 3(a) (4) (A) of the Act generally defines a "broker" broadly as
“any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account
of others.” (SEC).
The Ponzi schemes that are the primary focus in this study are those that had been
legitimately registered financial investment entities. The civil and criminal legal action
documents, (listed below), within the SEC, CFTC and FBI data bases indicate whether or not the
entities have been properly registered, at any point in the duration of the business entity. The
SEC, CFTC and FINRA websites allow for searching for information on legitimate, registered
entities within their websites. This is instituted for investors, as well as those who manage
other’s investments to perform due-diligence. The information within agency documents
indicates when the entity became a Ponzi scheme, as well as when federal agents ended the
scheme. This is determined by the investigations by federal regulatory and investigative actions.
The SEC, CFTC and FBI designate a scam “Ponzi” through the investigative process. The
investigative process by the SEC and CFTC refers to an action (complaint, indictment) in a case
that has been brought before the respective Commissioners, who then determine that the case
warrants an official, formal investigation. Many of these cases are turned over to the FBI or the
United States Attorney for criminal action. Other cases are initiated administratively by the SEC
and CFTC. Some cases start out with the FBI. This study accepts the presumption of innocence,
understanding that the cases documented in federal agency files are those where enough
evidence was found to determine violations of the law. There were a great many other cases that
are not public record because they did not become formal investigations; there was not adequate
evidence for the SEC, CFTC or the DOJ to commence a formal investigation.
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Legal Framework
This section explains the laws and regulatory violations that determine what the crimes are
in Ponzi schemes. These laws and violations have evolved with the frauds and economic
conditions over the decades. These laws and regulations are a response by Congress or the Supreme
Court to some negative economic condition, thereby supporting Minsky’s theory of financial
instability.
The Ponzi Presumption
This “general rule” states that when a Ponzi scheme exists, intent to defraud is implied.
(Bazoian-Phelps & Rhodes, 2012, § 2.03). This is used in clawbacks and disgorgement when
going after receivers of illegal gains in Ponzi schemes. Would-be investors supply their principal
investment to the would-be fraud perpetrator. The investors are entitled to their original principal
However, their interest payments received are actually the principal of later investors, thereby
illegal gains. This is also applied to commissions of brokers and investment advisers. If they
received commissions on fraudulent investment transactions, their commissions are the fruits of
ill-gotten gains. Any attempt to legalize ill-gotten gains can fall under the money laundering law
The Civil Process
The civil process allows a plaintiff to bring an action against a defendant for monetary
damages, when the defendant has failed to carry out a legal obligation. In Ponzi cases the
primary of a company has a legal obligation to be honest with investors concerning the
investment risks. Further, these primaries have a responsibility to invest their clients’ money in a
manner consistent with stated investment goals. Finally, there is a legal obligation of the
principal to report their credentials, or lack thereof.
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The federal civil process generally enforces only when federal regulation is involved; this
applies to jurisdiction. Further, most Ponzi cases are multi-state, thus, federal jurisdiction also
would apply. The civil process generally begins with a complaint served on a defendant,
presumably the primary agent in a business, brokerage or corporation generally brought by the
SEC or CFTC. This complaint alleges the facts, violations and financial damages and equitable
relief sought. In some cases, this complaint will state that a jury trial is requested. The burden of
proof is much less in civil proceedings. The plaintiff has the burden of proving the case by a
“preponderance of the evidence.” Generally, this means finding in favor of which party presents
the stronger evidence. Civil proceeding records are coded as: “cv” in court documents.
The SEC’s Role in the Ponzi Scheme Investigation
The SEC commissioners are comprised of five Presidential appointees with staggered
terms. No more than three of these can be of the same political party. The SEC’s mandate:
“The SEC was established in 1934 as a reaction to the Great Depression, it is mandated to:
•
•
•

interpret federal securities laws;
issue new rules and amend existing rules;
oversee the inspection of securities firms, brokers, investment advisers, and ratings
agencies;
• oversee private regulatory organizations in the securities, accounting, and auditing
fields;
• Coordinate U. S. securities regulation with federal, state, and foreign authorities.”
(SEC website)
The Investigative Process
The SEC process for investigation of any suspected fraud generally starts with an
investor complaint, market surveillance, an SEC inspection or a whistleblower. In the past,
anonymous information has not been regarded with credulity. When a complaint is received,
there is to be a search performed through the Name Relationship Search Index (NRSI) system to
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determine if there are any other ongoing examinations or investigations of the subject. In the
Madoff case, the NRSI search did not take place. This would have informed all staff of any
ongoing inquiries in any division, (different divisions had different ongoing inquiries into
Madoff’s operations at the time). In a competent investigation, examiners would ascertain the
validity of comments and documents from an entity under inquiry, such as determining if stated
trades actually took place; this was not done in the Madoff case.
The SEC staff receives a complaint and then opens a Matter Under Inquiry (MUI). This is
an initial examination to determine if there is evidence to recommend the matter to the SEC’s
Enforcement Division. The secondary investigation determines if there is evidence to send the
matter on to the Commission, which determines whether there are grounds to open a Formal
Investigation. Commission meetings, where decisions to open formal investigations are
discussed, are not open to the public, nor are there publicly available records of the proceedings.
The criteria for determining if a MUI is worthy of being referred for an investigation
recommendation is located in the SEC Enforcement Manual: “Whether the matter involves:
particularly egregious or extensive misconduct, potentially widespread harm to investors; if it
involves a person of authority; a large number of victims or particularly vulnerable victims.” (P.
4 section 2.1.1). The Enforcement Manual discusses how Regional Directors have flexibility,
creativity and the ability to prioritize their resources. It goes on to give criteria for determining
how best to allocate personnel resources. The manual specifically designates the number of
attorneys that are to be assigned to significant cases, but it does not mention fraud investigators,
forensic accounting experts, or investment specialists. (P. 5, sec: 2.1.1). The Enforcement
Manual was produced after the congressional hearings, the IG and Government Accountability
Office (GAO) reports, as well as after the independent Boston Consulting Group (BCG) report.
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Section 2.3.1 of The Enforcement Manual discusses the MUIs and what the criteria are
for recommending a matter for formal or further investigation. The designation is open to the
discretion of SEC investigative personnel, but cover such considerations as: if an SEC regulation
is in violation, the scope of possible victims, if the issue can be investigated within the statute of
limitations, the monetary amount, and is the issue something best referred to another agency or a
state authority. Once an MUI has been opened, senior SEC regional officials receive weekly
reports on the progress of the inquiry. If the matter has not been closed before sixty days, it then
becomes an investigation. An MUI is submitted to the Associate Director of the Enforcement
division who is obligated to make a determination to submit an issue to the Commission, for a
formal investigation determination, within two days of receiving the MUI. Only the vote of the
Commission determines a formal investigation will take place.
The matter will then go through the Wells process, whereby the suspected entity has the
opportunity to explain their actions. The Wells process informs the individual being investigated
that a preliminary investigation is being submitted to the Commission, what securities laws are
thought to have been violated, and that the individual has the right to communicate with the
Commission. In some cases, if the Commission receives information where there is evidence of
serious wrongdoing, the Commissioners can issue cease and desist or other equitable relief,
within the same day, to prevent further loss to victims. The Commission then rejects or refers a
MUI to the Law Enforcement Division for a formal investigation. Once the Law Enforcement
Division is involved the matter generally results in further criminal legal action by working with
the Department of Justice. All criminal investigations are handled by the FBI. However, the
SEC, CFTC administrative judges can institute civil monetary penalties and sanctions.
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Commodities Futures Trading Commission Investigations
The CFTC carries out the investigative process in the same way as the SEC. In the
CFTC, the different divisions determine that a Commodities Exchange Act violation has taken
place or that other relevant federal laws have been violated. The CFTC personnel then must
recommend administrative action to the Commission. Once the commission has determined civil
action is in order the matter goes before an administrative law judge. If the Commission
determines that criminal action has taken place the case is referred to the Department of Justice.
Administrative Law Judges
Administrative law judges preside over civil proceedings in securities and commodities
cases. These judges are selected internally through SEC and CFTC personnel processes.13
These federal level law judges hold public hearings in federal courts.14 These hearings include
the hearing of evidence, determining the facts and rendering legal conclusions. When defendants
do not appear, the judge may order a default judgment against them. Administrative law judges
can require disgorgement and set civil penalties and issue sanctions against the defendants.
This process has been challenged recently in federal court. David F. Bandimere received
a sanction in a Ponzi scheme case in Denver, Colorado. He appealed the sanction based on
Article II of the Constitution, the Appointment Clause. In a recent 10th Circuit United States
Court of appeals case, Bandimere v. SEC, Bandimere questioned whether administrative law
judges are inferior Officers of the court or are Officers, as it pertains to Article II, section 2,
clause 2, of the Constitution (the Appointment Clause). Under the Constitution federal judges

Administrative law judges are appointed pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act Public law 404-79th
Congress, section 11, authority granted in sections 7 and 8.
14
Some proceedings are held in U.S. District Courts, others are held in federal offices.
13
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are to be appointed by the President, but the administrative judges are selected through internal
processes within the SEC and CFTC. The issue at hand is that the actions of these judges are
more than administrative they are judgments, including imposing sanctions and penalties, both of
which suggest some indication of guilt. (Adler, 2016).
Many Consent orders in administrative cases, use the phrase: “neither admitting nor
denying guilt.” In short, the Bandimere v. SEC case brings into question the Constitutionality of
Administrative Law Judges (ALJ) and their decisions, and whether their decisions are a violation
of the Appointment Clause because they have not been appointed by the President:
U.S. Constitution Article II § 2 clause 2 states in part: “[The President] shall appoint
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme court and all
other officers of the United States….”
Civil Actions: Complaints, Injunctions and Disgorgement
Civil actions listed below are carried out by the SEC and the CFTC. These are
differentiated from civil suits filed by investor-victims who have lost money and sue the
perpetrators.
•

Complaint: The complaint is the initial pleading beginning a civil action. These
documents allege who did what, when they did it, where they did it, generally how they
did it and specific details about the defendants, what laws are violated. There is usually a
“prayer for relief” called a “demand”, this is requesting the court for relief against the
defendants.

•

Injunctions: Injunctions are orders by the court requiring that a defendant cease some
activity, such as taking funds, paying out funds, moving funds or investing. An injunction
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may be temporary or permanent. A “Cease and desist order” requires that an individual
or an entity stop whatever they are doing that is considered a violation. This may also
include a restraining order.
•

Disgorgement: This action causes those involved in a Ponzi scheme to give back the
illegally obtained funds. Generally, this refers to cases where there were no criminal
charges. In criminal cases, the term “restitution” is used. In both cases the court orders
the illegally obtained funds to be returned to the victims. The sanctions that are levied by
an administrative law judge generally include disgorgement, and a penalty, usually
barring an individual from participating in securities or commodity related activities for a
length of time or permanently.

Currently, the power of the SEC to require disgorgement is under consideration by the
Supreme Court. (Kokesh v. SEC). The argument is that the SEC is not authorized to require
disgorgement, under current legislation, with no time limit. The problem is, if there is a fiveyear time limit, then a case such as Madoff or Stanford that went on for much longer than five
years, would not be required to give back illegally obtained funds prior to the five years. This
would force the SEC and CFTC to find Ponzi schemes sooner in order to return funds
appropriately under the law. The Court ordered that disgorgement is a penalty as described
under 28 U.S.C. §2462 (Appendix E.), must be commenced “within five years of the date the
claim accrued.” (Kokesh v. SEC, pg. 11).
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The Criminal Process
The criminal process begins with an investigation that may be by the FBI or another
federal agency with law enforcement capacity. The Department of Justice’s United States
Attorneys determine if the case should go before a Grand Jury. Related criminal case documents
are designated as: “cr” in court documents.
Grand Jury
The Grand Jury process is enabled by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. The
Grand Jury is held in private; the proceedings are not open to the public nor are the transcripts. If
the jury determines that there is evidence of laws being violated, they vote to indict. In a grand
jury proceeding the evidence is presented by the prosecutor. The process is very one sided
against the defendant. The jury may ask questions and ask for evidence. The purpose is to
determine if there has been a crime committed and if there is evidence to go forward with a trial.
In grand juries, the deliberations are transcribed but not a matter of public record, the
proceedings are not open to the public.
Indictment
The indictment is a legal action, the written accusation, that specifies what laws the
individual is charged with violating. This is an affidavit that is sworn to under oath. This applies
to felonies. Generally, Grand Jury indictments are submitted to a magistrate judge, designated
as: “mj” in court documents. These documents are sealed, until the defendant is arrested.
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Informational Report or the Criminal Complaint
An “Information” is also known as an “informational” or a “bill of information.” An
informational is a “formal criminal charge made by a prosecutor without a grand jury
indictment.” (Black’s law, Garner, 2009). This is a list of the charges signed by the accuser,
usually an investigator with the FBI or DOJ. The prosecution may convince a judge that there is
probable cause to go forward with a case. In this process, the defendant can agree to plead
guilty and waive their right to a grand jury and formal trial in exchange for a lesser sentence.
Many cases are processed through this method.
Federal Judges
Federal judges are nominated by the President and are confirmed by the Senate with
lifetime federal judgeships. As stated above, the federal judges are authorized by United States
Constitution Article II § 2 clause 2. This Article gives authority to the President to appoint
Supreme Court judges, District Court judges, the Court of Appeals, and Bankruptcy Appellate
panel judges. The latter two courts consist of three judge panels who hear Appeals and make
decisions whether the law was correctly applied. Article III of the U.S. Constitution establishes
the authority of the courts.
The ongoing case of Claud Rick Koerber exemplifies the criminal judge’s discretion in
the due process equation. On January 21, 2016, Claud Koerber’s case was dismissed with
prejudice. It was dismissed because of the length of time it took to bring to trial, under the
speedy trial clause of the Constitution. The judge had also determined that many of the delays
had been caused by Koerber himself. It was dismissed with prejudice because of the seriousness
of the offenses with which he was charged. Koerber’s associate, Gabriel Joseph, was sentenced
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to seventy-eight months. On January 18, 2017, in a judgment on appeal, a ruling by the appellate
court overruled the trial judge and ordered the reinstatement of the charges against Koerber.
Koerber’s scheme was a real-estate based fraud that had taken place between 2004 and 2008
during the housing bubble.
Guilty Plea
The majority of federal cases, 95%, are pleaded out. (U.S.S.C. 2015). When a defendant
pleads guilty, many of the facts that would have come out in a trial are not presented. In these
proceedings, a more through explanation is generally provided in the presentence report. When
there is a plea agreement, the defendant agrees not to appeal. There is generally an agreed upon
sentence that is less than would be given in a guilty verdict in a criminal trial. Plea agreements
are not always matter of public record.
Plea Bargain
More often than not the perpetrators admit their guilt, pleading guilty to the crimes of
which they are accused. This process allows for the judge to reduce the length of time in
sentencing for saving the court the time and cost of a jury trial. In many cases the coconspirators plea bargained in return for their testimony against the primary defendant. These
offenders are considered cooperators. In such cases the agreement between the cooperator and
the Department of Justice is never filed or made public. While the court docket indicates a plea
agreement was made the details are never made public for the safety of the cooperator. In other
cases, the primary pleaded guilty. Madoff pleaded guilty saving the courts a jury trial (USDC,
SDNY, 09-cr-213 DC). In other cases, the primary pleaded guilty in the hope of a lesser
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sentence. Generally, these pleas include a clause whereby the defendant will not appeal the
sentence
Appeals
In the appeals process, those convicted or found liable in civil cases can appeal the
conviction or decision in a civil case. An appeal asks a higher court to reverse a lower court’s
decision, based on the reversible error of the lower court proceeding. Some cases go to jury trial
on criminal charges. Allen Stanford had a jury trial. Stanford then lost an appeal as of
November 29, 2015; the court upheld his 110-year sentence.
Restitution
Restitution is the monetary remedy intending to recover and restore the illegally obtained
funds to the rightful owner in criminal cases. This is stated in the sentencing. There is generally
a court appointed Trustee/Receiver who has the responsibility of determining who the victims
are, how much each victim lost, what was their principal investment, and the amount of interest
payments. Often times the money is gone and the perpetrator is bankrupt. Sometimes the
perpetrators or their family try to hide money or property. Ponzi perpetrator Scott Rothstein’s
wife Kimberly attempted to hide jewelry he had given her. Kimberly Rothstein pleaded guilty to
conspiracy to commit money laundering and obstruction of justice.
Sentencing
The legal actions may be civil, criminal or both; most cases received both civil sanctions
and criminal charges or convictions. In a criminal action, the convicted receives a prison
sentence, or probation, or home detention. There are federal sentencing guidelines, which are
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advisory, not mandatory. The judge takes into consideration the level of the offense and the
perpetrators previous history.
When the perpetrators only receive civil penalties, the sanctions are generally
disgorgement and being banned from brokering, advising or investing. In a few cases, when a
perpetrator does not comply with an ordered civil remedy such as disgorgement, the perpetrator
will be jailed for non-compliance, as in the case of Ronald Holt (CFTC PR 4975-04, 2004).
Mesa Arizona Ponzi scheme operator, Ronald Stephen Holt, was held in civil contempt for
refusing to reveal the location of victim’s funds. Holt was sentenced to federal prison until he
revealed where three million dollars went and he “Dismisses Frivolous Lawsuits He Filed.”
(CFTC PR 4975-04, 2004).
In a few cases the perpetrators did not live to be sentenced or committed suicide. If the
perpetrators die while under investigation, their life insurance policies are subject to being
confiscated in order to pay back investors. (SEC v. ISC & Holzhueter, 2015). The perpetrators
are older; more than half of all perpetrators are older than 50 years of age and 475 were 60 years
or older at sentencing. Three perpetrators are documented as having succumbed to cancer
shortly after being sentenced, or imprisoned. Two individuals had strokes. There were 13 deaths
that documents did not designate a cause but may have been suicides or natural deaths.
Federal Sentencing Guidelines
The Federal sentencing guidelines were developed as a result of the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984 (SRA). The purpose of this Act is to provide a base for similar sentencing when
there are similar circumstances in crimes, in order to eliminate unfairness in sentencing that
might be based on race, geographic regions or socioeconomic factors. (DOJ 2006). In short, the
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SRA was enacted to ensure consistency and fairness in sentencing of federal crimes, specifically
to ensure that in white-collar crimes, perpetrators of color would receive the same sentence that
White offenders would receive for equal crimes.

United States v. Booker
This 2005 Supreme Court case impacted federal sentencing practices. This ruling by the
Supreme Court established that the SRA can only be an advisory in sentencing practices. The
data in table 8 (page 204), shows a difference between sentencing prior to 2007 and after 2007.
Table 8 indicates that the average sentence for all Ponzi schemes is 64 months. Table 9 indicates
that after 2007 the average sentence is 37 months. Prior to 2007 the average sentence is 69
months as indicated in Table 10. The reason for this is a change in sentencing practices as a
result of the U.S. v. Booker ruling. According to the DOJ 2006 fact sheet on US v. Booker:
“Judges overwhelmingly use their authority under Booker to impose sentences below the range
suggested by the guidelines.” Within a year’s time since the Booker decision, the DOJ found
that “more than 8,100 defendants were sentenced to lower terms than the sentencing guidelines”
recommended. (DOJ, 2006). The change in federal sentencing standards is presumed to be the
cause of reduced sentence ranges from 2006 on, this is demonstrated in the lesser sentences as
demonstrated in Table 10.
In Jillian Hewitt’s research on sentencing in white-collar crime cases, she found
sentencing differences between the time periods prior to and post Booker federal criminal case
sentences. (Hewitt, 2016). Her results show that the severity of sentencing can be attributed how
cooperative defendants are may reflect on the severity of the sentences. Hewitt also suggests that
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there may be disparities in post Booker sentencing in geographic areas where judges see more
white-collar criminal cases, such as the Southern District of New York, compared to other
geographic cases where there would be fewer white-collar cases. (Hewitt 2016, p.1066). Hewitt
explains that there are many reasons that may influence the length of sentences: the amount of
money taken, the number of defendants in a case and geographic region. It is Hewitt’s opinion
that geographic areas with fewer cases may impose higher sentences.
Cases with extreme sentences may be designed to send a deterrent message, as well as to
punish the offender. A 2008 Colorado case, involving Norman Schmidt of Capital Holdings, is
an example of extreme sentencing. (US v. Schmidt 2008). Schmidt, convicted of taking $40
million in a Ponzi scheme, received a sentence of 310 years. In 2009, Bernard Madoff pleaded
guilty to taking $65 billion in client’s assets and was sentenced to 150 years. Clearly
cooperation and a plea did not earn Madoff a reduced sentence. In both cases the sentences are
quite extreme, considering both sentences are longer than a life time. Madoff was a high-profile
case; Schmidt was not a high-profile case.
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Chapter 3: Background on Ponzi Schemes
The Nature of Ponzi Schemes
The term “Ponzi” came to be used as a specific type of fraud perpetrated by Charles
Ponzi in 1920. Prior to that event this type of fraud fell under the general category of a
“swindle” or “confidence game.” Kathy Bazoian-Phelps and Honorable Steven Rhodes (2012),
provide a concise list of characteristics that law enforcement and regulatory agencies use before
they name a fraud as a Ponzi scheme:
1. Deposits were made by investors.
2. The Debtor conducted little or no legitimate business operations as represented to
investors.
3. The purported business operations of the Debtor produced little or no profits or earnings.
4. The source of payments to investors was from cash infused by new investors.
(Bazoian-Phelps and Rhodes § 2.03[1][b] p. 2-8)

The primary action that determines that a fraudulent scheme is a Ponzi is that the funds of
later investors are used to pay off earlier investors. Without this action, a fraud is not a Ponzi
scheme. Not all frauds labeled as Ponzi schemes in the common media were designated as Ponzi
schemes by federal agencies. Only those cases that were determined by federal authorities to be
Ponzi schemes are used in this study.
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Some cases were falsely labeled as Ponzi schemes in the general media. These were
frauds where the perpetrators simply stole the money of their victims, not investing it or paying
other victim-investors but instead spending the funds on what is usually an extravagant lifestyle.
These were instances where there was taking of funds without Ponzi payments. These cases are
theft by deception, not Ponzi schemes. For this reason, media designations of Ponzi schemes
were not used in this study.
The perpetrators make guarantees of consistent profits as well as promise high returns
such as 100% or even more as in the case of Zufelt, Nelson, Decker et al, whom offered as much
as 220% in three separate schemes they were operating together. (SEC L.R. 21570 Zufelt,
2011). Nicholas Roblee promised some victims 70% per month and others 200% per month.
(USDOJ, 2005, Roblee). Scott Walker and Scott Simpson of Zappa International Corporation
“guaranteed returns exceeding 200% per month.” (SEC L.R.15984 Zappa). No investment can
be guaranteed to bring a profit, nor can anyone guarantee a specific amount of profits. Madoff
never showed a loss throughout the entirety of his scheme; that is impossible. Legitimate
investment businesses have losses.
Exclusiveness is a very common quality among Ponzi schemes. In part, the Ponzi
perpetrators choose who they will allow into their schemes. It might seem the primary criteria
would be financial worth; in many cases that is likely to be a prerequisite for victimization. In
actuality, the exclusiveness allows the very perceptive perpetrator to weed out anyone too
sophisticated, who might ask too many questions or who might be able to discern when they are
being lied to or receiving falsified financial statements. It is thought that Madoff was very
exclusive, in reality he was simply being careful not to bring anyone on who was too financially
savvy, or who would not trust him.
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Social relations are often times the bases for perpetrating the frauds. In many schemes, it
is the family members and friends who are the first victim-investors. Perpetrators nurture close
relations with victims. They dine together, attend weddings and worship in the same
congregations. This reinforces the feeling that the perpetrator can be trusted. When there is a
social bond between the perpetrator and the victims, the victims feel even more violated when
the perpetrator is exposed.
The Ponzi perpetrators commingle the funds of all of the investors rather than keeping
separate accounts. In the securities laws, these are referred to as “pooled investment vehicles.”
(17 CFR 275.206(4)-8). There are regulations governing pooled funds for securities or
commodities pools and funds. Each agency has requirements and exemptions based on specific
criteria, as to whether or not the pools or funds are required to be registered with the SEC or
CFTC. In many cases the Ponzi perpetrators were charged with running a pool without being
registered. Often times they have commingled all investor-victim’s funds into one account
without the appropriate registration and accounting records. This is called “commingling of
funds.”
In many cases the perpetrator had several business entities, Wayne Puff had 82 business
entities and Val Southwick had as many as 150 business entities. This enables the perpetrator to
move funds from business to business, as well as to have several schemes going on at once.
These entities can be extraordinarily convoluted, with one entity providing funds to the other.
Melbye, Coughlin and Harrison of Provident Royalties had 23 business entities, this was also
two separate Ponzi schemes with Joseph Blimline. (SEC v. Provident Royalties). Edward P.
May of E-M Management had 150 limited liability corporations (LLC), in his Ponzi scheme that
took $350,000,000 from his victims. (FBI 2011, Mays).
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This section has provided a basic overview and description of the white-collar crime
known as Ponzi schemes. The following section will discuss specific types of schemes that are
the basis of this study.
Distinguishing Typological Categories of Ponzi Schemes
Ponzi schemes have not been formally defined or differentiated in academic literature.
This is the first academic study to define and quantify Ponzi schemes by types and variations.
This schema of typing Ponzi schemes was originally presented by the author at the Northeast
Business, Economic and Association conference (2012), the New York State Political Science
Association (2012), and the Northeast Conference on Public Administration (2013). Defining
types of Ponzi schemes will provide greater understanding for legislators, support regulatory
enforcement and will aid in law enforcement and investigations. Many Ponzi schemes are made
up of several of these designations. For example, Madoff's scheme was an affinity fraud that
also involved hedge funds and feeder funds. Madoff's investment firm became a Broker-failure
firm early on because he simply was not very good at trading stocks. There are two primary
types of Ponzi schemes: those that were intentionally initiated and known to be fraudulent intentional frauds, and those that became Ponzi schemes through investment failure herein
known as accidental frauds. The following are the five-secondary level of variations of Ponzi
schemes.
Figure 1 illustrates the sub-categories that fall under intentional or accidental schemes.
The third category shows those types of entities that may fall under either intentional schemes or
accidental. As an example, a hedge or feeder fund may be a legitimate brokerage entity that
believes it is investing in a larger legitimate entity, when the larger entity is actually a Ponzi
scheme that the hedge or feeder fund may or may not have known was illegitimate. There are
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schemes that were quite intentional that do not fall under sub-categories of affinity fraud,
cybercurrency or False-brokerages that are classified in the diagram as “other.” These schemes
were intentional confidence schemes from the on-set and are coded in the data as “intentional.”
Figure 1 Intentional Versus Accidental Types of Schemes

Accidental

Intentional

BrokerageFailure

Affinity Fraud
False-Brokerages

BusinessFailure

Cybercurrency
Other

Either-Or
Hedge funds
Feeder funds

Intentional Ponzi Schemes
It was generally assumed by academics and mainstream media that all Ponzi schemes
were quite intentional, designed to be Ponzi schemes from the very beginning. It is suggested in
this study that up until the financial crisis from 2007-2010, the focus time period, that this type
of Ponzi scheme was indeed what most refer to when they say: “Ponzi scheme.” This type of
scheme is quite strategic. The perpetrators tend to be intelligent and well spoken. They must
convince victim-investors of the legitimacy of their business entity. The SEC definition of Ponzi
Schemes:
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A Ponzi scheme is an investment fraud that involves the payment of purported returns to
existing investors from funds contributed by new investors. Ponzi scheme organizers
often solicit new investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities claimed to
generate high returns with little or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the fraudsters focus
on attracting new money to make promised payments to earlier-stage investors and to use
for personal expenses, instead of engaging in any legitimate investment activity. (SEC)

The primary activity that identifies a Ponzi scheme is the action of using the funds
acquired from later investors to pay interest to earlier investors. This is differentiated from
pyramid schemes where a participant pays money for a product or service, who then receive their
profits from bringing in new participants who then also sell the service or product. Chain letters
are an example of illegitimate pyramid schemes. There are legitimate pyramid-type businesses
built on the practice of adding layers of sales people; these are referred to as multi-level
marketing entities. Legitimate pyramid style businesses would be those that sell cosmetics or
home goods, frequently in show cased parties. In legitimate multi-level-marketing entities there
are actual products manufactured and sold within layers of sales personnel.
Intentional Ponzi schemes make use of any manner of other types of fraud, including
feigning to be someone else who owns a legitimate business; telemarketing; internet fraud; false
promissory notes; false bank notes; document fraud; pump and dumps; the list is only limited by
the creative thinking of the perpetrators. With most intentional Ponzi schemes, investigators
may find a Ponzi scheme through investigating some other aspect of the fraud taking place, such
as tax evasion or mail fraud. Ponzi schemes can be either multidimensional or uni-linear.
Multidimensional schemes include multiple business entities for shuffling funds, often times
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including offshore entities. Uni-linear schemes have one investment-Ponzi scheme, generally
with few perpetrators and generally only one business entity. The methods of operation of Ponzi
perpetrators are endless, each one more creative than the other. These entities often times have
several businesses, making it difficult for authorities to find all the money and perpetrators.
In the intentional-scheme, the primary perpetrator may or may not have legal standing
with the SEC or CFTC, or state regulatory agencies. The data sets, compiled for this research
show the actual number of perpetrators, and whether or not the primary was registered with
federal regulatory agencies. Differentiating between accidental fraud and intentional fraud is
determined by SEC and CFTC documents indicating that the business was legitimately registered
with federal agencies, and indication in federal documents of whether or not the business was
functioning as a legitimate business and the indication of failure. Brokerage-failure schemes are
determined by whether or not the business entity is registered with the SEC or CFTC and the
primary perpetrator is a registered broker/dealer or investment adviser. There are different levels
of professional certification that are registered with these agencies such as a broker, certified
investment adviser (Chilton, 2011). This is important to know, because if an entity is not
registered with the SEC, CFTC or the Financial Industry Regulatory Agency (FINRA), or a state
regulatory agency, it can function illegitimately with no means of attracting notice. This means
they may not be in a position to legitimately invest in stocks, commodities, futures or options, for
other people. They can legally invest for themselves but not for others; this is one law Ponzi
perpetrators rarely break: they do not bother to invest their client’s money! There is no means
for these regulatory agencies to have these entities in any kind of monitoring capacity. In the
case of Bernard Madoff, he was in business for more than twenty years, and Chairman of the
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ); the SEC did not
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require him to be registered until 2006, two years before he finally confessed to his fraud.
(Markopolos, 2010).
When the purported stocks, product or service that victims are told they are investing in
does not exist, there is nothing for anyone to follow, monitor or trace. Ponzi perpetrators are
expert at producing falsified documents that look quite legitimate, such as annual reports and
financial statements. If the perpetrator tells investor/victims that what is being invested in is
proprietary, and investors go along with that, as was the case with Madoff, there is no way for
investors or regulatory agencies to ascertain if anything is actually invested or traded. The claim
that investing practices are proprietary, in and of itself, should be a red flag to investors.
Intentional schemes tend to be quite complex and present an image of credibility. They
generally have very convincing made-up financial reports and literature. Investors that do not
know how to perform their own due diligence or to verify claims made within falsified financial
documents, which is most people, are quite vulnerable to these confidence artists.
False-Brokerages
False-brokerages are entities that functioned as investment businesses presenting
themselves as registered entities, but they were not registered with the SEC, CFTC as required.
These entities may have carried out some investing or trading as promised, or they may not have
done any investing whatsoever. In all cases, they presented themselves as legitimate brokers,
traders or investment advisers without being legally registered with the SEC or the CFTC.
These schemes are classified as intentional schemes because they were not functioning as
legitimately registered brokerages. In some cases, the perpetrators did have the appropriate
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series licenses through FINRA and may have registered with the state they lived in or traded in,
but they were not registered with the appropriate federal agencies as required by law.
•

Claudio Aliaga ran a false foreign exchange trading company out of Florida from 2007 to
2010. Aliaga was never registered with the CFTC in any capacity nor was he a licensed
broker, trader or investment adviser. As is common to False-brokerages, Aliaga did
invest a small portion of the funds taken in from investors in foreign exchange markets
(FOREX) trades, but the great majority of the $4.5 million was used for himself or as
Ponzi payments. (CFTC, 2012)

•

Eric Schmickle ran a commodity pool without being registered to do so. He was also not
registered with the CFTC in any way. This scheme made use of a registered futures
commission merchant for trading but Schmickle was not registered to run a commodity
pool. Schmickle did make trades but endured heavy losses. He then resorted to a Ponzi
scheme. Schmickle’s scheme was a classic form of commodities False-brokerages; a
great many were alleged commodity pools that had no formal authority to trade
commodities or to accept investors’ money for investing.

•

Michael Regan ran a securities-based false-brokerage from 1998 until 2008. His business
entity was never registered with the SEC as required, nor had he ever been licensed as a
broker or investment adviser. Regan did invest a small portion of the funds but endured
losses. He used the majority of funds to pay Ponzi payments, as well as using funds to
provide himself with the appearance of being very successful. This was a classicintentional Ponzi scheme, complete with false credentials and falsified profits. (SEC
2009).
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Affinity Fraud
These Ponzi schemes might seem more egregious than others because the primary preys
on people he or she has some affiliation with. This is a relationship that is built on trust or builds
trust to perpetrate the fraud. The perpetrator either belongs to a self-identifying group or finds
his or her way into a group. Among these groups, we see people victimized by: national
heritage, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or profession. A subset of affinity fraud are those
schemes that featured immigrants who were preyed on by other immigrants of the same
nationality. There have been cases perpetrated within religious groups that the victims refused to
believe they were defrauded; they are preyed on by their deep faith. Affinity Ponzi schemes are
generally intentional Ponzi schemes; they are differentiated by the nature of the relationship
between the perpetrator and the victim. (Perry & Brody, 2012). It is differentiated in the study
because of the social relationship between the victim and the perpetrator. The affiliation
establishes trust, the social bond of trust being the primary mechanism used to carry out the
fraud.
Most Affinity fraud cases were based within religious organizations15. Frauds based on
religious affiliation are known as faith-based frauds. Charles Frasca discussed the use of
religious affiliation to acquire victims for frauds in 1931; the method of using religious affiliation
to acquire victims for fraud is anything but new. (Frasca, 1931).
Affinity fraud perpetrators may have exploited their victims based on multiple qualities
such as faith and ethnicity, or faith-nationality and profession, such as one scheme that preyed on
Filipinos, military and Christians. (SEC v. James Duncan et al, 2008). Nationality is

15

See tables 4.1 and 4.2 for details on faith-based frauds.
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differentiated from ethnicity because the victims self-identified with a specific nation. An
example of nationality-identity is Armenians, who may have come from several countries
originally, but self-identify with being Armenian. Ethnicity refers to African-Americans, AsianAmericans or Hispanics, which are Americans but not self-identifying with a specific nation in
federal documents. Some schemes preyed on Brazilian and people of Portuguese nationalities,
which might be classified as Hispanic, but these victims were identified as being of specific
nationalities. Of the schemes designated as affinity frauds, 84 were faith-based; 41 were
nationality based; 25 were ethnicity based; five were profession based other than athletes, such
as a veteran or member of the military. (See Tables 4.1 and 4.2). Although not classified as
affinity fraud in federal documents, four schemes preyed on professional athletes, two of which
had former professional athletes as the perpetrator.
•

Trevor Cook and Patrick Kiley operated a Ponzi scheme that was intentional and was also
an affinity fraud. The self-defined affiliation was other Christians as victims. In this
scheme, Cook and Kiley did invest some investor funds in commodities, but those
investments were losses not gains for the investors. Some of Cook's employees were
licensed brokers who could legally carry out these actions. The majority of funds
collected were not included in the investments, they were moved around to shell
companies, paid out to earlier investors and used for the perpetrators extravagant
lifestyles. The majority of the scheme involved several shell companies that allowed
Cook, Kiley and their associates to move funds around and providing the appearance of
legitimate entities. This Ponzi scheme was not caused by Broker-failure due to the
financial crisis, it was several mechanisms of fraud with a small portion of legitimate
trading taking place. This scheme is classified as a False-brokerage. (SEC v. Cook).
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Cryptocurrency Ponzi Schemes
Cryptocurrency, cybercurrency, digital-currency, virtual-currency, electronic-currency,
bitcoins, are all names for currencies that do not physically exist as a tangible object. Currently
the top names in cybercurrencies are: Bitcoin, Litecoin, Ethereum, Zcash, Dash, Ripple, and
Monero. (Bajpai, 2017). These internet-based currencies enable a new financial transaction
mechanism making Ponzi schemes possible, solely existing through internet technology.
Currency is defined monetary units minted and recognized by a government for legal tender.
Cybercurrencies are not minted or recognized by any nation as valid for legal tender; they have
no physical existence nor nation backing their value. Bitcoins, a commonly known form of
virtual currency, are also referred to as cryptocurrency, cyber-currency and sometimes digitalcurrency.
The SEC took action on the first case of this kind in July of 2013; the Department of
Justice filed criminal charges in November of 2014 against Trendon Shavers. Shaver’s
company: Bitcoin Savings and Trust, promised investors 7% per month, and was an intentional
Ponzi scheme; there were no investments. Shavers was sentenced to eighteen months in 2016;
his total Ponzi scheme take was less than $800,000, one of the lowest amounts taken in a
federally charged Ponzi scheme.
Bitcoins emerged in 2009, as a reaction to global economies that were in trouble, in
countries where the people were afraid of bank collapses. This is a form of trading
cybercurrency or digital-currency. There is a supplier who offers the cyber-coins at a price with
a limited supply, only on-line, not through a legitimate investment or currency exchange; no
government entity has monitoring capacity. There are easily thousands of buyers waiting; it is an
artificial market that drives bitcoin prices up. The Bitcoins investment opportunities are posted
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on-line. Investors can participate from anywhere in the world, making this a difficult crime to
investigate and to enforce any one nation’s laws.
Cryptocurrencies require no central authority such as a government or central bank to
require a bank account or identification of ownership. For those who want absolute anonymity it
is a preferred currency. Physical money is not stored in a central location, such as a bank or
thrift, that would enable authorities to monitor transactions, enabling perpetrators to avoid
taxation, regulation and law enforcement. The funds cannot be seized if they do not physically
exist, or even exist on paper such as with a stock, certificate of deposit or a bond. (Goodman,
2015).
Several cases have been presented to the courts requiring judges to determine whether or
not bitcoins or cybercurrencies qualify as money under the law. In the earliest case, United
States District Court Judge Jed Rakoff determined that bitcoins are defined as money, setting a
precedent for charging crimes using bitcoins for monetary transactions. (U.S.D.C. 14-cr-00243).
United States District Judge Alison Nathan determined that: “Bitcoins can be accepted as
payment of goods and services or bought directly from an exchange with a bank account.” (U.S.
v. Murgio, 15-cr-00769). In July of 2016, Miami-Dade Judge Teresa Pooler determined that
bitcoins and virtual currency do not fall under the statutory definition of a “payment instrument”
under federal tax law.16 (Florida CC F14-2923). In the most recent case, a state level judge held
that bitcoins are not money by federal definition, whereas two previous federal judges
determined that bitcoins are money. Cybercurrencies must be considered money for charges to

While this case was not a Ponzi scheme, it is interesting to note that the investigating agent’s name is Gregory
Ponzi.
16
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be brought. This is a topic that should go before legislators in order to establish cybercurrencies
as a monetary unit for legal definitions.
The use of cybercurrency is becoming more common as the world market place becomes
more internet-based. The ability to move money around the world electronically without any
government’s ability to monitor it is a perfect breeding ground for Ponzi schemes and other
frauds. Currently, an international Ponzi scheme called MMM for Mavrodi Mondial
Moneybox/Movement,17 is currently plaguing Nigeria. Once this scheme came to light in
Nigeria, it moved on to Ghana as of January, 2017. This scheme, begun in Russia in 1994, was
founded by Sergey Mavrodi. This scheme branched out to Ukraine, India, Thailand, African
countries and Indonesia. MMM has several versions of the scheme, each titled by the year. This
ability to move money around the world through the internet will prove a challenge for
governments to keep up with fraud perpetrators, money launderers and those who evade
prosecution and paying taxes.
Financial markets are digitized, meaning transactions are all computerized and move
from computer to computer, nation to nation, in a fraction of a second. This allows for
sophisticated trading practices that may not be legal. Blockchain is the computerized system
used in cybercurrency transactions. (Vigna and Casey, 2015). This system time stamps all
transactions so that they are carried out chronologically. This system recognizes individual users
accounts and passwords so that bitcoins can be used anywhere in the world for any transaction.
As this system grows worldwide, illegitimately attained funds can be transferred to bitcoins, or

Originally titled: Mavrodi, Mondial, Melnikova after its originators. Now it can be referred to as Moneybox or
Movement in the last part.
17
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originate in bitcoins, the usage of which can be easily accessed anywhere in the world.
Encryption can make tracking these transactions virtually impossible for authorities
This section has described the types of schemes considered to be intentional in nature.
The perpetrators designed the fraud quite by intent. The following section describes those
schemes that are deemed to have occurred out of broker or business failure: accidental frauds.

Accidental Frauds
Accidental frauds are a type of fraud whereby a primary or partnership is running a
business or brokerage successfully, who then experiences some financial difficulty causing them
to resort to fraud as a means of survival. (Kranacher, Riley, Wells, 2011). Accidental frauds are
those schemes where an entity began as a legitimate business, with the intent of running a lawful
business. At some point the business or brokerage failed, and the primaries turned to a Ponzi
scheme in an effort to keep their business afloat. They believed they would eventually make a
profit and pay their investors back. How “accidental” the fraud is will always be debatable. The
business owners know they are breaking the law, lying to investors and falsifying documents.
Brokerage-failures and Business-failures are sub-groups under the heading of accidental frauds,
however, the primary type of scheme that is the focus of this study is the Brokerage-failure
scheme in an effort to determine if there was an increase in this specific type of scheme during
the financial crisis of 2007-2010.
Brokerage-failure Ponzi Schemes
This type of scheme is of the primary focus of this study. It is thought that this type of
Ponzi scheme evolved out of legitimate brokerage, investment pools, or hedge funds that began
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to fail with the financial crisis. The primary makes the choice to “borrow” funds from new
investors to satisfy the promised investment profits to earlier investors. It is theorized that as the
financial crisis grew, many legitimate brokerages evolved into Ponzi schemes in a last effort to
survive. It is thought they believed they would make a good trade and return the funds without
anyone knowing of the losses. But the losses kept coming during the financial crisis, and once
legitimate businesses then became Ponzi schemes. This is compared to other variations of Ponzi
schemes that were conceived of as scams, the perpetrators intended to break the law.
The difference is the Brokerage-failure type of Ponzi scheme did not begin as other Ponzi
schemes, with the intent to defraud from the inception and onset of the business entity.
Brokerage-failure schemes differ from intentional- schemes that tend to be quite complex and
present an image of credibility. The Brokerage-failure Ponzi schemes began as legitimate
businesses with the intent of making profits for clients, not scamming them. The perpetrators did
not knowingly set out to strategically defraud victims, at the beginning.
These once legitimate brokerage entities were working within the law and staying afloat
prior to the financial decline. Unlike the intentional types of Ponzi schemes, these perpetrators
would have been registered with the SEC, CFTC, FINRA and state agencies, as licensed traders,
brokers, hedge funds or financial advisers. These legitimizing credentials are required by law at
designated financial levels, and a matter of public record with the SEC, CFTC, FINRA and state
regulatory agencies. The perpetrators believed that they could recoup their losses with good
trades so they then borrowed from later investors to provide earnings for earlier investors.
Many of these legitimate brokerages may have been heavily invested in the homemortgage market. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC), has determined the homemortgage/sub-prime scandal was the primary cause of the financial crisis. (FCIC 2011). This
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would have caused their investments to fail with the declining economy. They would not have
been able to remove their investments soon enough to prevent losses.
The laws determining who is required to be registered and not registered among federal
and state agencies are clear. There are reporting requirements for legitimate trading and money
managing businesses. The shortfall is the confidence scams that feign legitimate businesses
aren’t investing anyone’s money, rendering them impossible to monitor by regulatory agencies,
as they would with registered brokerages. Any individual carrying out financial investing
actions with other people’s money must be registered with the SEC or the CFTC and-or state
regulatory agencies depending on the financial level. In many Ponzi schemes the perpetrators
were not registered. This information is documented in SEC and CFTC documents. This
determines which of the entities determined by federal law enforcement to be Ponzi schemes
were legitimately functioning investment businesses.
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 states:
Section 3(a) (4) (A) of the Act generally defines a "broker" broadly as
“any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account
of others.”
All “financial planners, money managers and investment consultants are regulated as
‘investment advisers’ in the Unites States under the United States Investment Advisers
Act of 1940.” As such, they are required to register with the SEC. (SEC).

The Ponzi schemes that are the primary interest in this study are those that were
legitimately registered with the SEC or CFTC brokerages or investment advisers. The legal
action documents within the SEC, CFTC and FBI data bases indicate whether or not the entities
have been properly registered. The documents also indicate when the entity became a Ponzi
scheme, as well as when federal authorities ended the scheme. This is determined by the
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investigations of federal regulatory and criminal investigative actions. The SEC, CFTC and FBI
designate a fraud “Ponzi” through the investigative process. The investigative process in the
SEC and CFTC refers to a case that has been brought before the Commissioners and they have
determined that the case warrants an official, formal investigation. Many of these cases are
referred to the FBI or United States Attorney for criminal action. Some are initially handled
administratively. Others are initiated with the FBI, Internal Revenue Service(IRS), Secret
Service, or United States Postal Inspectors (USPSI). This study accepts the presumption of
innocence, understanding that the cases documented in federal agency files are those that enough
evidence was found to determine violation of the law, administratively and-or criminally. There
were a great many other cases that are not public record because they did not become formal
investigations. There was not adequate evidence to take the issue to a formal investigation; the
amount of these cases is not known, nor are these cases a matter of public record. Examples of
Brokerage-failure:
•

A classic example of a Brokerage-failure scheme is Carlin King of Hanover Stevens.
King began Hanover Stevens in 2002 as retail foreign exchange brokerage in Atlanta
Georgia. His costs of doing business had become more than his profits. Also, investors
began to pull their funds out. Without enough principal to make investments he could not
make enough in profits to maintain the business. To meet his business expenses, in 2006
he began a Ponzi scheme. When new clients were not found, the scheme collapsed; this is
the pattern of most schemes. In 2007. King was sentenced to three years in prison. (FBI
p.r. July, 17, 2009).

•

Angelo Alleca is also a classic example of a Brokerage-failure. Alleca was a registered
investment adviser. Alleca began his investment fund in 2004. By 2006 he started
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seeing losses and opened more funds to cover up the losses. He thought he could make
profitable investments to repay other investors but as the financial crisis peaked, he could
not recoup the losses. (SEC,1:12-cv-3261, 2012).
Business-Failures
This classification covers Ponzi schemes developed out of legitimate businesses that
failed. In Business-failure schemes the perpetrator made an attempt at running a legitimate
business; there were actual purchases of properties, or business activities that were other than
financial market enterprises. These businesses functioned profitably at some point prior to
turning into a Ponzi scheme. Most of these schemes took place during the bubble and financial
crisis. Many were based in real estate and mortgages. Examples of Business-failure schemes:
•

Jonathan Papa owned several restaurants. He asked investors to invest in Papa
Holdings, his business entity, in support of his restaurants. His restaurants failed,
turning the investment into a Ponzi scheme. This scheme took place from 1995 until
1999. Papa offered unregistered stocks of his four restaurants. It was originally a
legitimate, functioning business that failed, turning it into a fraudulent scheme. (SEC
v. Jonathan Curtis Papa, l.r. 19928, 2006)

•

Brent Newbold had a company that sold environmentally-safe cleaning products to
retail businesses such as Walmart and Ace Hardware. His business owed more than it
was bringing in and turned to a Ponzi scheme, eventually filing for bankruptcy. This
scheme took place from at least 2008, through 2010. (DOJ p.r.2:14-cr-223-MCE,
2016).
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•

Michael Morawski, and his partner John Constant, had a business in apartments and
multi-family dwellings in several states. There were properties purchased but these
properties did not bring in the promised revenues, therefore Morawski and Constant
could not pay the interest and resorted to a Ponzi scheme. In this case, there were
actual properties purchased; in many schemes, the perpetrators only said they
purchased properties. (FBI 2011 p.r. Morawski).

•

Michael James Turnock had a business that paid insurance premiums for businesses.
Investors contributed funds that were to be used to pay the insurance premiums for
businesses. These businesses then paid Turnock the fees for the premiums, with the
interest. The interest was to be paid to the investors. After two years, this business
was not making a profit so Turnock resorted to Ponzi payments. This scheme took
place between 1996 and 2012. (DOJ 2013, p.r. Turnock)

The following sub-categories may have been functioning legitimately, falling in the
accidental fraud category or they may have been the bases for, or part of, an intentional scheme.
Feeder Funds
Ponzi schemes frequently attract other investment entities such as hedge funds in the
securities market, and pools in the futures and options market. The nature of these financial
entities is quite complex, they can easily out maneuver regulators trying to monitor their
activities. These are funds that have their own clientele. Frequently they are hedge funds.
Those included in the data set were charged either civilly through the SEC and/or criminally
through the Department of Justice separately from the main Ponzi scheme. It is unlikely that the
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clients know where their funds are being invested. In some cases, the primary business owner in
some feeder funds were not charged civilly or criminally because they did not know that they
were investing in was a Ponzi scheme. The following are examples of feeder funds:

•

Nikolai Battoo lost his investor’s money by investing in feeder funds to Madoff. Battoo
was the manager of or senior adviser for several hedge funds. This means hedge funds
worked with him to make their portfolio investments. Battoo had to have a good
performance record and must have been considered a sophisticated investment manager
to achieve that status. One of his clients was a major international bank, (but un-named);
this bank terminated his services in 2008. This was a big client. At the same time Battoo
was heavily invested with Madoff. As the financial crisis increased his hedge funds
diminished. A sophisticated investor, such as Battoo, had a fiscal responsibility to know
that Madoff was operating a Ponzi scheme. It may be that Battoo hedged his bets and
thought these investments would somehow improve. Regardless, with the admission of
Bernard Madoff and the decline of the stock market, Battoo’s empire crumbled. (SEC,
12-cv-7125, 2012).

•

Another classic feeder fund case is David McQueen et al. In this case, the perpetrators
were insurance salesmen who became involved in Jim Clements’ scheme, without
knowing it was a Ponzi scheme, originally. Clements’ scheme told investors they were
investing in foreign currencies. (SEC l.r. 21910, 2011). Clements’ scheme used certain
investors as account managers who then recruited other investors. McQueen was one
such account manager who went on to form a second Ponzi scheme feeding into
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Clements’ scheme. McQueen was making 10% in Clements’ Ponzi scheme; he then
involved others, promising them 5-6%, meaning he was making 4-5% off of those
victim-investors he brought in to his feeder fund. (DOJ p.r. May 9, 2014, McQueen),
(SEC l.r. 21910, March 30, 2011).
Hedge Funds and Commodity Pools
Hedge funds and commodity pools are legal joint investment entities when properly
registered with the SEC or CFTC, as required by law. These funds, or pools, allow for investor’s
funds to be jointly invested in a fund that distributes losses and gains to all fund members
according to their contribution percentage to the fund.
Some feeder funds are legitimate hedge funds. In some cases, they were legitimate
hedge funds that were duped by someone they believed were credible. Some were legitimate
hedge funds that knowingly were involved in fraudulent activities. In other cases, the hedge
fund itself was not a legitimate business entity but presented itself as such. Hedge funds are
particularly vulnerable to the market because they often invest in higher risk investments. Also,
there are new start up hedge funds that begin then do poorly because they cannot bring in or
maintain enough working capital. (Johnson, 2010). If a hedge fund cannot bring in sizable
returns for sophisticated clients, they lose the client. Hedge funds are private investment groups
that require at least 65% of the investors to be accredited. An accredited investor is one who has
at least $1,000,000 in assets and has an income of at least $200,000 per year. Generally, there is
a minimum investment requirement of at least $250,000; the minimum amount varies by fund.
Hedge funds trade in many markets including stocks, bonds and commodities. These funds
move billions of dollars in and out of investments very quickly and can dramatically influence
trading volume.
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When there was no legal responsibility for hedge funds to register with the SEC, there
was no reason for the SEC to monitor their activities, making them the perfect partner in Ponzi
schemes. As of December 2, 2004, hedge fund managers are now required to register with the
SEC as investment advisers. (Downes & Goodman 2010). The previous lack of regulation
allowed some entities to legally thrive without the knowledge of the SEC.
Madoff’s scheme had many feeder-funds that were contributing to the greater pool of
Madoff’s fraudulent investment arm. After Madoff’s conviction, some of the managers of these
feeder funds were also convicted of participating in securities fraud, many of whom received
prison sentences. Some funds were victims. It is not known how many feeder funds were
considered victims and how many were accomplices.
Some hedge funds that have been caught up in larger Ponzi schemes claim they did not
know the entity they were investing in was fraudulent. However, anyone involved in the
financial industry understands that guaranteed profits, especially guaranteed high profits, are a
sign of something illegitimate. Anyone running a hedge fund, has a fiduciary responsibility to
carry out due diligence and to recognize a fraudulent investment scheme. There is also a legal
expectation of performing due diligence for those who are registered brokers, dealers or advisers.
No one can guarantee a profit in investing and surely no legitimate entity can promise or deliver
consistent high-profit returns on an investment. In other words, they know something
illegitimate is in play but they claim innocence while their profits continued. No feeder fund,
hedge fund, or investor files a complaint with the SEC or CFTC while they are receiving
consistent profits from an entity they have invested with; they only cry foul when they lose
money.
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In the commodities markets, there are commodity pools: “A cooperative effort in which
funds contributed by a number of people are combined in order to trade commodity futures or
options contracts.” (Etzel, 2003). Commodity pools function in the same manner as hedge
funds, in that participants share in the profits and losses of the investments made by a pool
operator. Commodity pools differ from a hedge fund in that they do not require investors to be
accredited. Commodity pools are regulated under the Commodities Exchange Act 7 U.S.C. §1A,
5, definition:

Commodity pool operator
The term "commodity pool operator" means any person engaged in
a business that is of the nature of an investment trust,
syndicate, or similar form of enterprise, and who, in connection
therewith, solicits, accepts, or receives from others, funds,
securities, or property, either directly or through capital
contributions, the sale of stock or other forms of securities, or
otherwise, for the purpose of trading in any commodity for future
delivery on or subject to the rules of any contract market or
derivatives transaction execution facility, except that the term
does not include such persons not within the intent of the
definition of the term as the Commission may specify by rule,
regulation, or order. (CFTC, CEA)

Commodity pools are regulated by the CFTC. In both cases, pools and funds are
collected funds of several investors used to invest as a whole. With each case, it is a matter of
determining whether or not the primary was registered with the SEC or CFTC as a legitimate
investment business according to the law. As with securities fraud cases, in many cases the
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primary only states that the entity is registered, providing very convincing falsified documents,
when the entity is not registered.
•

Such a case is Michael Gale and the Capital Management Group. Gale ran a Commodity
pool and did indeed invest in commodities under accounts in his wife's name. However,
he was not registered with the CFTC; not being properly registered is a violation. When
he experienced losses, he began a Ponzi scheme. (CFTC v. Michael Gale, 1:12-cv01932). This qualifies as a false-brokerage scheme. Gale was sentenced to 2 years in
prison.

•

Chetan Kapur began his first hedge fund: Think Strategy, as an investment adviser, in
2002. After one year, he established a second hedge fund: Capital Fund. Kapur
established a third fund to contribute to the first two hedge funds in 2004: Multi-Strategy
Fund. His companies were a feeder fund to two other Ponzi schemes. (SEC v. Chetan
Kapur, 2011). He contributed to the Ponzi schemes: Valhalla, run by Arthur Nadel and
Bayou Superfund run by Samuel Israel III. (SEC L.R. 22588). Kapur had a
responsibility to register his hedge funds with the SEC and to perform due diligence on
the entities he was investing in.

The Mechanics of Ponzi Schemes
This chapter discusses the mechanics of the Ponzi schemes; the tools, manners and means
by which the perpetrators carry out the frauds. This first section explains the basic tools used to
carry out the frauds. The second section will discuss the manner and means of the schemes:
what the perpetrators told their victims they were investing in. Some tools, such as fraudulent
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documents, were used in all Ponzi schemes, whereas offshore accounts and aliases were used in
only some schemes.
The Tools Used to Perpetrate the Schemes
Aliases
In many cases the perpetrators used aliases. In some cases, such as Gerald Leo Rogers,
and Scott Klion, there were several aliases.
•

Scott Klion also operated under the names of David Tanner and James Tucker,
conducting three separate Ponzi schemes, with three sets of co-conspirators and three sets
of victims. Two of the schemes were going on at the same time, the third had taken place
six years earlier. (SEC 5:06-cv-04107-RDR-KGS, 2006).

•

In the New Century Coal Ponzi three of ten perpetrators used aliases. These perpetrators
started one scheme, then when it could no longer bring in investor-victims, the scheme
collapsed. They then changed their names and established new schemes. (FBI P.R. 2015
Knoxville Division; Rose) (FBI P.R. 2017, Rose).

•

Gerald Leo Rogers also went by the names Jay Rogers, Jay Rodgers, Jay Kellum, Jerald
Rogers Kingston, Gerald Lee Rogers and Roger Charles Gilliam. Rogers had two
previous securities felony convictions, and multiple securities sanctions, before his 20042005 Ponzi scheme, one of which he served a 25-year sentence. Rogers’ started three
companies within months after his release from prison. These companies were
incorporated in Nevada and Wyoming, as well as an offshore entity said to be the parent
company. Both Wyoming and Nevada are known for opaque incorporation laws. Rogers
had established the ground work for this Ponzi scheme while in prison; when he was
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released from his last sentence he had also incorporated within one month in Wyoming.
(SEC v. Premium Income, 2005).
Falsified Credentials
In most of the false-brokerage schemes the perpetrator presented themselves as a broker,
trader or investment adviser. In some cases, they may have taken the appropriate exams through
FINRA, but they were not properly registered to do business as required by the SEC or CFTC.
In many of these cases the perpetrators stated to clients that they were appropriately licensed.
However, the perpetrators had not taken or passed the series licensing exam enabling them to
register and establishing the appropriate credentials for managing clients’ funds. For this reason,
the SEC, FINRA broker-check and the NFA have sites where consumer-investors can go to
check to see if someone they want to do business with is properly registered and licensed. These
agencies also explain in plain, understandable vocabulary what investors can and should expect
from a legitimate investing company. This information is provided in many languages.
A commonality in Ponzi schemes is the representation of the primary or the business
entity as registered with the SEC or CFTC, such as in the case of David L. Ortiz. Ortiz claimed
to be both registered with the SEC and having 30 years’ experience, both of which were false.
(CFTC PR 5992-11 February 28, 2011). False representation of being properly registered with
the SEC or CFTC is quite common in Ponzi schemes. Some perpetrators may have been
registered at some point prior to their scheme but were not registered at the time of the scheme.
There were other individuals in other professions that also represented themselves as
being appropriately licensed for business. Some of these businesses were false banks. Others
stated that they were in mortgage processers and real-estate brokers, but they did not have the
appropriate licensing to carry out the stated business. It is also thought that some perpetrators
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acquired the licensing such as real-estate, insurance agent or broker’s license just to present
themselves as having credentials to perpetrate the fraud.18
Unrealistic Interest Promises
It is customary for Ponzi perpetrators to promise guaranteed interest revenues as well as
high interest rates in most cases far beyond any realistic value. There is generally a promise of
no risk or a failure to truthfully report possible risk. One reason Madoff was successful was
because he promised what was considered a low interest rate of about 1% per month, up to
13.5% annually. This amount was believable to his investors, considered conservative for most
investors. However, the amount was guaranteed, which is not credible. No legitimate broker or
investment adviser can ever guarantee any profits; the market is too unpredictable. A guarantee
of profits is a red flag for investors, as is a guarantee of high rates of interest. Realistically, if a
business entity was capable of generating 1,000% profit or more, it would not need the funds of
investors.
•

John Scott Clark promised investors in writing that they would receive 3,000% in returns,
annually. Clark’s investors were told the investment was low risk, and that an individual
LLC would be established in their names. The scheme revolved around payday loans that
were nonexistent. (SEC v. John Scott Clark, 1:11-cv-00046-DAK).

•

Blake Prater promised his victims 1,000% annually in his internet-based Ponzi scheme.
Prater’s scheme victimized more than 20,000 victims through a series of related websites.

18

See appendix C for broker series licenses.
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Prater was also a recidivist with prior convictions for forgery and fraud. (SEC v. Blake A.
Prater, l.r. 18336, 2003).
•

C. Edmund Burton and Ralph W. Odom promised a return of 2,600% annually, also
promising that there was no risk to the investor’s capital. This was a prime-banking
scheme; investors were told that this was a bank to bank trading entity that supported
humanitarian activities. (SEC v. Advance Local Development Corp. l.r. 17480, 2002).
Fraudulent documents
Fraudulent documents are the rule in Ponzi schemes; all schemes make use of fraudulent

documents. Just as the perpetrators are experts at oral deception, they are skilled at producing
fraudulent documents and literature. The perpetrators may send out financial statements that
appear to be legitimate, individualized to each victim. The practice of falsifying financial
statements is as old as financial statements. Charles Frasca discussed the unscrupulous
accountants that would provide falsified certified financial statements in the 1920’s and 1930s
for stock swindlers. (Frasca 1931, p. 59). Then, as is the case now, victims did not, nor do not
have the ability to recognize fraudulent statements nor to check if the actual reported investments
were made. The Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley Acts now have sections requiring corporate
executives and accounting firms to provide honest accounting and honest financial statements. It
is common place for Ponzi schemes that represent themselves as brokerages to send out monthly
statements with false trading information, as if actual securities investing had taken place.
In more prominent cases, some exhibits used in prosecutions are publicly available. One
such document is that of Bernard Madoff, included in appendix F. The Department of Justice
offers many of the exhibits in these cases, however, to the untrained eye these documents look
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perfectly legitimate. In the Thomas Petters case, the fraudulent documents are quite lengthy.
These documents are invoices to major companies such as Costco and Sam’s Clubs. (DOJ,
exhibit 105, U.S. v. Petters, 2008).19
Offshore Accounts
Offshore accounts are a means for hiding illegitimately acquired funds. Offshore
accounts are often used by money launderers, drug traffickers, arms dealers and other illegally
obtained funding activities. Offshore accounts are a way for anyone who needs to hide funds,
including legitimately attained funds that entities and individuals may want to avoid paying taxes
on, or those who may want to shield from divorce proceedings. Ponzi perpetrator Allen Stanford
held 29 separate offshore accounts. (USDOJ, Stanford 2009). Stanford had incorporations in
Antigua, Texas, in addition to incorporating the Stanford Bank in Venezuela. There are
businesses that have legitimate reasons for offshore accounts, but in general, the purpose of
offshore accounts is to avoid taxes or monitoring; these Ponzi schemes were all intentional.
In some countries, such as the Cayman Islands, there are residents who sit on boards of
companies incorporated within that country, as a profession; they are professional board
members. These individuals may be retained by hundreds of companies as board members
through licensed professional firms. For example, the Cayman Islands government website
informs perspective corporations that there are professional firms licensed for the purpose of
being officers in corporations. (Cayman Islands). These boards may be required to meet at least
once per year, based on the country’s laws, however these board members have little capacity for

See appendix F for examples of fraudulent documents. The Petters documents, and specifically exhibit 105, are
too lengthy to be included in the appendix and can be accessed through DOJ sources.
19
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oversight of a corporation carrying out business outside the Cayman Islands. The only option of
oversight for the professional licensing corporation entity is to resign its service from a
corporation doing business in a foreign country, that is suspected of wrongdoing. The foreign
company, (in this case, an American company), can simply switch to another professional board
of director company. The Cayman Islands website explains that disclosure of board members or
professional agents is prohibited by law, in other words, the identities of owners and board
members is opaque to the general public. These companies are allowed to have as few as one
shareholder, and there are no corporate, property or payroll taxes. As of 2014, the Cayman
Islands has 92,000 companies registered with its Registry of Companies. (Cayman Islands). The
Cayman Islands has a population of 57,268 as of July 2013, (CIA); this is 1.6 corporations per
capita.
Mossack Fonseca is a law firm in Panama that specializes in setting up offshore
incorporations. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists exposed the Panama
Papers in May of 2016, making public thousands of offshore accounts from individuals all over
the world that were set up by Mossack Fonseca. This source enabled law enforcement
authorities to search for missing funds from some Ponzi perpetrators and other white-collar
criminals.
Among the U.S. citizens listed in the Panama Papers who were Ponzi perpetrators was
Martin Frankel. Frankel ran an insurance based fraud that used Catholic based charities around
the world. Another is Robert Miracle, who perpetrated his Ponzi scheme with Mukhtar Kechik
and Fahimi Faisal; the latter two are fugitives. (ICIJ, 2016). Another scheme with 16
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perpetrators took place in Indonesia, defrauding 3,500 victims. The perpetrators are mentioned
because some lived in Washington state where a civil suit took place.20
Several Ponzi schemes within this study were incorporated in other countries, as
illustrated below. Tropikgadget is a Ponzi and pyramid scheme incorporated in both the Madeira
Free trade zone of Portugal and United Arab Emirates, with the primary place of business in
Portugal. However, the Ponzi scheme took place primarily in Massachusetts. This affinity fraud
case has 15 perpetrators who predominantly preyed on other Portuguese and Brazilian
Americans.

20

This case is not in the data set because federal charges were not brought within the United States.
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Table 2 Offshore Incorporations
Country

Number of
Incorporations

Country

Number of
Incorporations

Antigua

1

Mexico

1

Aruba

1

Nauru

1

Bahamas

6

Nevis

10

Belize

2

New Zealand

5

British Virgin Islands

4

Panama

9

Canada

4

Peru

1

Cayman Islands

8

Portugal

2

China/Hong Kong

3

Saint Vincent &
Grenadines

1

Costa Rica

1

Seychelles

1

Denmark

1

Sweden

1

Dominica

1

Switzerland

2

Ecuador

1

Turks & Caicos

6

Great Britain/U. K

1

United Arab Emirates

1

Grenada

4

United States Virgin
Islands

1

Jamaica

1

Venezuela

1

Multiple Business Entities
Many schemes have multiple business identities, often times incorporated in several
states, and at times in other countries. This enables the perpetrators to move funds from one
business to another quite easily. It enables hiding funds and provides the appearance of
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legitimate transactions. Multiple business entities also give the perpetrators more opportunities to
reach potential victim-investors in more locations.
•

Gregory Gray Jr. of Archipel capital and BIM Management, had at least 12 business
entities with variations on the name Archipel Capital. Gray’s methodology:
“When Investor A sought proof of the Late Stage Fund LP ' s ownership of Uber shares,
Gray sent Investor A's business manager a fabricated stock transfer agreement that bore a
cut-and-pasted signature from a prior legitimate purchase of stock by another Archipel
Entity. The purported seller of these Uber shares, “Seller A, never owned or signed any
documents related to a sale of Uber shares.” (SEC v. Gray, 2015).

•

Ariel Quiros and William Stenger, mentioned in the EB-5 immigration schemes, had 15
different business entities: hotels, ski resorts, medical research facilities and construction
companies, all business entities were included in the civil charges. (SEC v. Ariel Quiros,
2016).
Career Fraudsters and Recidivists
A few perpetrators were recidivists; some are repeat Ponzi perpetrators; the others were

recidivists of other types of securities fraud. The following are examples of recidivist cases:
•

One of the more famous repeat offenders is Barry Minkow. Minkow went to prison for
his first Ponzi scheme based on carpet cleaning when he was only 22. While in prison he
became a Christian. When Minkow was released, he became a minister. He used his
ministry to educate people about avoiding frauds. Minkow simply could not resist
temptation and perpetrated another Ponzi scheme that was a faith-based affinity fraud
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scheme. Minkow is scheduled to be released from prison in 2019, he will be 52; it will
be interesting to see what he does when he is released. (FBI, 2014, Minkow p.r.)
•

A few perpetrators were career con-artists, in particular Larry Reynolds, an attorney who
spent four decades involved in multiple fraud schemes. Reynolds knowingly and actively
helped Thomas Petters with the nuances of succeeding in fraud as well as running a shell
company through which funds were laundered. Petters’ scheme would have collapsed
much sooner were it not for Reynolds expertise. When he was arrested he turned on
Petters, providing authorities with the details of the scheme. (FBI p.r. 2010 Larry
Reynolds), (U.S.A. v. Larry Reynolds).

•

Gerald Leo Rogers had five aliases as well as multiple business entities. Like Reynolds,
he spent four decades committing a variety of frauds. He was twice convicted of felonies
before he began his Ponzi scheme with Alexander Shevenchenko in 2005. (SEC LR
19115)

•

Charles Ponzi was a recidivist. He had been jailed in Canada for check forgery. Ponzi
then helped a friend bring undocumented Italians into the U.S. from Canada and was
sentenced again, serving a term in an Alabama prison. His third sentence was for his
famous fraud scheme in 1920 that now bears his name.
Exclusiveness
Most Ponzi perpetrators enhance the attractiveness of their program by giving the air of

exclusiveness. This behavior provides a sort of snob-appeal to the scheme. In most Ponzi cases,
it is not that the perpetrators are trying for exclusiveness, but instead they are picking victims
who are not sophisticated enough to realize the fraud. When people feel special, it is the snob112

appeal affect. Perpetrators are looking for the most gullible people, the myrmidon, people who
will believe whatever they are told without questioning the validity of what is said, nor the
fraudulent statements and documents submitted by the perpetrators.
Campaign Donations
It is common for perpetrators to give donations to congressional and Presidential
candidate's campaigns. They frequently get photographs of themselves with candidates and
elected officials. This is one mechanism used to enhance their credibility. Both Allen Stanford
and Bernard Madoff made campaign contributions to many Democratic party candidates.
(Mayer, 2008, Mayer, 2009). Senator Frank Lautenberg had received a campaign contribution
from Bernard Madoff, (Mayer,2008), and was also a victim of Madoff. The Lautenberg family
charity: The Lautenberg Foundation was one of Madoff’s victims. (Lautenberg v. Madoff, 2009).
Former First-Lady Hillary Clinton, Representative Charles Rangel, Senator Charles Schumer
received donations from Madoff. (Mayer,2008). Madoff’s most interesting donation is to
Christopher Dodd, one of the authors of the Dodd-Frank Act. Dodd’s donation was received
prior to 2008; the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted in 2010.
•

Daniel Christian Stanley Powell received a photograph of himself with Bill Clinton for
donating to musician Usher's New Look Foundation. (FBI p.r November 13, 20-14)

•

Norman Hsu was charged with securities violations as well as illegal campaign
donations. (SEC vs. HSU p. 2 paragraph 7). Hsu raised $850,000 for Hillary Clinton's
campaign in 2008. The money had to be returned. (Willis, 2015). Hsu received more
than 24 years in federal prison for his $60 million Ponzi scheme. Hsu was charged with
violating the Federal Election Campaign Act in addition to several fraud charges. (USAO

113

SDNY p.r. 2007). Hsu asked investors to make campaign donations at $25,000, then he
reimbursed them with funds from the Ponzi scheme. (FBI, p.r. 2009)
•

In the Allen Stanford case, Stanford made donations to many politicians. Stanford made
contributions to both Republican Senator John McCain and Democrat Senator Bill
Nelson and then Presidential candidate Barack Obama. In the House, Stanford had
contributed to then Speaker John Boehner. (Winship, 2012). Allen Stanford is currently
serving 110 years in prison.
The above characteristics described the basic tools commonly used by Ponzi perpetrators

to carry out the schemes. The following section describes the types of investments that victiminvestors were told they were investing in. The two sections are the mechanisms of Ponzi
schemes, although the means are not limited to those stated below.
Manner and Means Used to Carry Out the Schemes
The section below describes the manner and means that perpetrators used to entice their
victims. Braithwaite uses the term “modus operandi” more commonly known as the method of
operation. (Braithwaite, 1985). The term “manner and means” is commonly used in federal
documents to describe the methods of operation of the perpetrators. This section is not an indepth explanation of the accounting manipulations, just an overall description of the basis for the
frauds. It is important to understand that there may have been some actual investing or business
going on as stated by Ponzi perpetrators, but more commonly, no actual investing or business
was taking place. Generally, the perpetrators stated there was business or investing activities
happening, regardless of whether or not that was true. Some intentional frauds never had any
actual investing or business, some had a façade of investing or business practices to keep the
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needed influx of victims. In the cases of accidental frauds, the entity was running a legitimate
business or brokerage that then simply failed. The following section discusses the manner and
means that Ponzi perpetrators used to carry out their schemes, in most cases, what the perpetrator
stated the actual promised investing or business that was taking place. No actual investing or
business transactions occurred in most instances.
Charities
It is common for Ponzi perpetrators to donate large sums of money to charities. This
helps enhance their credibility in the community and increases their ability to bring new investorvictims into their scheme. In some cases, the victim-investors are told that a portion of their
investment returns will be going to charities. Generally, this charitable giving is brought to the
attention of the courts during sentencing, trying to show a good side to the perpetrators. The
charitable giving is just a mechanism to give the appearance of being an upstanding citizen, but
their charitable donations are made through their victim’s funds. Some of the victim-investors
were charities.
•

Michael E. Gause gave the World Harvest Church $1.8 million dollars. (World Harvest
Church v. Guideone Mutual Insurance Company,2010). The Court appointed receiver,
Phillip Stenger, had to sue for a return of the funds. The court ruled that the church had
to return $1 million. Gause also operated his scheme from the Cayman Islands; he had
several offshore corporations. (SEC l.r. 17509, 2002).

•

A classic example of using charitable giving and philanthropy is stated in the
government’s position report in Thomas Petters’ sentencing: “Throughout, the defendant
carefully crafted and manipulated his image as a charitable and religious philanthropist to
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fool business, political and religious leaders, who in turn lent credibility to the defendant
further facilitating and concealing the fraud.” (USDS MN, Petters, 2010).
•

Kenneth Wayne McLeod operated his scheme from 1988 until 2009, when he committed
suicide. McLeod's victims were primarily federal and state law enforcement officers.
McLeod had made large donations to the DEA Survivors Benefits Fund. (OIGDOJ
2014). Many of his victims were DEA agents as well as other federal law enforcement
agency employees.
Ponzi perpetrators not only gave to charities to enhance their credibility in the

community, but in some cases, they told their victims that the funds were to be used in
humanitarian or charitable activities. Some affinity fraud schemes told investors they were
helping build businesses or in support home of mortgages in specific communities. The
perpetrators preyed on the investors desire to help others within their communities.
•

In some cases, it is the charity or non-profit that is the victim. In Madoff’s case, there
were several non-profit entities that lost large amounts of money; one was Yeshiva
University (Hernandez, 2008) and another was the Lautenberg Foundation. (Lautenberg
v. Madoff).

•

In the case of John G. Bennett Jr. and New Era Philanthropy, it was the charities and nonprofits that were the victims of the Ponzi scheme. Bennett offered unregistered securities
that did not exist to the charities. (SEC l.r. 15095, 1996).
Debt Service
Ponzi perpetrators prey on both individuals and businesses in debt service schemes. In

one type of debt scheme, the mechanism is debt consolidation where the individual victim or
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business-victim pay into a debt service that will allegedly negotiate for lesser fees to debtors.
However, the Ponzi perpetrator does not pay into the debts for long, they simply take the money.
In these cases, the investors to the debt consolidation entity receive Ponzi payments.
Mortgage and Real-estate
Mortgage and real-estate based frauds have many variations. The classic form of both is
that the perpetrator purports to be placing investors funds in a business entity that invests in realestate or mortgages but is instead fully a Ponzi scheme from the onset. Some were alleged to be
part of the mortgage derivative markets that contributed to the housing boom and financial crisis.
One type invites investors to be part of a mortgage company that allegedly funds mortgages, but
no real mortgages actually existed. In some cases, the mortgages did exist, at least in part, but
the entity developed into a Ponzi scheme or only functioned superficially as a mortgage
company. Prior to the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, there were many mortgage frauds similar to
those that took place just prior to the financial crisis, during the housing boom created by
subprime mortgages. These were two periods in history where regulations were not in effect,
allowing many mortgage frauds to occur in relationship to a booming economy and then a
financial collapse. In the 1920s there were cases of mortgage securities fraud whereby the
investor/victims were buying securities in mortgages companies that never actually provided
loans to consumers. (Examples from Frasca, 1931). These same mortgage-based securities
frauds took place during the housing bubble prior to the financial crisis of 2007-2010.
•

The most classic case of mortgage fraud that came about as a result of the subprimemortgage failure was the case of James Tyson Jr. et al. This case involved 92
perpetrators, 90 of which pleaded guilty or were found guilty and sentenced. Two
perpetrators were foreign nationals and are currently fugitives. Twenty-five of the 92
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perpetrators were women, a very high ratio as compared with other schemes. This
scheme, centered in North Carolina, operated from 2005 until 2012, making use of
predatory lending practices. (FBI p.r. Tyson et al 2012, October24). The Ponzi
characteristics were only one aspect of the many fraudulent actions involved in this
scheme.
•

Ronald Luczak and his wife Lisa and Sandra Mainardi-a loan officer, were involved in a
mortgage scheme during the housing bubble. They made use of straw buyers who
presented themselves as buying the properties for their primary residence. This also
included many falsified documents including income statements falsified asset
documents and inflated property values. (FBI, p.r.2009, Luczak).

•

Gerald Lee Kelly’s scheme told investors they were investing in short-term high interest
loans, in a program designed to help those who were in danger of losing their homes, just
before the financial crisis in 2006-2007. The victims were vulnerable and in fear of
losing their homes; Kelly preyed on their vulnerability. (FBI p.r. 2012 Kelly).

Researching the individual cases of the mortgage and real-estate based frauds would
require intensive research of each case using state level records. Determination of appropriate
licensing and whether or not the perpetrators had any actual real-estate transactions were made
must be undertaken on the state level. This research is very time-intensive, as a result this aspect
of mortgage-based frauds is a separate research topic to be addressed in the future.
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Securities
`

Securities are specifically defined as investment instruments that indicate partial

ownership in a corporation. (Downes & Goodman, 2014). Securities based frauds are the most
common means for perpetrating Ponzi schemes. These frauds may have included any securities
trading that failed, trading in part, or no actual trading/investing in stocks. The schemes may
have included unregistered securities. Generally, financial instruments of: stocks, bonds,
options, futures, annuities, warrants, are frequently referred to as securities; anything that does
not fall under commodities or foreign currencies. Some schemes may have included securities,
commodities and foreign currencies in actual trading or, solely in words alone; meaning the
perpetrators only stated they were making trades; no actual trades took place.
•

Michael C. Regan offered securities in his unregistered investment fund. The fund, called
River Stream, was to invest in stock trades. However, Regan lost money early on and
resorted to a Ponzi scheme. His scheme sold unregistered securities in his investment
firm that was supposed to be investing in the stock market. (SEC v. Regan & Company,
2009).

•

Paul Moore was an investment advisor that sent his clients account statements indicating
that securities had been purchased. The statements were falsifications in that no
securities had been purchased. Moore also lied about his experience, education and
registration as an advisor. Moore’s scheme was a classic intentional Ponzi scheme. (SEC
v. Paul Lee Moore, 2015).

•

Martin T. Wegener told his clients he would invest in “publicly traded securities, publicly
traded mutual funds and other investment vehicles…” (SEC vs. Martin Wegener p. 6,
2010). While some of the companies on Wegener statements to clients did exist, others
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on the statements were fictitious companies. Due diligence by victim-investors would
have found the companies on their statements did not exist. Regardless, Wegener did not
invest the funds in any of the stocks he had purported to clients.
Commodities
Commodities are physical goods that are traded on markets and exchanges. Commodities
include: agricultural products, livestock, precious metals and minerals. Commodities frauds
may have included actual investing in commodities, investing in part or only purported
investing, similarly to securities. There were many entities that claimed to be commodities
pools. Some of these pools were appropriately registered with the CFTC and NFA, others
only stated they were properly registered. Schemes that purported to be investing in
commodities could have made legitimate investments that failed, made some investments but
not used all of the received funds, or simply made no investments in commodities at all.
Thus, commodities based schemes fall under either intentional frauds or accidental frauds,
including False-brokerages.
•

Jose Cecilio Martinez Beltran et al, (six perpetrators) of Alpha Trade group and Orsa
Investments. Beltran ran an unregistered commodity pool throughout 2009. This entity
was incorporated in Panama. This scheme stated that the investments were risk free and
would bring returns of at least 12% per month. The funds were never invested, some of
which were sent to an offshore account in Anguilla. The commodity pool was not
registered with the CFTC, nor were the perpetrators registered as brokers. The alleged
investments were to be in crude oil, sugar FOREX and futures. (CFTC v. Alpha Trade
Group, 2011).
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•

Victor Cilli’s company: Progressive Investment Fund was a registered commodity pool.
Cilli’s pool was investing in commodities futures trading. A small percentage of the
funds taken in were used for commodities futures trades, then suffered severe losses.
The losses were not reported to investors, then Cilli used the funds from new investors to
pay earlier investors. This scheme ran from approximately 2006 through 2007. (CFTC,
p.r.6053-11, 2011)
FOREX
Foreign Exchange, known as “FOREX” are schemes or investments based in foreign

currency exchange markets. These perpetrators may make some actual investments in foreign
currency markets but, more often than not, there were no actual investments made, only
purported investments. Legitimate FOREX trades are based on the fluctuations of the values of
foreign currencies. As the values of the currencies rise and decline investors make or lose
profits. The CFTC has oversight over these markets.
•

The scheme of Anthony Garcia, Shawn Christie and Edward Lindsey made use of
options on the foreign currency exchange. Garcia pressured victims to invest, however,
trades were never actually made. This was a classic intentional Ponzi scheme complete
with high pressure and telemarketing tactics. Even though this was an intentional
scheme, the offenders were ordered to repay the money, since the scheme was only
$219,000. (CFTC p.r. 4776-03 Garcia).

•

Eldon Gresham did engage in some trading in FOREX, but was unsuccessful. Gresham
reported gains when there were actual losses to clients. Gresham also targeted Christians
as investors, telling them that: “the Lord had blessed him.” (CFTC complaint, Gresham,
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3 09-cv-75, p. 7 line 19). Gresham also used the tactic of exclusiveness saying he was
only offering his investment to “a limited number of fellow Christians.” (CFTC
complaint, Gresham, 3 09-cv-75, p. 7). Gresham was never registered with the CFTC in
any capacity as required by law.
Oil and Gas
Oil and gas based schemes have taken place throughout the entire time span of the study.
As soon as there was a demand for oil and gas, there was opportunity for fraud. In these
schemes, the perpetrator says that the investors will be investing in oil or gas enterprises, wells,
and revenues thereof.
•

In the 1997 Amerivest case, Jerry Anderson, Peter Sacker and Robert Kerns promised
investors that they would be investing in securities in oil and gas wells. Anderson,
Sacker and Kearns did not own all of the oil and gas wells the stated revenues were to be
collected from. (SEC, l.r. 15534, 1997). In administrative proceedings Anderson and
Kearns insisted they had purchased oil wells. However, they had sold the same shares of
those oil wells to multiple investors. (SEC v. Anderson and Kearns, administrative
proceeding, 3-10027).

•

John Bridges and his fictitious company: Logan Investments, told investors that they
would be investing in a private oil company and the construction of a liquid petroleum
pipeline. Bridges scheme was an intentional scheme; there was never any shares or a
pipeline to invest in. (FBI,p.r. July 23, 2013)
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Precious Metals and Mining
Precious metals are gold, silver, platinum and palladium. Their value is universally
recognized and are the bases for markets, fine jewelry and industrial uses. Frauds based on
precious metals generally stated they were investing in mines or bullion; in most Ponzi cases
based on precious metals or mining, there was little, if any, actual investing taking place. At
least one scheme was based on diamond mines, and two schemes were based on jewelry.
•

Ryan and Bita Nassbridges told investors they would be investing in bullion and coins,
and that their investments would be insured against losses. Instead they used their
victim’s money to invest in commodity futures and options trading and lost the money.
(CFTC p.r.7044-14, Nassbridges).

•

William Ison and Douglas Ellingson and Blue Diamond Excavation, alleged that they
were running a mining company. This company did not mine nor produce profits. (DOJ,
p,r. 2014). The perpetrators also claimed that they had donated a trillion dollars to AIDs
research (FBI, p.r. 2012).

•

Lawrence Heim operated a legitimate coin and gold investment company in Oregon. “In
2009, Heim fell behind in his coin purchases, as the value of gold and silver rose.” (FBI,
p.r. 2012). He then began a Ponzi scheme. This entity falls under the Business-failure
schemes. Many of his victims were elderly.

123

Technology Based Frauds
In the 1923 book by Edward Smith: Confessions of a confidence man: A handbook for
suckers,21 Smith explains that all inventions, and aspects of social activities are an opportunity
for a fraud or scam. Even in the immediate-post Charles Ponzi years, this was evident. This
section describes those schemes that are technologically based schemes that lured investors. As
technology changes, fraudulent schemes adapt to include technology. This may be technological
products as the vehicle to be invested in, or in the case of cyber currencies, the actual means of
investing. When there are new and upcoming technologies investors want to get in early and
invest in the hope of buying low and selling high. The technological tools of this type of fraud
have changed with the times: ATMs, pay phone, Dot-coms, algorithms, internet/IPO, and recent
technologies: Twitter & Uber. As science makes progress and electronic technologies improve
each progression invites yet another base for a Ponzi scheme. Now most, if not all, Ponzi
perpetrators make use of the internet and phones; as a result most perpetrators are charged with
wire fraud.
One earlier example of a technology based fraud was Peggy Stines in the 1980s. The
scheme was based on extraction of silver halide from photographic film processing. Digital
photography and home printing are quite commonplace in 2017; this type of scheme would not
be successful in this time period. However, there was no actual extraction taking place.

21

Fraud and Swindles Collection. [collection of published and unpublished works on subjects relating to
fraud and swindles, broadly defined]. Special Collections, Lloyd Sealy Library, John Jay College of
Criminal Justice/CUNY, New York City.
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•

Larry Ellis’ scheme of 1995-2000 was one of several schemes based in Automated Teller
Machines(ATM). (SEC l.r. 17078, 2001). These types of schemes were based on
privately owned automated teller machines, with the intent that investors would be partial
owners and share in the profits from fees earned through usage. In most Ponzi scheme
cases, there were never any automated teller machines purchased.

•

Charles Edwards ran one of the pay-phone schemes in the time period of 1996-2000.
Edwards’ business was a legitimate Business-failure. Cell-phones were on their way in;
pay-phones were on their way out. (SEC, l.r. 19788, 2006).

•

Steven Bartko’s scheme from 2003-2011 was based on electronics parts and circuit
boards to be sold to government contractors. He provided investors with fraudulent
statements and invoices on government contracts. (FBI p.r. 2012 Bartko).

•

Michael Garian was a classic technology scheme of the dot-com era technology schemes
in 1997-2001. (SEC v. National Investment Enterprises, 2003). This scheme falsely sold
investors initial public offerings of internet and other technologically based companies.
This scheme was intentional and an affinity fraud scheme that preyed on Armenian
Americans.

•

Gregory Gray’s scheme is known to have been active by at least June of 2014. His
scheme was based on pre-initial public offerings of Twitter social media stocks. Twitter
went public in November of 2013. (SEC v. Gregory W. Gray Jr. 2015). His second
scheme was investing in pre-initial offerings of Uber Technologies. (DOJ, p.r. 2015,
March 5). Uber is a phone application technology available through smart phones
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allowing pairing potential riders with a car service. As of January 2017, Uber
Technologies has not yet gone public with an initial public offering of stock shares.

As technology changes, the means of carrying out the frauds changes. Several Ponzi
schemes of the past decade report the use of “algorithms” as tools to determine investments.
Algorithms are mathematical data processing designed for specific functions. Those purporting
to use these techniques may or may not have an actual system for trading in place. Some cases
may have been using algorithms but failed, turning to a Ponzi scheme. Others only said they
were using algorithms. What is certain is that any new technology or gadget to come to the
market will inspire new types of frauds as investors speculate on the possibilities of whatever is
the newest trend.
Banking Fraud
Banking frauds as Ponzi schemes come in several varieties. In most cases the Ponzi
scheme was based in prime banking or false banks. The perpetrator simply set up a bank without
the authorization to do so, and it became a Ponzi scheme. Prime banks are generally considered
the top 50 banks in the world. A perpetrator may be offering shares in these top banks, or they
may suggest that their investment product invests in international banks. The use of the term
“prime” is designed to convince the victims of the status of the investment when it is not a real
investment product.
•

Sarah Howe was a type of scheme that developed a false bank, with her Ladies Deposit in
1880. (Robb 2012)

•

In some cases, it is the banks that are defrauded, as in the case of Robert L. Bentley who
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was selling privately issued certificates of deposits to small banks and credit unions.
•

In Stanley Anderson’s prime banking scheme, he told investors that major international
banks were selling “high yield bank instruments off the books to private traders who are
allowed to buy the instruments at a discount and resell them for extremely high
unrealistic high rates of return.” (SEC v. Anderson, 2008).

•

Roy E. Matlock and Alan Root sold “prime bank instruments.” His victims were
members of the Chicago Housing Authority Pension Plan. (SEC l.r. 16797, 2000). Prime
bank instruments are not an actual financial instrument that exists legally. (There are
many forms of prime banking fraud, which are defined in the glossary Appendix B).

•

Edward Driving Hawk’s Native American bank was complex because the business entity
was granted licensees by Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South Dakota. The business was
functioning as a bank without the federal or state governments authority to do so. The
intent was a Native American financial institution that would offer investment trading for
Native Americans. This scheme also made use of prime banking instruments. (SEC v.
Driving Hawk, 2002).

•

In a separate, earlier scheme, Ron Sparks also ran a Native American bank called the
First Americans Bank. Similar to Driving Hawk, Sparks did not have the federal or state
authority to run a bank. In this case, it also turned out to be a Ponzi scheme. (SEC
l.r.16452, 2000)

The false bank fraud schemes of Howe, Driving Hawk and Sparks were primarily affinity
fraud cases where the perpetrator appealed to those in their self-identifying groups. However,
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the prime banking schemes tend to prey on anyone gullible enough to believe the perpetrator’s
words.
Promissory Notes
Promissory notes are a written promise to pay money, basically “I owe yous” (IOU).
Promissory notes specify that the borrower is borrowing a certain amount of money and the
terms of that borrowing, such as maturity date, and the interest that is to be paid. Promissory
notes include the place that they are issued, as well as the names and signatures of the parties.
The transaction becomes illegal when the borrower has no intention, or has no ability to pay back
the funds that were borrowed. In many cases the schemes were intentional frauds from the onset,
meaning there was never any intention of paying back the principal investment/loan.
•

Robert Narvett’s promissory notes specified his company “Shield” as the borrower and
his investor-victims as the lender. The notes specified that they would pay back the
principal amount and an annual interest rate of 20%. (SEC v. Robert Narvett, complaint,
2000).

•

Algird Norkus’ scheme convinced victims to invest in promissory notes designated to his
business entity. His business was alleged to insure people who had been refused
insurance from other insurance companies. Higher risk insurance companies charge
higher fees, and would therefore bring in higher revenues from premiums. In this case,
the promissory notes were scheduled to be repaid in five years’ time. The business
entity: Financial Update Inc. was an intentional Ponzi scheme, the funds were never used
in an insurance capacity, nor were there insured clients. (SEC v. Algird Norkus, 2010,
complaint).
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Medical Equipment and Medical Billing
The medical Ponzi frauds came in three basic versions, for the most part. One of which
purports to be investing in medical equipment; a second is said to be investing in medical
receivables, a third is investing in research and development of treatments or pharmaceuticals.
In truth, there was never any investing or research and development going on in any of the
medical cases.
•

Edwin Fujinaga’s scheme was a business that purported to buy accounts receivable from
medical providers. The investors were also Japanese, as was Fujinaga, making this also
an Affinity fraud scheme. (DOJ p.r. 15-857, 22015, July 8).

•

Robert Hurd and his company, “Your Best Memories” was stated to be promoting
Alzheimer’s treatments. Hurd had told investors that his company had received approval
from the United States Food and Drug Administration, another fraudulent claim. The
entire scheme comprised several frauds, including unregistered securities. (SEC v. Robert
Hurd, l.r. 23019, 2014).

•

Christopher Pedras ran a New Zealand based scheme that told victim-investors that they
were investing in kidney dialysis machines, and dialysis clinics in New Zealand. Pedras
also had a bank trading company as part of his fraud. Pedras lived in California and New
Zealand, his victims were primarily in the United States. (SEC v. Christopher A.T.
Pedras, l.r. 22862, 2013).
Insurance Frauds
Insurance frauds are carried out in many forms. In some cases, the perpetrators were

licensed insurance agents, in others the perpetrators falsely presented themselves as being
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licensed agents. In some cases, the victim investors are told they are investing in insurance
companies and in other cases they are investing in insurance products, such as viaticals.
Insurance companies must make a profit in order to function as a business. They make profits
from investing the funds and by collecting premiums where the insured do not make claims.
Where the insured never make claims the insurance company keeps the money that has been paid
into the company as premiums. Some schemes were properly functioning insurance businesses
that failed, becoming Business-failure schemes.
One particularly egregious form of insurance frauds are viaticals. Viatical settlements
offer legitimate insurance clients who have terminal illness the opportunity to sell the death
benefit policy to someone who will collect upon their death, providing a source of income in the
late stage of life. Several frauds purported to be investing in viaticals, and that all investors
would receive a portion of the death benefits when the policy holder died.
•

Frederick Brandau, with eleven other offenders, perpetrated one of the more egregious
types of schemes: viaticals. The Brandau’s scheme took place in the late 1990s. The
victim-investors were investing in a company that purported to buy viaticals; it was just a
Ponzi scheme. (SEC v. Frederick Brandau, l.r. 17601, 2002). The fraudulent documents
used to perpetrate the fraud were falsified insurance policies. (U.S. v. Brandau, 99-8125cr-Hurley, 1999). During the 1990s there were several of these types of schemes that
preyed on the elderly and those dying with AIDS.

•

James Griffin’s scheme invited investors to invest in an insurance company that was
allegedly selling insurance to the disabled. These schemes also told victim-investors that
a percentage of their returns on their investments would be going to a charity of their
choice. (SEC v. Griffin, 2015).
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•

Donald Neuhaus, and Kimberly Snowden told investors that their funds would be used to
pay premiums on life insurance policies that were being sold. In this case, investor funds
were being used to pay on life insurance premiums. Part of the process includes actuarial
calculations of life expectancies. This determines how much money should be set aside
for an insured individual. If this is not done correctly the premiums are not enough and
the fund runs short. Additionally, instead of putting the received premiums into
investments, Neuhaus and Snowden used the money paid in premiums for themselves.
When the money was depleted, they began to pay out as a Ponzi scheme. (SEC v. Secure
Investment Services, 2:07-cv-01724, 2007).
Loans
In the cases of loan-based frauds, there was rarely a legitimate business that failed. In

most cases the perpetrators only told investors the company was providing loans. Many were
affinity fraud cases the perpetrators told investors that the business was making loans to people
from their own specific nationality or ethnic group.
•

Sona Chukhyan’s case involved investors making short-term loans to individuals who
might not qualify with a traditional loan entity. Her scheme also involved flipping realestate; she falsely told investors that she already had buyers set up to flip properties. (FBI
p.r.. 2013 Chukhyan)

•

The scheme of Matthew Haab, Veros partners et al, told investor-victims that their
investments would be supporting short-term loans to farmers as well as bridge loans.
Haab was properly registered with the SEC. A portion of the funds were used for some
farm’s previously unpaid debts, not for current loans, as investors were falsely told. This
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scheme had taken place between 2013 and 2014. Many of the farmers did not do well
and were delinquent in paying back their loans. When the farmers could not repay their
loans, Haab could not pay the funds due to investors; he began a Ponzi scheme. This is
an accidental fraud, Business-failure scheme. (SEC v. Matthew Haab, 2015).
•

Lydia Cladek ran a company that was supposed to be funding high interest motor vehicle
loans. She used promissory notes for these transactions and promised an interest rate of
20%. (FBI, p,r.2010, Cladek).

•

A recent case based on professional athletes was perpetrated by Will Allen and Susan
Daub. Allen was a former National Football League player, having played with the New
York Giants, the Miami Dolphins and the New England Patriots. The scheme was based
on making short term loans to professional athletes. The few loans that were made, were
smaller than the amount reported to investors. The funds were used to perpetuate the
Ponzi scheme. Allen was sentenced to seventy-two months in prison as of March 1,
2017. (DOJ p.r. 2016, Allen).
EB-5 and Immigration
The schemes involving immigrants were generally affinity frauds. Previous research on

affinity fraud and immigrant communities found that immigrant communities were particularly
vulnerable because they are new to the country and tend to trust others from their native land.
(Springer, November, 2015). The immigrants trust those who speak the same language. Many
are not fluent in English and do not know that there are government agencies available to help
them. Some of the immigrants came from areas of political upheaval such as Cambodia or
Vietnam where the governments were not trusted.
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The second aspect of immigrant focused Ponzi schemes is a new tool for preying on the
vulnerability of immigrants, and comes from the EB-5 program. Like cybercurrency, this is new,
so there are only a few cases. The EB-5 program was established by Congress in the early
1990s, to allow EB-5 visas for immigrants who want to invest in commercial business in the
United States. The EB-5 immigrant investor program gives foreign investors the opportunity to
earn permanent residence in the United States, through investing. These investors must invest in
a business established after 1990 or start a new business. This legitimate federal program was
soon used by fraudsters to take advantage of immigrants, in many fraudulent means, not just
Ponzi schemes.
•

Jenny Coplan primarily victimized Columbians and Americans of Columbian descent;
her scheme is classified as an affinity fraud. Her company: Immigration General
Services, was supposed to invest in immigration bail-bonds. In the classic mechanism of
falsifying federal credentials common in Ponzi schemes, Coplan told her victims their
funds were Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured. The FDIC only
insures up to $250,000 per individual in banks and savings associations that qualify. It
does not insure investment services, brokers or hedge funds. (SEC v. Jenny Coplan,
2013).

•

Ariel Quiros and William Stenger’s EB-5 scheme promised investment in a Vermont ski
resort: Jay Peak. He targeted individuals who wanted citizenship. Funds were also stated
to be used for a biomedical research center. (SEC v. Ariel Quiros, 2016).

•

Marco and Bebe Ramirez promoted their investment scheme first to Mexicans, then to
immigrants from Egypt, and Nigeria. The scheme promised to hold immigrant’s funds in
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escrow until the immigrants received their EB-5 visas. The Ramirez’ traveled to other
countries trying to recruit investors. (SEC, 2013, Ramirez).
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Chapter 4: Ponzi Schemes and Meso-Macro-Micro Theoretical Explanations

Meso level: The Ponzi Schemes
Offense Based: Herbert Edelhertz
The meso-level of analysis examines the “middle level of theoretical analysis” (Vogt &
Johnson, 2011), in this study the meso-level is the Ponzi schemes. The Ponzi schemes are
established by perpetrators to take advantage of victims. This level of analysis will examine the
nature, characteristics and organization of the schemes. Meso-level is the offense based analysis
method of looking at crimes. While looking at white-collar crime based on the offense is not a
theory, per-se; it is generally used as a means of defining white-collar crime. Here it is used as a
theoretical approach.
Defining the white-collar crime in terms of the offense, in this case the Ponzi scheme,
was the initial step of research; the meso-level. Once the offense based research and data set was
established, the secondary level of research: the individual, or micro level of the perpetrators was
established.
The offense based perspective has allowed for the study of Ponzi schemes as an offense
or in this case a type of fraud considered a white-collar crime. Offense based research allows for
studying variations within an offense. In this case, the offense: the Ponzi scheme, is the unit of
analysis. The actual laws broken and regulations the perpetrators are charged with define the
crime. The type of fraud being studied, allows for the study of variations of that offense, which
are the types of Ponzi schemes, Intentional, Accidental, the sub-categories of Brokerage-failure,
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Business-failure, False-brokerages, affinity-frauds and cybercurrency. Feeder funds, hedgefunds and commodity pools are another layer of study.
The study of offense based research in white-collar crime is defined by “the illegal act or
the series of illegal acts committed by nonphysical means and by concealment or guile, to obtain
money or property, to avoid the payment or loss of money or property, or to obtain business or
personal advantage” (Edelhertz, 1970 p.3). This definition by Herbert Edelhertz came from his
work in the Department of Justice. Edelhertz felt that the academic (Sutherland 1947, Reiss &
Biderman, 1981; Cressey, 1973; Clinard & Quinney, 1994), approach of offender-based
definitions of white-collar crime were too narrow, too restrictive. As a criminal investigator
Edelhertz saw that not all white-collar crimes are committed by people of a high social status.
His approach looked at the legal perspective, the laws and regulations that were violated, instead
of socioeconomic status. (Pontell, 2016). It might be argued that in Donald Cressey’s Other
people’s money, his research on embezzlers as white-collar criminals is actually offense based
research because the research looks specifically at the crime of embezzlement. (Cressey, 1973).
Edelhertz developed the offense based theoretical explanation and definition. This approach
came from a perspective of investigative research within a law enforcement agency capacity,
rather than academic researchers.
Edelhertz felt that it is the “modus operandi” (Edelhertz, 1970 p. 4), that determines the
crime not the socioeconomic status of the perpetrator. This study agrees, in that the perpetrators
of Ponzi schemes use their victim’s money to give the appearance of being a highly successful
and of upper level socioeconomic status. Similarly, there are a few blue-collar Ponzi
perpetrators who carried out a white-collar crime. Benson and Simpson also support the study of
offense based research as one method of researching white-collar crime. (Benson, Simpson
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2015). For this reason, the primary meso-level theoretical perspective is that of Edelhertz, using
an offense based perspective.

Macro: Financial Trends Level of Theoretical Explanations
Economic Theories: Adam Smith and Hyman Minsky
The macro level of analysis examines the larger society as a whole. In this case, the study
reflects on the financial crisis and the relationship to the unit of analysis, Ponzi schemes. The
study looks at Ponzi schemes as far back as public record allows, going back to 1973. The
financial trends are compared to the occurrences of Ponzi schemes, using the Federal Reserve
financial stress indicator for the general economy of the United States during the relevant time
period.
Adam Smith and the Invisible Hand
Adam Smith (1723-1790), the political economist, greatly influenced the economics of
today and our understanding of “the invisible hand” or what is more commonly known as the
basics of supply and demand. Adam Smith was a contributor to the age of enlightenment with
his book: The Wealth of Nations. (Adams, 1776). This is the basis for our free market economy,
that expects prices to go up as demand increases, then when demand is reduced, prices diminish.
In relationship to the Financial crisis of 2007 and the housing boom prior to the collapse,
the market was let to run itself through the neo-libertarian economic policies of the Reagan and
Clinton administrations, as well as through the first and second Presidents Bush. Alan
Greenspan was on the board of the Federal Reserve for almost two decades, under four
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administrations. Greenspan was the primary proponent of neo-libertarian economic policies in
these administrations. The FCIC report (2011) made it very clear deregulation contributed to the
collapse of 2007, supporting Hyman Minsky’s theory of financial Instability.
Hyman Minsky and his Theory of financial Instability
The primary economic theory that has been applied to Ponzi schemes as well as the
financial crisis is Hyman Minsky’s theory of “financial instability.” (Minsky1982). Minsky’s
theory of “financial instability” explains that first, there is some “acceleration in the economy.”
Second there is “financial crisis.” Third, there is “a sharp thrust towards lower income.” Fourth,
there is “intervention by the government.” All of these occurred in this case with the housing
market boom and the financial crisis.
The administrations of Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush implemented
economic policies that contributed to the economic boom of the 2000 decade prior to the
financial crisis, illustrating Minsky’s theory of acceleration in the economy. Some policies were
already in place to increase home ownership for the population that had not been able to afford
home loans, (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Alan Greenspan had been the influence for
libertarian economics under Ronald Reagan; George H.W. Bush; Bill Clinton and George W.
Bush. All kept Greenspan on as Chair of the Federal Reserve. Greenspan was the policy maker
that influenced the laissez-faire trend towards deregulation that fueled the financial boom, which
then resulted in the collapse of 2007. Under President Clinton’s administration Congress had
repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1934, enacting the Financial Services Modernization
Act/Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. The Glass-Steagall Act had separated commercial banks
from investment banks, in an effort to prevent the type of financial failure that happened during
the Great Depression. Glass-Steagall was the legislation government action that Minsky referred
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to. The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 allowed commercial banks and
investment banks to merge.
This change in legislation allowed commercial banks and investment banks to pool
mortgages to what became known as “bundling.” Mortgage originators began to securitize their
mortgages. Securitization turns a group or bundle of mortgages into a security of which
investors purchase shares. The availability of loans with minimal proof of ability to pay caused a
boom in the housing market, these were called sub-prime mortgages. Everyone seemed to think
the prices of houses would continue to go up. The Report on the Financial Crisis indicates that
“excess liquidity” was the first step in the financial crisis. This was characterized by a “credit
bubble” brought on by global investors and low interest rates. (FCIC, p. xxv). Lewis, a very
perceptive academic from the University of South Australia, explains that: “investment fraud
flourishes in market bubbles.” (Lewis 2011). The primary conclusion in the FCIC is that this
was brought on by deregulation in the Clinton and Bush administrations that allowed for the subprime mortgages. (FCIC, 2011; Henderschott & Villani, 2012). The dissenting argument in the
FCIC, felt that the cause of the financial boom was a global credit bubble, whereby there were
excess funds available for borrowing. This allowed for cheaper loans and riskier loans. In the
dissent, it is indicated that high oil prices globally produced more money availability for lending
to home buyers. (FCIC, 2011).
The second stage of Minsky’s theory is a “financial crisis” which did indeed happen in
the time frame of 2007 until 2010. (FCIC, 2011), (Minsky 1982). It became clear that a great
many of the home buyers who bought during the housing boom could not pay their mortgage
payments. Many of these purchases were fraudulent in and of themselves. There was a practice
of buying the homes then flipping them: the act of buying and then selling a house immediately
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for profit. One of the conditions for purchasing under the more relaxed regulations was that the
buyers had to live in the homes to receive the specialized sub-prime loans. There was no
authority checking on these home purchases to determine that the people who bought the homes
were actually living in them. The loans on these homes were then securitized, meaning they
were bundled together then sold together, good loans and bad, which proved disastrous for the
economy.
The third phase of Minsky’s theory is a “sharp thrust toward lower income.” (Minsky,
1982). As the economy fell in 2007, a great many people began to lose their jobs and were not
able to make mortgage payments. The banking entities responsible for those loans had set them
up as securitized investments, that then declined as the borrowers began to default on their loans.
This triggered a domino effect in the stock market. As the market spiraled downward many
investors began to pull their money out of investments causing many Ponzi schemes to become
evident. However, this is the difference: this is the time when some legitimate businesses
became Ponzi schemes out of desperation, the Brokerage-failures and Business-failures.
This financial decline peaked in September of 2008 when Lehman Brothers went into
bankruptcy and Merrill Lynch was taken over. Ben Bernanke, Chair of the Federal Reserve,
considered the time period of September and October 2008 the “worst financial crisis in global
history, including the Great Depression.” (FCIC, p. 354). This led to the next step in Minsky’s
theory: government intervention.
The fourth phase of Minsky’s theory is intervention by the Government. (Minsky 1982).
The government intervention was the Dodd-Frank Act, the bail-outs and Troubles Asset Relief
Program, (TARP). Several authors present arguments in favor much stronger regulation.
(Henriques, 2011; Dheshi, 2010). The ideas on what the regulatory legislation should be vary.
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In September of 2008, the government sponsored enterprises of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
were put into conservatorship, meaning what were pseudo-government entities, were now put
under guardianship of the federal government to prevent further decline. At that time, AIG was
bailed out to the tune of $182 billion by the Federal Reserve and the Department of the Treasury.
Several of the biggest investment banks were bailed out by the federal government, whether they
wanted to be or not. Later, in 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted in the hopes of providing
legislation that would prevent such an extreme financial catastrophe from happening again.
Within the Dodd-Frank Act, it required an amendment to the Truth in Lending Act that applies to
lending practices, stating:
Subtitle B: Minimum Standards for Mortgages
Section 1411 Ability to Repay
“129C. (A) Ability to Repay (1) In General. - In accordance to regulations
prescribed by the Board, no creditor may make a residential mortgage loan unless the
creditor makes a reasonable and good faith determination based on verified and
documented information that, at the time the loan is consummated, the consumer has the
reasonable ability to repay the loan according to its terms, and all applicable taxes, and
insurance (including mortgage guarantee insurance) and assessments.”

This amendment goes on to require income verification, and Internal Revenue Service tax
returns as proof of adequate income, and specifies under what conditions the buyer must dwell
within the purchased home. This is to prevent flipping properties. The goal of this amendment
is to require lenders to perform due diligence on potential borrowers. In theory, this will prevent
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the lending practices that set the financial crisis in motion. Subtitle D Section 945 requires due
diligence and disclosure in asset backed securitization, meaning those buying securitized loans
have to perform due diligence to determine the soundness of loans that are bundled. Mortgage
buyers are required to know if they are buying bad loans with good loans.
Subtitle B Increasing Regulatory Enforcement and Remedies Section 922, allows for
incentives for whistleblowers. Whistleblowers that provide information on fraud in a case, that
is over one million dollars, can receive 10% to 30% for tips that result in bringing fraudulent acts
to legal action.
Dodd-Frank itself is the fulfillment of the fourth step in Minsky’s theory of financial
instability. These measures mentioned here are designed to address what has been determined by
the FCIC as the cause of the Financial Crisis: the sub-prime mortgage failure. The financial
incentives for whistle blowers provide financial motivation for potential whistleblowers such as
Harry Markopolos,22 who have everything to lose by bringing fraud to the awareness of
authorities.

Micro: The Individual Level of Theoretical Explanations: Perpetrators and Victims
The micro level of analysis addresses the individuals, in this case the perpetrators and the
victim-investors. The perpetrators are the root of the Ponzi scheme, but without the investorvictims there would be no scheme. Information on the perpetrators is consistently and publicly
available in government documents. The information on each case is consistently reported and

Harry Markopolos attempted to show the SEC that Madoff was running a Ponzi scheme on several occasions. He
was ignored by the SEC hence his book: No one would listen.
22
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usually in multiple federal agency sources, providing for consistency and reliability allowing
quantitative analysis of the characteristics of Ponzi scheme perpetrators. This section primarily
discusses the offender/perpetrator level of analysis.
Perpetrator Level Perspective: Psychological and Sociological Theories
The mainstream media often portrays Ponzi perpetrators as psychopaths and sociopaths.
(Chernow, 2009; Green, 2013; Cross & Tompkins, 2013; Konnikova, 2016; Malamed, 2012).
In the previous chapter, we looked at the social dynamic of trust and how that fostered
victimization. In this chapter, we will look at the psychological aspects that might apply to
perpetrators of Ponzi schemes. What type of person can take advantage of their fellowman with
such ease? Why is it that their conscience does not prevent them from bleeding the most
vulnerable of their last dime? The possible psychological explanations of Ponzi perpetrators are
rich with implications. Rosoff, Pontell and Tillman use the term: “Psychopathic Wealth” to refer
to individuals that have a kind of obsessive greed that has no empathy. (Rosoff, Pontell, Tillman,
2014 p. 587).
With any type of crime, psychological factors of the individual cannot be ruled out as a
causal agent. However, both medical patients and prisoners have rights with regard to their
personal information. Therefore, studies that might seek to measure psychological disorders in
relationship to white-collar crime, and specifically Ponzi perpetrators, are not available.
Psychological disorders are mentioned in the general media and books, suggesting that the type
of person who commits Ponzi schemes must be a sociopath or psychopath. (Chernow, 2009;
Green, 2013; Cross & Tompkins, 2013; Konnikova, 2016; Malamed, 2012). It is not provable,
nor would it be ethical to publish such research in the unlikely event such research would make it
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past an Institutional Review Board process. This section suggests possible psychological
explanations of those who carried out Ponzi schemes.
Antisocial Personality Disorders
Academic researchers have attempted to define and quantify psychopathological qualities
in white-collar offenders. With any type of crime, psychological factors of the individual cannot
be ruled out as a cause. The studies that do exist, (Collins and Schmidt, 1993; Alaheto, 2003;
Listwan, Piquero and Van Voorhis, 2010) look at extroversion, neurosis and recidivism in whitecollar criminals. Ragatz, Fremouw and Baker, (2012) use the research of others in a study to
measure psychopathology in white-collar offenders. Their study makes use of the Psychological
Inventory of Criminal Thinking Styles, study by Walters (2006,2010); the Lifestyles Criminality
Screening form (Walters et al 1991); the Psychopathic Inventory Revised, (Lilifield and Widows,
2005). Their study sample was taken from white-collar and non-white-collar inmates in Eastern
United States federal prisons. The population was made up of 226 individuals who had
volunteered for a drug abuse program. The study measured for a difference between white-collar
and non-white-collar offenders in psychopathological traits. The results were more indicative of
substance abuse related traits (anxiety, alcohol use), and treatment thereof, than in qualities that
define psychopathology in white-collar offenders.
Blickle et al (2006), tested for narcissistic and hedonistic tendencies in 76 white-collar
inmates, and 303 who had committed white-collar offenses (no mention of incarceration). The
comparison population was 150 white-collar managers from German companies. This study
measured for gender, social desirability, narcissism, conscientiousness and behavioral selfcontrol. Basically, they found that white-collar criminals were more conscientiousness (by
German standards), more hedonistic and more narcissistic then the compared population of
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white-collar management participants. While differences were found, these studies do not
present a convincing argument that white-collar criminals are psychopaths or sociopaths.
Adrian Raine and Andrea Glenn make the observation that “unsuccessful psychopaths”
have criminal convictions, versus those who have not drawn the attention of law enforcement
and are “successful psychopaths.” (Glenn and Raine, 2014, p. 9). It is likely that there are
psychopaths who never have an encounter with the law but still have the characteristics of
psychopathy. These individuals may function quite well in corporate settings without drawing
the attention of the law. (Hare,1993; Babiak and Hare, 2006). Raine and Glenn explain that there
is no biological test or predictor of psychopathy. There may by physiological characteristics that
contribute to aggressive behavior such as testosterone, but not all individuals with high
testosterone levels are psychopaths. In short, there is no gene that determines psychopathy or
antisocial behavior disorders in criminals. (Glenn and Raine 2014).
In the end, these studies measured small populations that were incarcerated with variables
that do not necessarily measure for psychopathic qualities. The participants were voluntary; true
psychopaths may or may not agree to participate in such studies. They may want to see if they
could deceive the researchers, or more likely, if there was nothing to be gained, they would not
agree to participate. Measuring for psychopathic tendencies in white-collar criminals or nonwhite-collar criminals--must be carried out by qualified psychological researchers. Psychopaths
are experts at deceit; only qualified researchers with appropriate training and experience would
be able to determine validity of responses by participants. Again, such studies can only be on a
volunteer basis and true psychopaths may not be willing to participate unless they saw some
gain, thereby negating the objectivity of the study.
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Ponzi perpetrators are experts at producing fraudulent documents and blatantly lying to
their victims. Ponzi perpetrators may be pathological liars or simply very good at lying. Ponzi
perpetrators are in prison for deceit; it is questionable how valid or reliable interviews or surveys
with them might be. White-collar criminals, in general, are unlikely to admit guilt. Interviewing
or surveying Ponzi perpetrators is more likely to be met with justification for their actions, rather
than an admission of guilt or an explanation of inappropriate actions.
In some cases, this type of extreme ego-centric behavior of white-collar criminals in
general, has been described as psychopathic or sociopathic. (Hare, 1993; Babiak and Hare,
2006). The commonly used phrase in the psychiatric field is antisocial personality disorder. The
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders lists the following qualities as the criteria
for diagnosing antisocial disorder. (DSM,2013, p. 659):

A. “A pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring since
the age of 15, as indicated by three or more of the following:”
1. “Failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors, as indicated by
repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest.” The behaviors of the Ponzi
perpetrators are unlawful. In many cases, the perpetrators were professionals who had
passed bar exams, public accounting exams, and passed the series exams to be
brokers or advisers. Some had real estate licenses and other had insurance licenses.
All of these exams have questions about the laws involved with doing business, that
test takers must pass in order to get their licenses. The Ponzi perpetrators know they
are breaking the law.
146

2. “Deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for
personal profit or pleasure.” What is evident in all Ponzi schemes is dishonesty: every
Ponzi perpetrator has lied to his or her victims and produced fraudulent documents.
Many perpetrators use aliases, in some cases several aliases.
3. “Impulsivity or failure to plan ahead.” The third indicator of antisocial disorders is
impulsiveness or failure to plan ahead. In some cases, Ponzi perpetrators
meticulously plan ahead. They can be extremely strategic in their manipulation of
their victims. Most cases have indicated extreme self-indulgence in luxury items such
as watches mansions and expensive cars; this could be an indicator of impulsiveness.
4. “Irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults.”
The Ponzi cases did not show indication of violent or aggressive tendencies or
activities. Ponzi perpetrators are experts at being charming and friendly in order to
build trust. Someone who is irritable or abusive would not succeed. If we were to
profile potential Ponzi perpetrators by their charm, pleasant demeanor and
friendliness we would mistake a great many honest people for Ponzi perpetrators.
5. “Reckless disregard for the safety of others.” The Ponzi perpetrators show a complete
disregard for the financial wellbeing of their victims. They know they are taking their
victims money. Most only show remorse when required to do so in court at
sentencing. Many perpetrators, such as Allen Stanford, do not feel they did anything
wrong; Stanford continues to appeal his conviction.
6. “Consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent
work behavior or honor financial obligations.” The Ponzi perpetrators present
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themselves as being successful legitimate business people. Appearing responsible is
part of keeping up the image of success. Some schemes go on for many years, even
decades, because the perpetrator keeps of the image of being a successful business
man or woman. Ponzi perpetrators honor their financial obligations early on and as
consistently as possible for as long as possible, in order to keep the scheme going. It
is only when they can no longer bring in enough new investors does the scheme fail.
Some cases were functioning quite well when authorities found the scheme to be
fraudulent.
7. “Lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt or
mistreated, or stolen from another.” Some perpetrators are noted for their lack of
remorse. Ponzi perpetrators lack of empathy enables them to commit the fraud.
Tamar Frankel; explains that perpetrators feel their victims are greedy. (Frankel,
2012, p. 129). If they were not greedy the victims could not be so easily fooled.
White-collar criminals in general tend to reject that their actions are criminal. (Benson
and Simpson, 2015, p. 61). Ponzi perpetrators are no exception.

B. “The individual is at least age18 years.” The youngest Ponzi perpetrators were both
19 years of age when they started their separate schemes. The majority of Ponzi
perpetrators were between the aged of 45 and 55.
C. “There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15 years.” The case
documents do not discuss behaviors prior to the Ponzi scheme, unless the perpetrator is a
recidivist. All recidivist perpetrators were over the age of 18. Documentation of criminal
activity before the age of 18 is not a matter of public record.
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D. “The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of
schizophrenia or bipolar disorder.” There was no mention of these disorders in any of the
Ponzi scheme documents. However, there were fifteen suicides among the perpetrators.
Whether the suicides are due to remorse, or fear of prison is not known.

For an individual to be considered as having antisocial personality disorders (or
sociopathic/psychopathic) Ponzi perpetrators must demonstrate at least three of the above
criteria. The perpetrators demonstrated the first criteria by the consistency in unlawful behavior
in that their schemes may have gone on for many years and are repeated on multiple victims.
The Ponzi perpetrators are the experts in deceit of every possible kind, the methods seem to be
limitless and creative; this satisfies the second criteria. The fifth criteria in showing blatant
disregard for the wellbeing of others, the Ponzi perpetrators knowingly and intentionally take the
victim’s money with no regard to how their lives will be devastated. The Ponzi perpetrators
willfully steal from their victims demonstrating the seventh criteria. They know the victims will
not get their money back. The perpetrators may state remorse, as required for sentencing, but
rarely do their actions show real remorse. Often times the sentencing memorandums discuss
how much charitable work the individuals have done as if this should diminish the harm they
have caused or reduce their sentence; the charitable works were carried out with their victim’s
money. One hundred percent of the intentional scheme perpetrators have committed the first,
second and seventh criteria, at the very least. In the accidental schemes, there may be
individuals who did not fit the seventh criteria, they may indeed harbor deep remorse. In
aggregate, the Ponzi perpetrators fit the criteria of antisocial personality disorders; individual
perpetrators may vary in these criteria.
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David Kotz was the Inspector General at the Security Exchange Commission who carried
out the investigations of the Madoff and Stanford cases failures by SEC employees. In his book:
Why Ponzi schemes work and how to protect yourself from being defrauded, (2014) he discusses
the psychology of fraudsters. Kotz had interviewed Bernard Madoff and Russel Wassendorf for
his book. In his view, he felt that Madoff, Wassendorf and Stanford's actions demonstrated the
behaviors of antisocial disorder. (Kotz, 2014, p. 62). While Kotz did not interview Stanford for
the book, through his investigation of the Stanford case he found indicators of antisocial
personality disorder. Kotz is not a psychiatrist and is not making a diagnosis, but stating that in
his view their actions demonstrate the behaviors of antisocial disorder.
McMasters talks about Charles Ponzi having a phobia about money, stating that: “no sane
person would do what he is doing.” (McMasters, 1962, pgs. 145-146). McMasters, like Kotz, is
not a psychiatrist, he was just a journalist observing behaviors he thought a normal,
psychologically balanced person would not demonstrate.
In conclusion, the psychiatric medical profession has standards by which they diagnose
antisocial disorders, psychopathy or sociopathy. However, establishing a willing sample or
population of possible white-collar criminals to interview and survey for social science research
has ethical and practical limitations. Likewise, a population that does indeed fit the criteria for
antisocial personality disorder, psychopathy or sociopathic may not provide honest answers in
interviews or surveys. In short, it is virtually impossible to carry out valid and reliable studies on
white-collar or non-white-collar criminals for these psychological conditions. In the unlikely
event that there was some scientific means of determining that someone is likely to be a fraud
perpetrator, individuals have rights, and the science could be wrong.
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Persuasion
The power of persuasion is the mechanism by which a Ponzi perpetrator convinces his
victim investors that what he or she is promoting is a secure, guaranteed investment. Persuasion
is as important a psychological mechanism as trust is in perpetrating Ponzi schemes.
Persuasiveness and cunning give the intentional fraud perpetrator an unfair advantage. The skills
with which they pursue their prey is evident in the number of victims they accrue. In legitimate
investing the investors have a 50/50 chance of gaining or losing. In Ponzi schemes, there is
100% chance of losing. The victims are persuaded to trust and persuaded to invest. The tools
used to persuade are the physical image of being a financial success; that the investment is a sure
thing and that the perpetrator is trustworthy. These qualities are all falsities in Ponzi schemes.
The perpetrators are glib, charming and exude self-confidence; investors want to believe they are
all that they say they are. This section discusses the mechanism of persuasion in relationship to
white-collar crimes and Ponzi schemes.
During times of financial booms, people have discretionary funds that they want to invest
safely and where they can get maximum interest return. Investors want to make sure they will be
able to withdraw their funds when they need it. The perpetrators know this and construct their
sales vocabulary to accommodate these fears.
The “house-money effect” is such that when investors experience profits they feel
confident and want to continue or invest more. (Nofsinger,2014). Ponzi perpetrators know this
effect and use it to their advantage. When investor/victims first invest, they get their interest
right on time, consistently, as promised. This causes the victims to feel confident so that they
roll over their earnings, invest more and tell all their friends about the great investment.
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In some faith-based Ponzi schemes, the members of the churches who were taken
advantage of did not believe they had been defrauded. They believed the government had falsely
convicted their church member. Among the faith-based Ponzi schemes, it is references to God
and God’s showing preference that are common practice as a mechanism to persuade.
•

One such case is that of David Souza who used his affiliation with his church to attract
investors. Souza used the line: “obvious favor of God,” suggesting that his investments
were successful because God made it so. (SEC v. Souza,2009, p. 3).

•

A second case example is that of Charles Leif Erickson of Massachusetts. Erickson, a
church elder said that the “Holy Spirit” had shown him the method he used in futures
contracts. (USA v. Erickson, 2016, p. 1)

•

Eldon Gresham ran a FOREX scheme in Georgia. In his scheme, he targeted Christians
telling them: “the Lord had blessed him” He also used the action of exclusiveness that he
was lonely offering his investments to a “’limited number of Christians for a limited
time.” (CFTC, p.r. 5674-09, 2009, Gresham).

•

Perpetrators use such phrases as: “deistically inspired or divinely guided” (SEC v.
TriEnergy, p. 6)

Gambler’s Fallacy
The Gambler’s fallacy is the behavior demonstrated by gamblers when they have had
losses in gambling but continue because they feel that one more game will change their luck and
they will win a large profit; it is suggested herein that same behavior applies in Brokerage-failure
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schemes. The brokers have experienced successful trades in the past, but then they endure
severe losses. They then borrow from investors in an effort to try to recuperate the losses,
always feeling they are one trade away from success when they will be able to pay back
investors principal.
Roser Granero et al, in Gambling on the stock market: an unexplored issue, addresses
investing in the stock market as it relates to pathological addiction. (Granero et al, 2012). Their
study included 1470 individuals who had been diagnosed with gambling addiction, in Barcelona,
Spain. This study interviewed the individuals to determine life style choices that would be
characteristic of gambling addiction such as lying about funds lost, obsessive-compulsive,
reward dependence, and many other indicator variables. Their findings did not support their
hypothesis that the consequences are more severe for those who are stock market gambling
addicted. Their study only included those who sought treatment for gambling addiction. The
study is novel in that few studies have attempted to measure stock market investing as a
gambling addiction. (Granero et al, 2012).
This study also looks at what is known as “the gambler's fallacy” to explain behaviors in
Brokerage-failure Ponzi schemes. The gambler's fallacy is: “a phenomenon whereby people
inappropriately predict a reversal.” (Shefrin,2002, pg. 46). Gamblers are absolutely certain they
will make that one good game or make that one good bet and win big, turning around a losing
streak. It is suggested herein that this is also a behavior that this is the thinking process with the
Brokerage-failure schemes. The broker-dealer endures losses, in this case, as a result of the
failing financial market during the crisis of 2007-2010, the study focus time period. He, or she,
then hide the losses from their clients and instead try for another investment. When that also
fails, the brokerage or hedge fund begins to pay back interest or principal to the earlier investors
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from the funds of new investors. The broker continues to believe they will have successful
trades and pay everyone back.
Rabin explains that in investing, the Gambler’s fallacy is demonstrated when an investor
or investment adviser has had several losses in the market, they believe the law of probability
infers that there must be a gain coming next. Rabin suggests that people mistakenly assume that
they can relate small batches of phenomenon to large batches of phenomenon, meaning a
relationship between the entire stock market to the performance of one investment product, or
that previous experiences in the stock market will be indicative of current stock market
performances. Individual stocks can go up or down regardless of what the stock market is doing.
When there is a binary, or 50/50, chance that an investment or market will go up or down
individuals believe they can predict what will be next. Generally, when the financial market has
several consecutive declines, investors tend to believe there will be a correction, somehow
naturally or magically occurring. With legitimate investments, there is not just up or down
trends but also staying even; an investment may continue at the same performance rate. Ponzi
schemes are doomed to failure; there is no 50/50 option.
According to the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, one of the
behavioral descriptions of a pathological gambling disorder is:
“A pattern of “chasing” one's losses may develop, with an urgent need to keep gambling
(often with larger bets or the taking of greater risks) to undo a loss or series of losses.
The individual may abandon his or her gambling strategy and try to win back losses all at
once. Although all gamblers may chase for short periods, it is the long-term chase that is
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more characteristic of individuals with Pathological Gambling (Criterion 6).” (American
Psychiatric Association 2015, p. 585)

Hersh Shefrin describes the Gambler’s fallacy in relationship to investing. The gambler's
fallacy dictates that when some individual experiences something repeatedly, such as five-coin
tosses of heads in a row, they feel certain that the sixth toss is bound to be tails. (Shefrin,2002,
pg. 17). In relationship to the Brokerage-failure Ponzi schemes, the broker sees loss after loss
and feels certain a good trade is in order and keeps trying. Shefrin also explains that some
individuals have loss-aversion: they simply cannot accept a loss and hold on even when there is
no reasonable chance of success. Shefrin calls this: “get-evenitis.” (Shefrin, 2002, pg. 107).
Meaning individuals feel that if they hold on long enough they will eventually bring their
investments back up to a profit.
This study suggests that in the Brokerage-failure schemes the brokers suffered from “getevenitis” (Shefrin, 2002, pg.107), and succumbed to the gambler's fallacy. Once this occurred the
brokers continued to borrow funds from later investors to keep earlier investors satisfied. They
could not just admit they had failed to their investors, they are loss-averse, unable to accept the
financial losses.
Greed
On the individual level, greed is what enables the fraud scheme to occur; this applies to
both intentional and accidental Ponzi schemes. Both the perpetrator and the victims want
money. Greed is an insatiable, ego-driven need for more money, and more possessions. Ponzi
perpetrators justify their actions in their beliefs that their victims are also looking for a quick,
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easy profit, that they are just as greedy as the perpetrator. In Tamar Frankel’s book: The Ponzi
Scheme Puzzle, she discusses that Ponzi perpetrators justify their actions, because the
perpetrators feel that their victims are just as greedy as they are. (Frankel,2012).
Justifying taking advantage of victims based on greed is victim blaming. That being said,
in many Ponzi schemes the victims were accredited investors. By the Securities Act of 1933,
accredited investors are required to have a high financial worth and to be financially
sophisticated. These are individuals or financial entities such as insurance companies or pension
funds that are required to perform due diligence and to have an understanding of trading
practices and laws. These are people who are considered knowledgeable and who should have
recognized that something was amiss. In: History of Greed, David Sarna also explains that the
greed of investors enables the fraud to happen. (Sarna, 2010). Perpetrators believe anyone
willing to invest with them wants something without working to earn it and therefore deserve to
be taken advantage of.
When a Ponzi perpetrator promises their victims outrageous profits, such as 100% or
3,000%, the victims must know on some level that it is not feasible. If the individual pushing
their investment was so successful, why would they need anyone else’s money? The potential
investor-victims in many schemes must have known that something does not pass the “smell
test.”
It seems quite irrational that anyone would knowingly contribute funds that they have
any inclination they might lose. The Ponzi perpetrators go to great lengths to convince their
potential and current investor-victims of the legitimacy of their product. They are experts at
deceit and fraudulent documents. The victims are not completely to be blamed.
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In some cases, it is the status of having luxurious possessions that assuages the needy ego
of the perpetrator. Most Ponzi perpetrators are listed as having used the illegally obtained funds
for mortgage payments and more often than not, the purchase of at least one mansion. The lists
of luxury vehicles in many Ponzi schemes is quite beyond the pale, some of the top perpetrators
have many. Scott Rothstein had a collection of watches as well as these luxury cars:
•

Two Ferraris

•

Two Rolls Royces- one a convertible

•

A Corvette

•

A Lamborghini

•

A Bentley

•

A Cadillac Escalade

•

A Limousine Ford Expedition

•

A Mercedes

•

A Bugatti Veyron

General Strain Theory and Individual/offender Level
Steven Messner and Richard Rosenfeld (2013), discussed the American Dream and
white-collar crime. Their theory is that Americans are ingrained with the belief that they must be
financially successful to fit into society. Their theory lends itself directly to those in the Brokerfailure schemes: the perpetrators fear a loss of status and evolve into a fraudulent scheme to
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remain a part of the social group they have achieved. It would also apply to most perpetrators
who use their victim’s money to present themselves as being financially successful
It was attempted to find indicators of “strain” in federal documents for quantification.
Indicators of strain would be the perpetrators stating their fear of loss of finances or social status
in their letters to the judge. However, these pre-sentencing reports or memoranda documents are
not always transcribed and are not consistently available to the public; not enough of these
documents were available to carry out a quantitative analysis. The sentencing memorandums, or
letters to the judge from defendants, that were available were from: Bernard Madoff, Allen
Stanford, Tom Petters, Scott Rothstein, Francisco, Illarramendi and Samuel Israel were analyzed
for indicators of strain theory.
•

Francisco Illarramendi was originally from Venezuela. Illarramendi became accustomed
to the American culture as a child while his father served as an embassy official from
Venezuela and chose to live in the U.S. Illarramendi is responsible for a $723 million
scheme that lasted for at least five years. Coming from an upper socioeconomic class in
Venezuela, as well as holding a master's degree in economics, indicates that Illarramendi
would have fit into an upper middle-class group in America and possibly a wealthier
class in Venezuela. Illarramendi’s sentencing memorandum to the court describes that he
was pressured into a sizable international trade that did not successfully compete, leaving
Illarramendi with a $5 million loss. He felt backing out of this business would have
jeopardized his family’s reputation and social status. His memorandum also disclosed
the paying of bribes in order to carry out business in other countries. Illarramendi would
be a classic example of strain theory, that also includes not just the American Dream but
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social pressures within his own Venezuelan culture. (USDC, Connecticut, 3:11-cr-41
SRU)
•

Scott Rothstein came from a “tight-knit family” (USDC, 0:09-cr-60331 JIC -doc 272, p.
11). He went to law school, passed the bar exam and had a successful law career. There
were no indicators of failure, or fear of failure. Rothstein had achieved the American
Dream. He gave generously to charities before and during his criminal acts. Rothstein
appeared to be clearly of upper-socioeconomic status and was quite accomplished but
still felt the need to commit fraud. There is no indicator of fear of loss or of strain theory
in the sentencing documents. He had an insatiable desire for more money and material
wealth.

•

Allen Stanford denied he had perpetrated a Ponzi scheme and continues to appeal his
conviction. Stanford was sentenced to 110 years incarceration. Stanford insisted there
were actual investments taking place and that he had created banks in Panama, Ecuador,
Venezuela and Peru. Stanford still felt he ran legitimate businesses and that he had been
wrongly convicted. There was no fear of failure or loss simply because in Stanford’s
view he successfully ran many legitimate businesses. (USDC, TXSD 4:09-cr-00342m
Doc 875)

•

Tom Petters started with nothing; his sentencing memorandum talks of achieving the
American idea of success. Petters impressed upon others that his was a classic case of
someone who had humble beginnings then achieved success through hard work. Petters
sentencing document would demonstrate Messner and Rosenfeld’s discussion of strain
theory and the desire to fulfill the American Dream. His sentencing memorandum was
quite religious in nature and asked for mercy. The document does not mention a fear of
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failure or loss just reiterates the notion of achieving success through hard work. (USDC
0:08-cr-000364-RHK-AJB Doc. 391).
•

In Bernard Madoff’s sentencing memorandum, he admitted he knew what he was doing
was illegal. Madoff stated: “As I engaged in my fraud, I knew what I was doing wrong,
indeed criminal. When I began the Ponzi scheme I believed it would end shortly and I
would be able to extricate myself and my clients from the scheme. However, this proved
difficult, and ultimately impossible, and as the years went by I realized that my arrest and
this day would inevitably come.” (USDC SDNY, 09-cr-213, pp. 23 &24, lines 21-1). He
stated that the country was in a recession when he began his scheme in the early 1990s.
Madoff stated that: “While I never promised a specific rate of return to my clients, I felt
compelled to satisfy my clients expectations at any cost.” (USDC SDNY, 09-cr-213, p.
25, lines 18-20). Madoff came from a middle-class family, he had gone to Hofstra
University and Brooklyn Law school.
Madoff’s admissions at his sentencing would indicate a fear of disappointing his
clients. The fear of disappointing his clients would represent a fear of loss of business and
loss of social status indicative of strain theory. Also, his admission of starting the Ponzi
scheme out of failure, believing he would be able to stop it early on, then realizing the
scheme could not stop, is the classic Brokerage-failure scheme. In this case, the scheme
went on for at least eighteen years.
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Social Learning Theory
Social learning theory holds that “Criminal behavior is learned” and that “Criminal
behavior is learned in interaction with other persons in a process of communication.”
(Sutherland 1947, pgs. 6-7). It is not known how many or which Ponzi perpetrators may have
learned their skills from other perpetrators. Some feeder funds may be examples of social
learning theory, in that some funds may have learned to carry out the scheme from the main
fund. However, not all of the feeder funds knew that the primary fund they were investing in
was a fraudulent scheme. Two cases in particular stand out as probable social-learning
theory examples.
•

In the case of the Merkle brothers, Eric and Jay were taken advantage of in a scheme
in Michigan. Rather than report their loss to authorities, they began a scheme of their
own. They had been in their community for many decades and had the reputation of
being upstanding members of the community. It was easy for them to convince
fellow church members and friends to invest in their scheme. They learned the skills
of running a fraudulent scheme from being taken advantage of then used those skills
to take advantage of others. The brothers then established their own oil and gas based
Ponzi scheme, establishing several shell companies to perpetrate their fraud. This one
case would demonstrate the social-learning theory of crime, in that the brothers
learned how to perpetrate a fraud by being victims of a Ponzi scheme. (FBI,
1/19/2010).

•

A second case is that of Tom Petters. Tom Petters worked with a recidivist in
securities fraud schemes, Larry Reynolds, a disbarred attorney. Reynolds taught
Petters how to produce fraudulent documents and how to run the scheme. When
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authorities suspected something illegal was at play in Petter’s business, it was
Reynolds who they went to. As a recidivist who had served to prior sentences,
Reynolds knew that the first person to work with authorities gets leniency, in most
cases. It was Reynolds who explained to authorities how Petters carried out the
scheme. (U.S. v. Larry Reynolds 2010).

Victim Level Perspectives
There is minimal information provided on the victims of Ponzi schemes in federal
documents. The information is generally limited to the quantity of victims and in many cases
only an estimate of the total number of victims. Rarely is information on the demographics of
victims offered, except in the cases of affinity fraud or when the elderly are the victims. Very
few documents provide individual information on the victims. Thus, there will be only general
discussion of the victims, simply because there is no consistency in reporting on victims to allow
for reliable and valid quantitative results. The victims start out as investors and become victims.
The term “victim” will be used throughout because the former investors lost their money to the
frauds; they are no longer investors but instead the victims of fraud.

Trust as a Mechanism of Fraud and Social Theory
Financial markets and investing could not exist without the social dynamic of trust. This
section looks at the dynamic of trust and the relationship to financial markets, investing and how
trust enables the frauds to take place.
Theories of social connections and trust have been well studied among academics in
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sociology and psychology. Bart Nooteboom, states that: “Trust requires interdisciplinary
analysis, a combination of economics, sociology, social psychology and cognitive science.”
(Nooteboom 2012). This study has taken that approach, finding the social dynamic of trust
overlapping these disciplines and a significant part of human social and financial interactions.
It is the social connections that enable the fraud to occur. Among those, Frijters and
Foster explain that individuals can be members of several groups at once in social identity
theory. (Frijters and Foster, 2013). Hence, we will see in the data that some perpetrators used
their belonging to a nationality or ethnic race as well as their religious affiliation to find their
victims, such as: Persian Jews (SEC vs. Neman, 2012), Somalian Muslims (SEC vs. Shidaal
Express), African American Christians (Austin, 2004), and Fijian-Indian (USDOJ, Singh, 2014).
It is likely that perpetrators would have included individuals from other groups, were they
willing participants, but the initial contact method to perpetrate the fraud is based on a
relationship of affiliation. The relationship of an affiliation supports the concept of trust within
individuals in self-identifying groups. The sense of trust within groups, especially those that
hold two affiliations such as both religiousness and ethnicity, is likely to be a stronger bond that
renders the group members more vulnerable to the fraud.
Academics have attempted to classify and define trust in social relationships. (Fiske,
2004; McNight, 2006; Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2001). Anthropologist Alan Fiske developed the
Relational Models Theory, applying the concept of trust to social relationships. (Fiske, 2004).
His theory implies that people relate to each other in four ways. These models suggest how
individuals in groups can be victimized by their trust of others they perceive to be similar to
themselves. The “communal sharing model” suggest that members of a group self-identify,
distinguishing themselves from others. Fiske's second model is that of “equality matching”,
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meaning members of a group participate in reciprocal behavior: you do for me; I do for you.
The third model is that of “authority ranking.” (Fiske, 2004). In this model members of a group
have some recognized hierarchy. This concept applies to religious groups who would recognize
someone to be an authority within the group such as a rabbi or pastor. In some affinity frauds,
the pastor was the perpetrator that took advantage of parishioners. The fourth model component
explains that the group recognizes something of value such as currency. This may seem obvious
but Fiske is an anthropologist using this model to explain human social interactions revolving
around trust. A society must hold a mutual concept of financial value in order for there to be
actions such as investing, theft or fraud. Basically, Fiske is saying there must be basic
communally accepted values in place for a community to build a sense of trust from within itself.
Castelfranchi and Falcone explain that there are boundaries between when trusting is a
rational act and when it is actually “overconfident and risky.” (Castelfranchi and Falcone 2001).
The authors have quantified trust in an attempt to bring a logical format to the concept of trust.
Their argument uses basic logic formulas: (if X then Y), in order to measure the concept of trust
as well as different types of trust. It all boils down to one's ability to determine whether or not
acquaintances or strangers can be trusted and if trust is a logically knowable, predictable
occurrence? In their discussion, Castelfranchi and Falcone explain that trust requires shared
values that two parties are aware of. This is the basis of the trust in affinity fraud. Potential
investors assume that their shared affiliation with another means that the individual will be
functioning under the same moral values that they themselves would have. This concept has
been discussed by other authors as well. (Frijters & Foster, 2013).
Baker and Faulkner (2004) discuss social connections and how they foster economic
gain. It is their contention that social connections are based on culturally recognized values that
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allow for economic transactions to take place. They clarify that sociology tends to concentrate
on the positive qualities of social interactions as they relate to financial transactions, and
criminologists concentrate on the negative social qualities that may contribute to criminal
financial transactions. These authors argue that the views of economic sociologists and whitecollar criminologists oppose one another. It would seem in the case of affinity fraud the
criminologists are winning the argument, in that it is the social connections that render the
victims vulnerable to the predatory behaviors of the perpetrators of the frauds - the negative
outcome.
Charles Tilly addresses trust in relationship to transnational migration. Tilly states that:
“trust consists of placing valued outcomes at risk to others' malfeasance, mistakes or failures.”
(Tilly 2005). This is exactly what immigrants who have been victims of affinity fraud have
done, they trusted in someone from their homeland and lost their money as a result. Tilly
explains that “trust networks” are made of “interpersonal; connections, consisting of mainly
strong ties,” that may leave those within the social bond, vulnerable to “malfeasance, mistakes or
failures of others.” (Tilly, 2007).
One of the qualities that distinguishes white-collar crime from other types of crime is that
there are generally multiple victims. Often times the perpetrator of a white-collar criminal act
does not know the victim or victims nor has or will ever see them. Ponzi perpetrators generally
know their victims and most often times have carefully manipulated them into being victims.
The quantitative section of this study cannot discuss characteristics of victims on Ponzi schemes
because there is not consistent information about them publicly available. Literature and
research on the victims of white-collar crime in general is uncommon. The few studies that do
exist have surveyed for satisfaction in outcomes and restitution, not for characteristics of the
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victims. (Croall, 2016). Given the right to privacy of the victims limits direct contact or knowing
details about their victimization, we can only surmise about the victims in general from available
information and literature.
In many cases, such as Westridge Capital-Greenwood, (CFTC v. Westridge, 2006) and
Capital Consultants-Grayson, the victims were pensions (SEC l.r. 17490, Grayson, 2002). The
court records may indicate that there were only eight victims but each victim was a pension that
represented thousands of people who lost their pensions. If there is one suggestion this research
could make, it would be for required enhanced due diligence by individuals running pensions
investment plans.
The victims are rarely, if ever, identified in federal documents on Ponzi schemes.
Generally little information is provided on the victims beyond a mention of the quantity, or
affiliation such as family members, church members or in the case of affinity-fraud, the
affiliations. Federal documents may refer to victims anonymously such as: victim “A” deposited
an amount of money in an account; victim “B” deposited this much money with the perpetrator,
and so forth. Names of victims are rarely if ever provided. Thus, victims cannot be contacted
for interviews or surveys.
Generally, in Ponzi schemes, there is a trustee or receiver’s website that victims must
contact to be considered for reimbursement. The receiver has names of victims, but the names
are not a matter of public record. The receiver has the responsibility of finding all of the victims
and determining how much each individual invested with the perpetrator. The receiver must also
determine who are legitimate victims and who are not victims, but instead pretending to be
victims in the hopes of receiving funds.
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The initial number of victims listed in federal documents may be very exact such as “84”
or it may be listed as something less specific such as “hundreds.” There must be multiple
victims for a crime to be considered a Ponzi scheme because earlier investors must be paid with
the funds of later investors for the fraud to be a Ponzi scheme. The number of victims listed in
this study is at least 2,169,860. In the cases where the amount was vague such as “dozens,”
“hundreds,” or “thousands” the amount counted was the minimum number stated, such as a 12,
100 or 1000. Generally, the number of victims in a scheme is not known until the receiver has
fulfilled his or her obligation to give back any funds recovered. However, the final number of
victims is not then posted in any formal or public documentation.
Hazell Croall (2016) also states that white-collar crime includes multiple victims, but she
adds that some are also repeat victims. Croall notes that white-collar crime not only affects the
lives of the victims but also the community and businesses in general. In her study, she reports
that the poorest victims are the most severely affected. (Croall, 2016, p. 70). Individuals with
less money, have less to lose and suffer more intensely than those who can rebound their
finances. However, she also reports that white-collar victims cut across all races, genders and
socioeconomic levels. Trahan et al, state that “fraud affects all persons regardless of race, age, or
socioeconomic status.” (Trahan et al 2005; Mizell 1997).
Croall also discussed the issue that the perpetrators are carrying out their crimes in the
environment of a business situation where the victims have a reasonable expectation of being
able to trust. (Croall, 2016). Trust is the commonality among all authors reporting on whitecollar crime. Croall also points out that the victims in white-collar crimes do not always
consider themselves victims. One point that Croall makes that was also made by Benson and
Simpson (2015), is that what information there is on white-collar crime studies do not
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differentiate between civil actions by regulatory agencies and criminal actions by law
enforcement agencies. Croall also makes note that the victims of white-collar crimes are not just
the individuals affected, but also organizations such as pensions, institutions and charities.
Again, in corporate crimes and environmental crimes entire communities can be affected. In the
real-estate and mortgage boom that came before the financial crisis, it was individuals and global
markets that were affected by the subprime mortgage failure. It affected individuals then
affected the financial markets which then affected the overall economy. Croall’s point is well
taken that victims are also communities; the victims can be both micro and macro level.
In most white-collar crimes, the perpetrator is running a legitimate business, it is the
environment that affords the opportunity. However, in the case of Ponzi schemes the business
entity is rarely a legitimate business, only in the case of accidental frauds. This study has
differentiated between criminal and civil actions and also accounts for those cases that received
both civil actions and criminal charges.
Shelly Jackson has defined financial fraud/exploitation victims by types. (Jackson 2015).
Jackson uses the term of age-based victims to discuss those victims, who are generally elderly
and frequently the victims of many exploitive and fraudulent acts, often times at the hands of
their own relatives. Ponzi perpetrators frequently victimize their friends and relatives first.
Vulnerability is also a category Jackson uses indicating that some victims pose a specific
vulnerability to exploitation or fraud such as individuals with dementia. Jackson defines a trust
relationship meaning there is a relationship of trust established between the victim and the
offender such as a caretaker, or a member of the clergy. Fiduciary relationships present an
opportunity for exploitation and fraud. In all Ponzi schemes, all cases had some level of a
fiduciary responsibility, in that the perpetrators were expected to carry out some investment.
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Some were attorneys, accountants and stock brokers or advisers who have a legal fiduciary
responsibility. Jackson differentiates between fraud and exploitation in that fraud involves
breaking the law and deception whereas exploitation might be simply taking advantage of a
relative. (Jackson 2015).

Conclusions about Victims of White-Collar Crimes
Ponzi schemes are based on trust. In order for the fraud to take place the perpetrators
must persuade the victims to trust them. As Benson and Simpson have stated: “the gendered
nature of white-collar crime victimization patterns mirror the gendered nature of white-collar
offending.” (2015, p. 220). This is not an accurate depiction of Ponzi scheme victims. Most
Ponzi perpetrators do not prey on one specific gender; everyone is vulnerable. There are two
exceptions: Sarah Howe victimized women. Kenneth Crumbley preyed on elderly men;
Crumbley was 55 years old. (SEC v. Kenneth W. Crumbley Jr., 2016). Trahan et al states that:
“fraud affects all persons regardless of race, age, or socioeconomic status (Trahan et al 2005),
(Mizell 1997). At most the gender of victims in Ponzi cases is not knowable; it is likely that in
most white-collar cases there is little documentation of gender documentation of the victims. In
the case of Enron, the victims were the entire state of California, the genders were equally
vulnerable and victimized.
Adam Trahan, James Marquart and Janet Mullings (2005), take an interesting approach in
applying Messner and Rosenfeld's concept on the American Dream and apply it to the victims of
crime. This would aptly apply to the victims of Ponzi schemes. These victim- investors, invest
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in an attempt to increase their socioeconomic status, or to maintain their socioeconomic status, as
part of the American Dream.
Trahan, Marquart and Mullings attempted to survey victims of Ponzi schemes in Harris
County.23 Their study shows that all 434 victims approached agreed to be interviewed
anonymously. The authors look at one scheme that took place in the 1990s, Jack Barnes, as a
case study to study characteristics of the victims. In this case, the victims found profits early on
then told their friends about the investment opportunity and true to Ponzi form, they all wanted
in as well. Of the victims in this study “44% were males, 25% were females and 31% were
couples,” the median age of victims was 47. (Trahan et al p. 607). The authors also applied the
theory of Messner and Rosenfeld concept of the pursuit of the American Dream (2001), being
the prime motivating factor for the victims.
The study of the victims of white-collar crimes in general is in great need. Such studies
are challenging because information is not available on victims. The issue is also complicated by
definitions; many people may have been the victim of a white-collar crime but do not know it.
Also, many victims of fraud are not willing to let on that they have been victimized, there is a
shame factor. Commonly, when victims are present at sentencing hearings and have then been
interviewed by the press; their stories are similar: they lost their life savings and are completely
without culpability.24 Their stories are those of devastation. A great many are elderly and have
no means of recuperating losses. They have lost their homes, and children’s college finds, and

23
24

This is state or county level prosecutions, the state listed is Texas.
These victim’s stories are quite common in the majority of schemes and far too great in number to cite.
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retirement savings. Ideally, specific to the case of Ponzi victims, research would be undertaken
into their culpability such as:
•

On some level, did they suspect something was amiss?

•

Did they realize that high rates and guaranteed interest could not be realistic?

•

How were they acquainted with the perpetrator?

One of the greater challenges of white-collar crime research is that each crime has many
victims, and sometimes those victims do not want to be exposed nor to admit they were
victimized. Many victims are fully victims; they never suspected or saw the confidence scheme
coming. In some of the faith-based frauds, the victims refused to believe they were defrauded.
Getting victims to participate in interviews or surveys would be a challenge, if they could be
located.
In some circumstances, the victims may have known something was not on-the-level, but
invested anyway; they may not be so willing to admit complicity in their own victimization.
There is the point that when something seemed too good to be true, and yet the victims invested
anyway, that a certain degree of responsibility must be accepted. These individuals may not be
willing to respond honestly to surveys or interviews. Again, research on the victims in Ponzi
schemes may not be possible.
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Chapter 5: Study Methodology
Focus of the Research
The primary focus of this research is to better understand the characteristics of a specific
type of Ponzi scheme: The Brokerage-failure schemes, an accidental type of fraud. The
differentiation of this type of scheme from intentional fraud Ponzi schemes will determine the
percentages of each during the financial crisis. For the purpose of this examination, Brokeragefailure schemes will be compared to other Ponzi schemes that are categorized as intentional
Ponzi schemes. This comparison is important for two reasons: 1) a systematic operationalization
(identification) of Brokerage-failures does not exist in any form in relevant academic literature
and, 2) the ability to understand what differentiated Brokerage-failure schemes from intentional
Ponzi schemes is expected to be a valuable policy and academic tool for the future of research in
this area. This will aid regulators and law enforcement.
This study does not concentrate on the Madoff, Stanford or Petters Ponzi schemes, or
Charles Ponzi, the namesake of all Ponzi schemes. These fraudsters have been studied and
written about quite thoroughly, (Henriques 2011; Markopolos, 2011; Kirtzman 2010; Ross 2009;
Kurdas, 2012; Hoffman, 2009; Brame, 2016), these are just the books alone. Madoff and
Stanford have been in the mainstream media every week since 2009; there is nothing new to be
said. Instead this research counts Madoff, Stanford and Petters as units of observation among
1068 of federally investigated and documented Ponzi schemes, referencing them as examples.
Charles Ponzi and other significant and historical schemes have been addressed in a section of
the literature review devoted to the history of this type of scheme, before and after Charles Ponzi.
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These cases are referred to throughout the study as examples, as well as many of the other Ponzi
schemes.

Hypotheses
H1: It is expected that the data will show that previously existing intentional Ponzi
schemes failed at a greater rate during the financial crisis of 2007-2010, and were
therefore exposed.

H2: It is expected that there will be more new Brokerage-failure Ponzi schemes than
intentional Ponzi schemes during the financial crisis of 2007-2016.

H3: It is expected that there is a difference in intentional Ponzi schemes and Brokeragefailure Ponzi schemes from 2007 to 2016.

H4: It is expected that there are differences between the types of Ponzi schemes from
2007 to 2016.

H5: It is expected that there are differences in the characteristics of the Ponzi scheme
perpetrators from 2007 to 2016.
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Explanation: The financial crisis was associated with existing intentional Ponzi schemes failure
when no new investors could be found to supply previous investors with interest.
Whereas, some Brokerage-failure and Business-failure schemes devolved into Ponzi schemes
from legitimate businesses as the stock market and economy declined. This study measures the
types of Ponzi schemes in relation to the entire study time frame of 1973 to 2016, the focus time
frame of 2007-2010-- the financial crisis years, and the time period after 2007.

Methods
Population-Units of Observation
The population being studied is the known cases of federal level Ponzi schemes included
in federal data sets, from the time period of January 1973 until May 2016. The criteria for
determining which federal level cases are included in the data set are the use of terms such as:
Ponzi; Ponzi scheme; Ponzi-like; Ponzi-style; Ponzi payment, in federal regulatory and law
enforcement agency documents. Each Ponzi scheme is a unit of observation, Ponzi schemes are
the units of analysis. The federal agency documents are a matter of public record, accessed
through federal agency websites. Only cases that have been determined in a federal criminal
court of law or by federal civil administrative proceedings to be a Ponzi in nature are included in
the data sets. The data sets are a comprehensive population of known cases within federal
websites as of May 31, 2016, not an exhaustive universe of all Ponzi schemes that took place
during this period; the latter is not knowable, documentable or provable.
The data sets are comprehensive in that they include all known schemes using the term
“Ponzi” that are included in federal agency documents. The term “Ponzi” is unique; federal
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agency search engines are sophisticated and can find all usage of the term when used in text.
The great majority of cases in the study involved actions by more than one federal agency,
allowing for cross referencing. It is known that there are frauds that technically have the actions
considered to be Ponzi schemes but no federal agency used the term “Ponzi” in the text; these
cases are not included in the study because the criteria is that a federal agency must designate a
fraud scheme as “Ponzi” to be included in the study.

Data Collection
Federal Agencies’ Data Bases
The documents used in coding the Ponzi schemes were collected from these federal
agencies: Securities Exchange Commission, (SEC) Federal Bureau of Investigation, (FBI), the
Commodities and Futures Trading Commissions, (CFTC), Internal Revenue Service, (IRS),
United State Postal Service Criminal Investigations, (USPS). The units of analysis, the Ponzi
schemes, have been collected from legal documents that are publicly available through the SEC,
FBI, CFTC, and the Department of Justice(DOJ). The Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force,
(FFETF), established in 2009, is a federal entity made up with the participants of the other
federal agencies that investigate fraud, allowing the agencies to work in partnership. The Fraud
Task force website allows for searching through press releases, by year and month. The FFETF
documents are the same information provided by the DOJ. Brokers, traders, investment advisers
are tested by are licensed through the private sector trade regulators: Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA), and the National Futures Association (NFA). These agencies
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also provide publicly accessible information on the professional status of broker, traders and
advisers free of charge.
The criteria for inclusion are:
1. Use of the following terms by federal agencies in the text of legal documents: Ponzi;
Ponzi-like; Ponzi-style; Ponzi payment; any variation thereof.
2. In Federal Agency data bases, a matter of public record.
3. Received civil federal agency administrative actions and/or criminal indictment or
conviction.
This study used advanced search engines of the federal agencies stated above, using the
search term “Ponzi.” The agency search engines are sophisticated enough to catch any use of the
term “Ponzi” in all textual usage.25 The agencies’ documents cross reference one another.
Department of Justice and FBI documents list other agencies involved in investigations, as do the
IRS and USPIS. The SEC and CFTC documents discuss criminal actions and provide docket
numbers for criminal actions. Additionally, these agencies offer the option to receive alerts
when press release and litigation release are released; these reports automatically come to email.
Each press release and litigation release was then searched for the term “Ponzi.” The media
often times referred to general fraud cases as Ponzi schemes, but the cases were not designated in
federal agency documents as Ponzi schemes. These cases are not included in the data sets.
These documents were reviewed at least four times throughout the coding process by the
author. Initially each document was looked at to determine the “Ponzi” criteria for inclusion.
Second, the documents for each scheme were again perused for the names and details of the

25

SEC web designer Robert Rand was consulted throughout the research to maximize SEC data bases.
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perpetrators. Third, the documents were again perused for details about incorporation and
methods of carrying out the scheme. Finally, the documents were perused for details about
registration with the SEC and CFTC to ascertain if the scheme was legally registered in 2006,
prior to the onset of the financial crisis to determine if it was a legitimately functioning business
or brokerage. This process has been carried out by the author with a meticulous attention to
detail.
Once a case was found to be designated a Ponzi scheme in federal documents, each
document was then analyzed for information on the amount of money taken in the scheme, the
time frame, the number of perpetrators and victims, the location, professions, incorporation, and
whether or not the perpetrators were registered with the SEC or CFTC or FINRA. Federal level
legal and civil actions are consistent throughout the nation as well as in sentencing and reporting,
allowing the consistency and validity needed for a quantitative analysis. State laws vary on
registration for brokers, dealers and advisers, prosecution sentencing and reporting; it would not
be appropriate to compare state and federal level prosecutions.
These Ponzi cases have been determined through criminal legal proceedings or through
an administrative judge to have occurred, they are a matter of public record. Cases that have not
resulted in civil administrative actions, sanctions, criminal charges or criminal guilt are not part
of the study. No individuals, either the perpetrators of the fraud, or the victims of the fraud, have
been contacted. These terms: “Ponzi” and “affinity fraud” are standard terminology that has the
same meaning in all federal agencies, allowing for consistency. Each agency is required to
enforce the same federal laws. As such, there is consistency and reliability in the laws, the
standard vocabulary and practices followed in these federal agencies. There is consistency in
reporting practices of all agencies. Likewise, all cases are prosecuted by one agency: The
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Department of Justice, by United States Attorneys; there is consistency in the prosecutorial
practices across the nation's offices.
Many of the fraud cases have taken place in several states. In most cases, they have been
investigated by more than one federal agency. There are cases that have been investigated and
prosecuted on state levels; this study only looks at federal level cases. State level cases do not
have the same consistency in prosecution or reporting as the federal level does. In most cases,
federal laws have been broken making the cases federal level. Few cases take place only within
state boundaries, most are multistate and in many cases, international in scope.
Federal Bureau of Investigation press releases are actually a product of the United States
Attorney's office, under the Department of Justice. They are listed through the FBI web site but
originate with the United States Attorney's office. The Department of Justice also issues the
same documents under their banner. Both the FBI and Department of Justice websites were
searched for cases. The Department of Justice main site was searched initially, then each state’s
United States Attorney’s office websites under the Department of Justice were searched for press
releases individually.
The exception in data collection are those cases that occurred in Hawaii. The Hawaiian
FBI/DOJ office does not post written press release as consistently as the U.S. mainland state
offices. The determination of Ponzi schemes in Hawaii has been acquired from phone
communications with written confirmation, with FBI Special Agent Tom Simon. Agent Simon
provided a list of Ponzi schemes in a phone conversation then confirmed through an email
communication. Agent Simon also held television press conferences publicly stating that these
cases were Ponzi schemes. In these cases, documentation has been taken from PACER, video
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press conferences featuring Tom Simon, and general media news reports, and in some cases FBI
press releases and SEC documents.
Federal Documents
The federal process of reporting legal actions is consistent. Only those cases determined
by federal agencies to be Ponzi schemes are used. Only those cases stated as being affinity fraud
in federal documents are designated in coding as affinity frauds. Whether or not the Ponzi case
is a registered brokerage, dealer or investment adviser is determined by publicly accessible
federal level documents as well as those registered with the SEC, CFTC, FINRA and the NFA.
Qualities of the schemes such as the number of perpetrators, the name of companies, the amount
taken, the months of sentences are a matter of court records and not subject to interpretation. The
quantity of victims or amount taken used in the data set is the amount in final legal actions, the
amount is not interpreted. The author was the single coder; the documents were each reviewed
at least four times, reducing the probability of error. Variables that required interpretation
because of inconsistent word usage in federal documents are considered qualitative and stated as
such in the description of variables and analysis sections. Therefore, inter-coder reliability was
not used. Meanings and definitions are determined by the federal agencies, and the Acts and
legislative statutes governing the federal agencies and their actions.
Federal documents are generally accessible through websites and internet sources as far
back as the year 2002. From 2002 on, the E-Government Act made these documents easily
available on federal agency websites. This requires court personnel, for federal agency to upload
documents to the website or other source. Not all older documents were uploaded and easily
available. In some cases, these documents were acquired through contacting court clerk’s offices
and requesting these documents. In most cases the documents were initially available through
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the SEC and CFTC, in other cases the IRS or USPS. Once a case has gone on to criminal
indictment the documents are available through the FBI and/or the DOJ. Those documents not
available through the above sources were acquired through PACER.
Once federal regulatory and DOJ agency websites were exhausted, any remaining
information not found was searched for through Public Access to Court Electronic Records,
known as PACER. This federal information site includes magistrate actions, civil actions and
criminal actions for a minimal charge. In many cases, the actual sentencing information was
derived from PACER. This federal service charges a search fee of ten cents per page. In many
cases the judgment stating the sentence, is free of charge. Not all court documents are available.
Each Court District determines what is posted on PACER. Transcripts of proceedings are
recorded and in a stenographers’ notes, but not necessarily transcribed unless the court, the
plaintiff or the defendant's attorney pays to have the proceedings transcribed. Also, the court has
to make the documents accessible, in many cases the documents are not available because no one
paid to have them transcribed. Pleas agreements are not generally disclosed to the public.
In some cases, the defendants appeal when there has been a jury trial. In cases where the
defendant plea bargained, part of the plea agreement is that they will not appeal the sentence.
When there is an appeal, the court documents are generally publicly accessible, the court records
have been transcribed in order for the defendant to appeal their conviction. Some of the most
detailed information comes from these appeals.
The Ponzi schemes/units of observation were also coded for dimensions of fraudulent
practices and the methods used to carry out the schemes. These aspects are qualitative
assessments because the different federal agency documents reporting the methods of the
schemes vary from very general to very specific; there is no consistency in vocabulary to support
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consistency, reliability for a quantitative analysis or replicability.
The schemes were coded for length of time as well as the amount of money taken in
millions. At times, there were discrepancies among federal documents with regard to the amount
of money taken in these schemes. It is not known how the federal agencies arrive at the amount
taken. The perpetrators of fraud do not keep meticulous financial records about the money they
take in and how it is used. The amount used in coding is the amount indicated in federal
complaints served on the perpetrators, indictments and convictions, whichever amount is the
final amount applied in the final administrative or criminal legal action. The schemes were also
coded for dimensions of fraudulent practices: the methods used to carry out the schemes. This is
a nominal variable that will be used in later research. They were coded for length of time as well
as the amount of money taken in millions. The details of the individual variables are as follows:

Race and Ethnicity

The study of the ethnic and racial make-up of the Ponzi perpetrators cannot in any way be
considered scientific. The source for ethnicity is the Bureau of Prisons inmate locator
information service. This source offers information on age, gender and race of those
incarcerated in federal facilities. It is cautioned, this should not be considered hard science,
because the designation of ethnicity is not exacting; the inmates self-designate their ethnicity. In
the Bureau of Prison records, inmates of Hispanic origin self-designate as White or Black, not
Hispanic. There is no option for anyone to self-designate as Hispanic. If only White or Black
were used as criteria, the study would not reflect Hispanic populations but instead, result in a
disproportionate number of White offenders; most of the individuals with Hispanic surnames
were self-classified as White. Secondly, affinity fraud is perpetrated by self-designating
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distinctions; those schemes that were based on Hispanic nationalities or ethnicities would be
questionable without a Hispanic race designation in the data set. There cannot be frauds
included in the study that were carried out based on Hispanic ethnicity if there is no Hispanic
variable in the data set. In federal documents those schemes that were based on Hispanic
ethnicities were stated as such. For this study, those individuals with a Hispanic surname were
characterized as Hispanic by the author; there was no other means of determining Hispanic
origin.
That being said, using surnames is not an accurate indicator of race for quantitative
purposes. In many cases women are listed in federal documents by their maiden name or their
married name. Some of the female perpetrators have been married more than once and may be
listed by more than one surname. Furthermore, surname is not always a predictor of ethnicity.
One example: Patricia Roszkowski is classified in BOP records as being Asian. (See appendix
G). The name Roszkowski sounds Eastern European in origin. Someone can have a fully
European surname while being racially Asian or of African descent. Additionally, those
individuals who come from the continent of Asia, do not all consider themselves Asian.
Individuals born in other countries may be fully the ethnicity of their birth, but may have
been adopted into an American family. These individuals are likely to have a surname of a
completely different ethnicity. Many children have been adopted from Korea, India and China
who have Anglo names. Surnames may not be an accurate indicator of ethnicity or nationality.
In the BOP inmate locator, inmates who come from the areas of Pakistan, Bangladesh
and India are sometimes classified as White and other times as Asian. Ponzi perpetrator Piyush
Bachubhai Patel is listed as Asian in BOP data. However, another inmate: Piyush V. Patel is
listed as being White. Likewise, there were three inmates by the name of Sunil Sharma, one of
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which is a Ponzi perpetrator. Two of the three Sunil Sharmas were listed as Asian, but one is
listed as White. Similarly, Ponzi perpetrator Ameer Khan is classified as Asian, while Ameer
Hamza Khan, who committed a different offense, is classified as White.
There are a great many people who are multi-ethnic in the United States. Designating
people by an ethnicity or race is not an exact science; people are likely to take on the values of
the culture that they were raised in which may have nothing to do with their ethnicity.
Hawaiians show the designated classification of Asians instead of American Indians.
While they are indigenous people of Hawaii, their ethnic designation is Asian in BOP
classifications. Again, the BOP race designation is self-identified; the inmates determine their
racial designation. That being said, surnames were the only means of measuring Hispanic origin;
the determination of ethnicity for the purpose of demographics is not an exact science in the
social sciences.
Data Sets
Two data sets have been established for use in this study. The first data set was coded
specifically for qualities of Ponzi schemes, such as timeframe; type; method of operation;
amount taken; the prosecution state indicted; and the documented length of time of the scheme
and quantity of victims. This data set has 1068 units of observation, or Ponzi schemes. These
were coded using the primary perpetrator's name initially, with an identifying code used in the
second data set.
The second data set was coded for those charged as defendants in each Ponzi scheme.
Many schemes have several perpetrators. There are 2354 units of observation, or perpetrators.
Each is coded for gender, age at sentencing and whether or not they are the primary perpetrator.
The data are coded for professions such as attorney, certified public accountant (CPA); whether
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they were the head of a religious organization (clergy); or if they were individually registered
brokers, dealers or investment advisers, on the federal level. Those perpetrators that were not
designated in one of these categories were coded as “other.” In the professions of attorney, CPA;
broker or investment adviser, all were required to pass a professional exam requiring knowledge
of the laws.

Scheme Level Measures: Definitions of Variables
The variables used in coding for Ponzi scheme level of analysis are as follows:
Amount taken: This continuous variable is determined through the amount of money
taken in Ponzi schemes as designated by federal documents, in millions. This is generally
the amount designated in the sentencing document or in the civil action by the SEC or
CFTC, whichever amount is documented at the end of all actions. The amount taken
varies throughout the investigations, this is why the amount used in this study is the
amount indicated in the last document whether criminal or civil in nature.

Number of perpetrators: The quantity of perpetrators involved in a scheme is indicated
in federal documents. It is designated in coding as a discrete variable.

Country of Incorporation: This categorical variable is coded using the United Nations
country codes.

State of Incorporation: The state of incorporation is indicated in federal documents if an
entity has incorporated. This is identified in coding using the Federal Information
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Processing Standards (FIPS) code for states. States with no known incorporation or
indicated as not being incorporated receive the code of “0.”

Registered with a federal agency: This dichotomous variable determines if the Ponzi
scheme were registered with the SEC or CFTC, (dichotomous: 1=yes; 0=no). This
variable is used in determining if the Ponzi scheme was a registered brokerage. This
information is stated in SEC and CFTC documents.

Registered in 2006: This dichotomous variable determines if the Ponzi schemes was
registered with the SEC or CFTC in 2006, (dichotomous). This determines if the entity
was functioning as a legitimate brokerage prior to the onset of the financial crisis.

Year the Ponzi began: This discrete variable is the year the Ponzi scheme is indicated as
beginning in federal documents. It is used to measure those schemes that began in 2007,
or later.

Year the Ponzi scheme ended: This discrete variable is determined as the date indicated
in federal documents as when the legal action was taken to end the scheme.

Duration: This discrete variable is the time the scheme is documented as having been in
operation, the beginning to the end, as indicated in federal documents.

Location of prosecution: Using FIPS codes, each scheme is coded by the state that the
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SEC, CFTC or FBI filed civil actions, or where there was a conviction when no civil
action was taken. This provides a geographical center for the case. Federal level cases
generally involve multiple states.

Federal Agencies involved in the investigation: The federal agencies involved in
investigating the schemes are recorded as dichotomous variables; 1= yes; 0=no.
Descriptions of these agencies and their functions are included in Appendix B.
•

Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)

•

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

•

Commodities, Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).

•

United States Postal Inspection Service. (USPIS)

•

Internal Revenue Service (IRS)

•

Secret Service(SS)

•

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

•

Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (FFETF)

Method of scheme- The method the perpetrator used is solely a qualitative, interpretive
designation assigned by the coder. Federal documents are not always clear on the
methodology used. Currently available information does not provide for consistency and
reliability for coding for quantitative analysis. Some cases are investigated by several
agencies and each may have a different description of the methodology. Future research
will be undertaken using content analysis to determine the methodologies used in the
schemes. Schemes were coded using descriptive nominal terms then categorized for
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percentages of each general method.

Victims nominal: In the case of affinity fraud federal documents have indicated the
affiliation between the perpetrator and the victims, and specifically used the term
“affinity fraud” in the documents. This is the only time this information is noted in the
federal documents and the only time this type of demographic is noted in the data set.

Elderly: Many federal documents state that many or most victims were “elderly” or
“seniors” or “retirees.” Because this term is never defined or quantified in federal
documents, this indicator of demographics has only been included as a qualitative
consideration. This variable was coded for 1=yes and 0= no, indicating that the federal
document mentioned that the victims were “mostly elderly”; “many retirees”; primarily
seniors.” Reporting was not consistent throughout all documents. The amount of cases
indicating elderly is included in the data set but is considered a qualitative response
because of the inconsistent and nonspecific reporting in federal documents.

Types and Variations of Frauds
The two primary types of Ponzi schemes studied herein are those that are Brokeragefailures and those that were intentional Ponzi schemes. The difference is the former became
a Ponzi scheme after failing to make adequate profits in the financial markets, and those that
are intentional were fraudulent schemes from the very beginning. The “type” variables have
subcategories that often times relate. For example: Bernard Madoff started out as a
legitimate brokerage early on, then through bad trading fell into being a Ponzi scheme. It
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was also an affinity fraud spread through primarily Jewish communities. There were several
hedge funds and feeder funds that contributed to the Madoff scheme. Intentional schemes,
those that were confidence schemes from the onset, and accidental schemes that developed
from legitimate brokerages or businesses that failed, then turned into Ponzi schemes.

•

Intentional: This dichotomous variable is determined in federal documents. The
determination is made by the language used in federal documents. These are frauds
that were conceived of as a Ponzi scheme from the very beginning. This differs from
the Brokerage-failure schemes because the Brokerage-failure schemes were
registered, functioning brokerages, dealers, or investment adviser firms prior to
becoming a Ponzi scheme. Coding for this variable was determined by those that
were not Brokerage-failure or Business-failures, by default.

•

Cryptocurrency: This dichotomous variable designates a form of fraud using the
terminology of “Bitcoin” or Cybercurrency.” This is new to the world of fraud. As
such there are only two cases brought to criminal action thus far. It is thought that
this mechanism will see an increasing number of frauds as federal agencies begin to
find ways of monitoring these entities. The major difficulty is the fact that the
internet is international, making it difficult to find and trace perpetrators in other
countries

•

Business-failure: This dichotomous variable is determined in federal documents by
the description of the entity in federal documents other than brokerages, hedge funds
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and cybercurrency. The federal documents use the terminology of the business
“failing.” The business entity was described as a business based in other than
financial instruments. Examples of legitimate businesses that failed were: restaurants,
real-estate, pay-phone, heating and air-conditioning, and equipment leasing.

•

Brokerage-failure: This is the primary type of scheme the research focuses on. A
broker-dealer is specifically defined as an individual or business entity that its
properly licensed and registered with the SEC or the CFTC. These schemes were
initially fully functioning brokerages, dealers or investment advisers registered with
FINRA, the SEC or the CFTC, or state regulatory agencies prior to becoming a Ponzi
scheme. These schemes fell into financial decline, then becoming a Ponzi scheme.
This is documented by their registration with FINRA, SEC or CFTC as a matter of
public record. In many documents, the SEC or CFTC have stated that the perpetrator
has never been registered with the SEC or CFTC or state regulatory agencies in any
capacity; these cases fall into the intentional category. This is coded as a dichotomous
variable.
Brokerage-failure schemes are defined by the registration required in the
securities and commodities industry that determines what financial products and
practices and entity or individual is allowed to perform with other people's money.
The documents indicate if the individual or business was registered with the SEC or
CFTC and whether the “securities” were registered or not. The designation of being a
failed broker-dealer is characterized in the government documents by the words:
•

“suffered trading losses”
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•

“unsuccessful trading”

In most cases the entity portrayed themselves as being a broker dealer or
investment adviser without the licensing or being registered with the SEC or CFTC.
This is against the law and they are either in jail for it or they are now barred from
associating with the financial industry. In these cases, there may or may not have
been actually trading going on, in most cases it was not, they only said that it was
taking place. In some cases, the primary did have the appropriate licensing and
registration but was not actually making trades; Madoff is an example of this

•

False-brokerage: This is coded as a dichotomous variable. There were many
schemes charged by the SEC and CFTC as operating as a brokerage, investment
adviser, or commodity pool without having registered with the SEC or CFTC. These
entities may have been properly registered within their state of operation giving the
appearance of legitimacy. However, they were charged by the SEC or CFTC for not
being registered as required by federal regulation. In some cases, these entities traded
a small amount of money, in other cases no money was invested. In the cases of
those that are not properly licensed by the SEC or CFTC the documents use
vocabulary such as: “has never been registered with the commission in any capacity”;
“No registration statement has been filed”; “is not registered with the commission in
any capacity.” These schemes were classified under intentional schemes.
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•

Affinity fraud: This dichotomous variable is designated as affinity fraud schemes in
federal documents. It is stated in federal documents. This relates to the variable
“victim” with a nominal designation of the type of self-designated affiliation. This
information will be used for future research on affinity fraud.

•

Feeder fund: Many schemes were sub-schemes that contributed to a larger scheme or
fund. Feeder fund is a dichotomous variable. These funds may or may not be
registered with appropriate government entities. This is determined by the words:
“feeder-fund” used within federal document text.

•

Hedge fund: Hedge funds are coded as a dichotomous variable. This is a specific
type of pooled wealth management that only accepts accredited investors of a net
worth of $1 million or more. Legitimate hedge funds may have become Ponzi
schemes or invested in other entities that were Ponzi schemes. Those licensed to run
these financial entities are required to know the laws and to perform due diligence on
entities they invest in. This was determined by the statement that the entity was a
“hedge fund” used in federal document text. Some cases reported that perpetrators
purported to be hedge funds; the federal agency had to state that the entity was a
hedge-fund to be coded as such. The investors to hedge funds are required to be
accredited, sophisticated investors, thought to be people or entities that would have
the financial sophistication to recognize a fraud. The Investment Advisers Act 1940
was amended in 2004 to require hedge funds managers to register with the SEC s
investment advisers. Discussion of this Act is included in Appendix D.
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Registered broker: A Broker is someone who acts as an intermediary between a buyer
and a seller in stocks, bonds or commodities. They are required to be licensed through
FINRA and registered with the SEC or CFTC. Those who are properly registered are
stated as such in federal documents. Broker is a dichotomous variable.

Registered dealer: This is an individual or firm acting as a principal in securities
transactions. This firm has their own supply of a security and sells directly to the
investor from their own inventory. These are generally specified in federal documents as
broker-dealers. They must be registered with the SEC. This is a dichotomous variable.

Registered Investment Adviser: These individuals charge a fee for advising others on
investing in securities or commodities. They are required to be licensed with FINRA and
registered with the SEC. This is a dichotomous variable.

Quantity of victims: This discrete variable identifies the quantity of investors-victims
indicated in federal agency documents. At times the number is specific, such as 233
investors. In other cases, the number of victims is indicated as: “more than 100.” Federal
documents refer to the victims of these frauds as: “investors” and sometimes as
“victims.” To maintain consistency this study will refer to the investors of the schemes as
investors-victims. In cases where the federal documents indicated “dozens” the number
coded was 12. When the quantity indicated was “hundreds” the number coded was 100.
When the quantity indicated was “thousands” the number coded was 1,000. This means
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there are a great many more victims; this research is reporting the minimum quantity of
known victims.

Perpetrator Level Measures: Definitions of Variables
Most Ponzi schemes have multiple perpetrators. A second data set lists each Ponzi
scheme by the name of the business entity and then lists each perpetrator charged civilly or
criminally, with the following characteristics as variables:

Race: The categorical variables of racial designation are determined using the Bureau of
Prisons inmate locater to identify race. Not all perpetrators have received criminal sentences
so not all perpetrators have a listing for race. Each variable is coded as 1= yes; 0= no. Multiracial individuals are not recorded in the BOP service. The Bureau of Prisons does not offer a
Hispanic option; those included here as Hispanic are designated as such from the use of
Hispanic surnames, by the author.
•
•
•
•
•

White
Black
Hispanic surname
Asian
American Indian

Gender: The gender of all perpetrators is recorded as “1” for males and “0” for females.
Gender is determined in federal documents by masculine and feminine names; by federal
documents using the pronoun “him” or “her”, “he” or “she”, as well as in Bureau of Prison
indicators of gender.
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Age: This continuous variable is recorded as the age of the perpetrator at sentencing. This is
documented in FBI and DOJ documents. Bureau of Prison information is also used. In some
cases, there was only a civil action, the SEC listed ages; the CFTC did not.

Sentence in months: This continuous variable is documented in FBI and DOJ documents.
Each perpetrator is coded for the number months they were sentenced in federal documents.

Probation only: In a few cases the perpetrator has only received probation, this is
documented in a continuous variable of months. This was determined through FBI and DOJ
documents.

Criminal charges: This dichotomous variable indicates whether or not the perpetrator had
received criminal charges as of the time of the study end date. In some cases, individuals
have since been charged or will be criminally charged at a future date. This is a dichotomous
variable.

Civil sanctions: In most cases the SEC and/or the CFTC have filed civil charges and
sanctions against the perpetrators. In a few rare cases, the perpetrator has only received
being banned from trading, advising or being associated with anyone who does broker, trade,
or advise in financial markets. This is generally those who were not directly involved in the
fraud scheme, but still were determined to have some level of culpability, generally by an
administrative judge. These are recorded as dichotomous variables.
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Licenses: Those individuals who are properly licensed with FINRA or the National Futures
Association are listed as such on these trade regulatory companies. Individuals are required
to be licensed with these trade entities, passing an exam that covers the laws. Information
about these individuals is publicly available through FINRA, NFA and the SEC websites.
Each series license, such as 65- the investment adviser exam, or the series 7- the general
securities representative exam, are listed as dichotomous variables. A complete listing of the
series licenses is listed in appendix C.

Clergy: In some cases, the primary perpetrator was of the clergy, meaning the leader of a
religious entity such as a Christian church, a Hindu or Buddhist temple, a Jewish Rabbi or the
head of a Mosque. This is recorded as a dichotomous variable.

Professions: this includes other professions such as attorney or certified public accountant
(CPA) in these cases the individuals would have been required to pass an exam that would
have included relevant laws. This variable covers all other profession not listed as clergy of
having passed a professional licensing exam.

Other professions: This variable includes those perpetrators that were listed as mortgage
brokers, real-estate agents, or insurance agents, any profession that does not include,
attorney, accountant, clergy or broker-dealer-trader-adviser. The real estate, insurance and
mortgage licenses are on the state level and not easily verified through state documents.
Verifying these licenses is time consuming and will be undertaken in future research. For
this research, these professions are recorded as “other” in a dichotomous variable.
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Other outcome: This could be anything from a suicide, to the perpetrator being a fugitive.
Death is differentiated from suicide, because some perpetrators commit suicide rather than go
to prison, while others have died of natural causes; neither went to jail for their actions. In
some cases, suicide is suspected due to the time being near to a legal action, but if it is not
documented as suicide it is classified as a death. This is purely a nominal qualitative variable.

Recidivism: In some cases, the perpetrator is a recidivist, this is included in federal
documents. This variable is coded for “1” yes and “0” for no prior felony convictions.

Analytic Applications
The primary questions are answered using descriptive statistics, bivariate statistics, and
chi-square. Specifically, descriptive statistics will provide understanding of characteristics at
both the scheme and individual level. In addition, descriptive statistics are presented in both
pooled and split form with the latter consisting of data split by Ponzi scheme type” intentional,
Brokerage-failure, Business-failure, affinity fraud, False-brokerage. The bivariate analyses tests
for key differences and associations in the time frames in relationship to the perpetrators and also
to the types of Ponzi schemes.
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Chapter 6 Results
This analysis examines Ponzi schemes, and Ponzi scheme perpetrators, throughout the
study time period, and then in relationship to the time period of the financial crisis. The
population is a comprehensive, known universe of Ponzi schemes and Ponzi perpetrators from
1973-2016; it is not a sample of a population. Therefore, no inference is being made about a
greater population. Instead the study describes the qualities and characteristics of a known
population, first using univariate analysis. The bivariate section of the research tests the
differences between the entire group of known schemes, throughout the study period, and then
the time frames of before 2007 and after 2007, to determine if there were differences as a result
of the financial crisis of 2007-2010.

A Note on Causality
It can be hypothesized that an event such as the 2007-2010 financial crisis, caused
legitimate brokerages and business entities to become accidental frauds, but we cannot prove that
there are not or were no other spurious causes, nor that the business entity would have succeeded
if there were not a financial crisis. Nor can we explain why some brokerages and businesses
succeed despite a financial crisis, while others fail. Neither can be predicted with currently
available data. It would be ideal to measure for causality in an attempt to determine if the
financial crisis caused the accidental frauds of Broker-failures and Business-failures schemes.
However, causality cannot be determined because there are many factors that may have
contributed to an individual’s business or brokerage failing during the financial crisis. It could
simply be that the broker was not a good trader, as was the case in many schemes. There could
be other causes, such as the primary going through a costly divorce or a partnership breaking up,
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or illness that contributed to a failure. In some cases, the schemes were based on technology;
technology constantly progresses. In those cases, a more advanced technology may have come
along, rendering a previous technology-based scheme obsolete. An example of this is phone
technology: in the late 1990s, several schemes were based on pay phone ownership. Ten years
later, almost everyone had a cell phone, rendering pay phones a thing of the past.
This research cannot determine that a brokerage or business would have been successful
had the financial crisis not occurred. Therefore, it cannot be determined that the financial crisis
directly caused Brokerage-failures or Business-failure Ponzi schemes. The data shows that
Brokerage-failures and Business-failures turned into accidental frauds throughout the entire
study time frame of 1973 to 2016. The financial crisis may indeed have caused some brokerages
or businesses to fail, thereby becoming Ponzi schemes, but causality cannot be proven
scientifically. For this reason, this study did not attempt to determine causation, because other
causes of failure could not be ruled out.
Rather than testing for causality, this research looks for associations between variables
and describes attributes of Ponzi schemes and characteristics of Ponzi perpetrators. Specifically,
it looks for differences between types of Ponzi schemes and time frames in order to determine if
there are differences before and after the 2007-2010 financial crisis. Secondly, the data will
show descriptive analysis of individual level of measures for the perpetrators.
The quantitative analysis is primarily descriptive in nature. The population is the known
universe of federal level Ponzi schemes between 1973 and May 2016. The study population is
not a sample of a populations, therefore, inferences about a greater population are not being
made here.
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Timeline
The initial research question asked if there was a difference in Ponzi schemes in
relationship to the financial crisis. The following charts demonstrate the timeline of which Ponzi
schemes were begun, in blue, and when they ended in orange, (Chart 1). This chart demonstrates
the quantity of Ponzi schemes per year. It is clear that during the financial boom peaking
between 2004 and 2007, (as indicated by the Federal Financial Stress index, chart 2), that at this
same time period the greatest number of Ponzi schemes were beginning. As the Financial crisis
peaked in 2009, so did the quantity of Ponzi schemes that ended. It is not a surprise that the two
peaked during this time. What it does mean is that when there was a financial boom there was
excess money; people looked for places to invest their excess funds. They invested in what they
thought were legitimate investments only to find they lost their investments, not so much to the
financial crash but to fraud. Then when the economy collapsed, investors ceased to invest and
withdrew their funds from investments. As Ponzi perpetrators had to return principal
investments to their investor-victims, and they were unable to recruit new investor-victims, the
schemes collapsed.
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Chart 1: Ponzi Schemes Begin and End Timeline, 1973-2015
Blue is year began

Orange is year ended
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Chart one shows the beginning of Ponzi schemes in blue and the ending of the Ponzi
schemes in orange. Chart two, below, is the federal reserve chart of financial stress in the
economy. The bold black horizontal base line at zero in Chart two, indicates that when the blue
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line goes below the zero base-line the economy is doing well; above the zero base-line indicates
the economy is in financial stress, meaning a decline in the economy. The blue line in chart two
is below the black horizontal zero base-line, indicating that the economy was doing well during
the period from approximately late 2003 until approximately early 2007. As this line begins to
climb in chart two, we see the period of stress known as the financial crisis. Comparing the
height of the beginning of the schemes in chart one, as compared with chart two, is that we see
that many Ponzi schemes began during the financial boom as indicated in chart two. Chart one
depicts the end of the Ponzi schemes in orange, climbing steeply in 2007, peaking in 2009 and
declining from 2009 through 2011. Chart two depicts the financial stress of the economy at its
peak in 2009, as compared with chart one when the ending of the Ponzi schemes also reached a
peak. As the economy failed, so did the Ponzi schemes.

Chart 2: Federal Reserve Financial Stress Index

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
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Discussion of Quantity of Ponzi Schemes Beginning per year 2002-2010 Table 3
Table 3 illustrates the number of schemes brought to action that began in the time period
from just after the tech-wreck failure 2002 until 2010, the end of the financial crisis. This table
shows that the greatest quantity of schemes began in the years 2005 through 2007. The 2002time period was the end of the tech-wreck/Y2k recession and the beginning of the boom
economy preceding the financial crisis. For schemes that began after 2010, federal agencies are
in the process of investigating these schemes, therefore the information is still being posted on
federal websites as the schemes are uncovered. This can be compared to chart 1, that also
demonstrates the beginning of Ponzi schemes and the end of Ponzi schemes in relationship to the
time frame. In the year since this data set was finalized, (May 31, 2016), approximately 47
schemes of varied beginning years, have been documented in federal websites.
Table 3 demonstrates the increase in the beginning year of Ponzi schemes, in the years
leading up to the financial crisis, and then the decline of Ponzi schemes beginning during the
financial crisis. The year 2010 is considered the end of the financial crisis. From the years 2011
on, there was an average of 11 schemes beginning each year.26 The 2002-2010-time period is
used because it shows the increase during the boom economy prior to the financial crisis and a
declining quantity of schemes after the peak of 2007. By comparison, the year with greatest
number of scheme collapses was 2009, with 175 schemes failing.

Schemes that began at any point will continue to be found and charged by federal authorities; this amount is valid
as of this writing.
26
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Table 3 Quantity of Ponzi schemes beginning per year 2002-2010
Year Began

Quantity

2002

46

2003

61

2004

75

2005

98

2006

105

2007

107

2008

75

2009

64

2010

33

Univariate Analysis Scheme level
Descriptive Statistics for 1973-2016, Ponzi Scheme Level, Table 4
The descriptive statistical analysis of all Ponzi schemes in aggregate is illustrated in Table
4. This explains general information about all Ponzi schemes in the study throughout the entire
time frame of 1973-2016. We see that the average Ponzi scheme length of time, is 4.3 years.
The longest duration of a scheme is 31 years. The modal length of time is one year or less, and
accounted for 195 schemes, meaning authorities were able to stop schemes in a year or less in
195 cases. In the descriptive statistics for all Ponzi scheme types over the entire time frame, the
average quantity taken in the schemes: $114.8 million. The average quantity taken in all
schemes, leaving out the eight largest schemes listed in Table 7, is $35.69 million. The smallest
quantity taken in the study is $138 thousand; the greatest quantity is $65 billion. The total
quantity taken is $122,620 billion. The modal quantity taken is the range of $1 million to $1.9
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million, accounted for in 107 schemes. Generally, the federal cases are over $1 million, however
there were 64 Ponzi schemes that had taken under $1 million. There were eight cases that were
over $1 billion, (Table 7).
The total quantity of perpetrators in this study is 2354. The average number of
perpetrators per scheme is 2.2. There were 574 schemes that had one perpetrator. The case with
the greatest number of offenders charged was PEI- James Tyson et al, with 92 perpetrators, the
great majority of which received criminal sentences. This case was primarily a real estate
mortgage based fraud that took place during the housing boom.
In the descriptive statistics for all Ponzi scheme types over the entire time frame, of all of
the aggregated schemes, 12% had been properly registered with the SEC or CFTC. Many
schemes were charged with not being properly registered, this is indicated in SEC and CFTC
documents. The indication of not being registered means that in many schemes the Ponzi
perpetrators were selling or trading stocks or securities without the appropriate registration with
the SEC or CFTC. This is what designates the entity as a brokerage for the purpose of
determining if a scheme was a Brokerage-failure. It was found that many schemes presented
themselves as being registered with the SEC or CFTC, but were not legally registered,
establishing the variable of “False-brokerage.”
Of the types of schemes in the all Ponzi schemes data, 4% were Business-failure
schemes; 5% were Brokerage-failure schemes; 90% were intentional schemes; 37% were Falsebrokerage schemes; and 11% were affinity fraud cases. Many cases overlap, meaning they could
have been affinity fraud, intentional Ponzi schemes and a false-brokerage. Generally, affinity
fraud cases were also intentional Ponzi schemes.
Of all Ponzi schemes, 10% were documented as indicating that victims were elderly,
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senior citizens or retirees as victims. This demonstrates the percentage of cases that indicated
elderly or retired victims. This is in no way exhaustive, in that few documents clarified the
nature of the victims, nor quantified how many victims were elderly, nor what age qualifies
being elderly, retired or a senior citizen. It is appropriate to note that senior citizens are targeted
because they tend to have funds to invest due to inheritance, pensions and in some cases a life
time of savings. It is likely that a large percentage of victims are over the age of 55, but proving
that scientifically is not possible because of lack of indication in federal documents.
The two primary classifications are intentional schemes, and accidental frauds
(Brokerage-failure and Business-failure); in this case, there are 90% intentional frauds and 9%
accidental frauds, with the missing 1% due to rounding.
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics for 1973-2016 of Ponzi schemes
Variable

Statistics

Ponzi scheme years’ time length mean

4.30

Ponzi year range

1-31

Quantity taken in millions of dollars mean

114.81

Mean quantity of perpetrators per scheme

2.22

Percent registered with SEC or CFTC ever

.12

Percent registered in 2006

.06

Percent Business-failure schemes

.04

Percent Brokerage-failure schemes

.05

Percent intentional schemes

.90

Percent false brokerage schemes

.37

Percent Affinity fraud (yes,no)

.11

Percent indicated elderly/retiree victims

.10

Valid number

1068
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Discussion of Affinity Faith-Based Frauds
A subset of the affinity fraud cases is Faith-based frauds. Of the 1068 Ponzi schemes, 84
were faith based. The details about the religious affiliation was stated in federal documents.
Some cases stated only: “church” or “religious organization.” The perpetrators used their
affiliation with a faith, a church, synagogue, temple or mosque to acquire their victims. In some
cases, this may also have included ethnicity such as African American, or Persian. In some case
the named specific Christians groups, but not all.

Table 4.1 Faith-based Ponzi Schemes

Faith

count

Christian

74

Jewish

5

Hindu

1

Muslim

1

Scientologist

1

Not indicated

2

Table 4.2 Christian Denominations in Faith-based Ponzi schemes

Denomination

Count

Christian non-specific

58

Mormon

11

Jehovah Witnesses

1

Amish

1

Catholic

1

Seventh Day Adventist

2
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Discussion of Descriptive Statistics for Schemes Before 2007 Table 5
Table 5 demonstrates the descriptive statistics for schemes that began before 2007. The
quantity of schemes that had begun from 2007 and thereafter, were 842. The average length of
time of schemes prior to 2007 was 4.75 years. The average number of perpetrators per scheme
was 2.32 in those that began before 2007. This simply means that those schemes started prior to
2007 there were more likely to have an average of 2.32 perpetrators.
Of those schemes that began before 2007, 13% had been properly registered with the
SEC or CFTC. The schemes that are classified as Brokerage-failures were 5%, those that were
properly registered brokers, investment advisers or hedge funds, this is the true percentage of
Ponzi schemes that could be considered Brokerage-failures. Of the Business-failure schemes that
began before 2007 were 4%. Intentional schemes were 91% up until 2007. The schemes that
were False-brokerage schemes were 37% before 2007. Affinity fraud cases were 12% before
2007. Of the cases begun from before 2007, 11% of cases reported that victims were elderly,
retired or seniors. This is explained by schemes that are both intentional and False-brokerages
and/or affinity fraud. Again, this only represents those schemes that indicated elderly victims,
the true percentage or number of elderly victims is not known. The average quantity taken of
Ponzi schemes prior to 2007 was $138.96 million.
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Table 5 Descriptive Statistics for Schemes Before 2007
Statistics
Ponzi scheme time length mean
Quantity taken in millions of dollars mean
Quantity of perpetrators mean
Percent Registered with SEC or CFTC ever
Percent Registered in 2006
Percent Business-failure schemes
Percent Brokerage-failure schemes
Percent Intentional schemes
Percent False-brokerage schemes
Percent Affinity fraud (yes,no)
Percent Elderly/retiree victims
Valid number

4.75
138.96
2.32
.13
.07
.04
.05
.91
.37
.12
.11
842

Discussion of Descriptive Statistics for Schemes From 2007 to 2016 Table 6
Table 6 demonstrates the descriptive statistics for schemes that began after 2007. The
quantity of schemes that had begun from 2007 and thereafter, were 217. The average length of
time of schemes from 2007 on was 2.55 years. The average number of perpetrators per scheme
was 1.8 in those that began in 2007 or after. This simply means that those schemes that began
from 2007 on, were more likely to be one or two perpetrators.
Of those begun after 2007, 10 % had been properly registered with the SEC or CFTC.
The variable that determines if the scheme was a Brokerage-failure is: if the entity was registered
with the SEC or CFTC in 2006. This defines the entity as a legitimate securities brokerage,
investment advisor or commodity broker. The onset of the financial crisis is considered to be
2007. Of those schemes that began in 2007 or after, only 2% were registered as brokerages in
2006. Of the Ponzi schemes that began after 2007 8% were Brokerage-failure, the difference
between the 2% and 8%, is that 6% of schemes registered with the SEC or CFTC after 2006. The
208

Business-failure schemes that began from 2007 on were 3%. Intentional schemes were 90%.
The schemes that were False-brokerage schemes were 38% beginning 2007 or later. The two
primary classifications are intentional schemes and accidental frauds (Brokerage-failure and
Business-failure combined); in this case, there are 90% intentional frauds and 11% accidental
frauds, with the additional 1% due to rounding. The average quantity taken of Ponzi schemes
begun after 2007 was $21.21 million
Affinity fraud and elderly are the variables representing the victims. Affinity fraud cases
were 8% from 2007 on. Of the cases begun from 2007 or later, 8% of cases reported that victims
were elderly, retired or seniors. Again, this only represents those schemes that indicated elderly
victims, the true percentage or number of elderly victims is not known.

Table 6 Descriptive Statistics for Schemes From 2007 to 2016
Variable

Mean Statistics

Ponzi scheme time length mean

2.55

Quantity taken in millions of dollars mean

21.21

Quantity of perpetrators mean

1.83

Percent registered with SEC or CFTC ever

.10

Percent registered in 2006

.02

Percent Business-failure schemes

.03

Percent Brokerage-failure schemes

.08

Percent intentional schemes

.90

Percent false brokerage schemes

.38

Percent Affinity fraud (yes,no)

.08

Percent indicated elderly/retiree victims

.08

Valid number

217
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Discussion Comparing all Schemes, Tables 4, 5 and Table 6
The average number of perpetrators per scheme was 1.8 in those after 2007, (Table 6) as
compared to those before 2007 with an average of 2.32 perpetrators, (Table 5). The average
number of perpetrators per scheme for the entire time frame of 1973-2016 is 2.2, (Table 4). This
simply means that those schemes that began after 2007 were more likely to be one or two
perpetrators and in those schemes started prior to 2007 there were more likely to be more than
two perpetrators.
Of those begun after 2007, 10% had been properly registered with the SEC or CFTC as
compared to 13% prior to 2007. Over the entire time period of 1973-2016, there were 12% that
had been registered with the SEC or CFTC. The variable that determines if the scheme was a
Brokerage-failure is if the entity was registered with the SEC or CFTC in 2006; this defines the
entity as a legitimate securities brokerage or commodity broker. The onset of the financial crisis
is considered to be 2007. Of the Ponzi schemes that had begun in 2007 or later, 10% were
properly registered with the SEC or CFTC. Of those schemes that began after 2007, only 2%
were registered as brokerages in 2006; 7% of those that began before 2007 were registered with
the SEC or CFTC in 2006. This means that 7% of the schemes were registered with the SEC or
CFTC before the Financial crisis; with 2% were properly registered of those that began to be
Ponzi schemes after 2007. The schemes that are classified as Brokerage-failures, 8% after 2007
(Table 6), include those that were properly registered investment advisers or hedge funds. This is
the true percentage of Ponzi schemes that could be considered Brokerage-failures. Of the Ponzi
schemes that began before 2007 only 5% were Brokerage-failure, meaning there is a 3% increase
in Brokerage-failure schemes that began from 2007 on. Of all Ponzi schemes in the entire time
frame of 1973-2016, 5% were Brokerage-failures. The Business-failure schemes that began after
2007 were 3% as compared to all Ponzi schemes being 4%. Despite the declining economy,
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there were less Business-failures that became Ponzi schemes during the failing economy after
2007, than before 2007. Intentional schemes were the same percentage after 2007 as in all Ponzi
cases, both 90%. The schemes that were false-brokerage schemes were 38% after 2007 as
compared to all Ponzi cases at 37%.
Affinity fraud cases were 8% of schemes begun 2007 or after, before 2007 there were
12% affinity fraud cases, as compared to 11% of all Ponzi schemes. Of the cases begun after
2007, 8% of cases indicated that victims were elderly, retired or seniors; before 2007 there were
11%. All Ponzi schemes indicated there were 10% of elder victims.

Comparison of Largest Ponzi Schemes Table 7
These largest eight schemes had been active for many years enabling them to take in
larger quantities of money. All of these schemes ended during the financial crisis, when they
could no longer bring in new investors to keep the scheme running. The exception is Joel
Steinger’s scheme that ended in 2005. By comparison, Phillip Barry’s scheme was not one of
the largest schemes, but it lasted for 31 years, only taking $40 million. Barry’s scheme was the
longest run scheme of all, also ending in 2009. In Barry’s scheme, it is likely the smaller
financial take over a longer period of time decreased the likelihood of being exposed as a Ponzi
scheme.
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Table 7 Largest Quantity of Money Taken Ponzi Schemes
Name

Quantity in
billions

Year
started

Duration in
years

1

2004

4

Scott Rothstein

1.2

2005

5

Joel Steinger

1.25

1994

11

Gregory Bell*

2.6

2002

6

3

1992

7

Thomas Petters

3.65

1995

13

Allen Stanford

7

1985

24

Bernard Madoff

65

1992

16

Bruce Prevost & David Harrold*

Martin Armstrong

•

Feeder fund to Petters

Univariate Analysis Perpetrator Level
Discussion of Descriptive Statistics for all Ponzi Perpetrators Table 8
Of all perpetrators in the study time frame 1973-2016:
•

Whites were 49% of all perpetrators

•

Blacks were 7% of all perpetrators

•

Hispanic surnames were 2% of all perpetrators

•

Asians were 2% of all perpetrators

•

American Indians less than 1% of all Ponzi perpetrators

•

No known race: 40%

Of all Ponzi perpetrators, there was no indication of race on 39.9% of all perpetrators.
This is because the perpetrators had only civil charges or were not sentenced as of the end date of
the research timeline; race is indicated in BOP record - perpetrators must be sentenced for there
to be indication of race. Of all perpetrators 70% received criminal charges, but not all had been
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sentenced by the end of the study; BOP sentencing data is the source for racial information.
Those not yet sentenced are not in the BOP data base. The Bureau of Prisons uses the term
“American Indians” to classify people of indigenous populations. This is a self-designated
classification as with all demographics. In all Ponzi schemes, only five perpetrators self-reported
as American Indian. These perpetrators were involved in two separate schemes, both of which
were Native American Bank schemes. The percentages for gender and average age:
•

The gender percentages of all perpetrators schemes: is the males were 90% of all
perpetrators, and females were 10% of all perpetrators.

•

The average age at sentencing of all Ponzi perpetrators is 50.27 years of age.
The modal length of all schemes is 60 months or 5 years. The average length of sentences

in all schemes was 64.29 months including all cases, even those that did not receive a sentence.
The average of all of the cases that did receive a sentence is 103.57 months or 8.6 years.

•

Irving Stitsky received 85 years- $23 million

•

Mark Alan Shapiro received 85 years - $23 million

•

Norman Hsu received 99 years - $80 million

•

Richard Harkless received 100 years - $60 million

•

Allen Stanford received 110 years - $7 billion

•

Andrew Hamilton Williams Jr. received 150 years - $78 million

•

Bernard Madoff received 150 years - $65 billion

•

Norman Schmidt received 310 years - $40 million

The sentences for the individuals above skewed the results of the overall sentences
calculations. Removing these cases from the data set provides an average of 83.8 months or 7.8
years of all schemes including those that did not receive a sentence.
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Criminal charges were filed in 70% of all perpetrators. The SEC filed civil charges in
66% of all perpetrators. The CFTC had civil charges in 15% of all perpetrators. Other federal
agencies were involved in 32% of the charges brought against perpetrators. Of all perpetrators,
seventy were recidivists with previous felony convictions.

Table 8 Descriptive Statistics for All Ponzi Perpetrators
Statistics
White percent

.49

Black percent

.07

Hispanic percent

.02

Asian percent

.02

American Indian percent

.00

No race indicated percent

.40

Gender male percent

.90

Gender female percent

.10

Age at sentencing mean

50.27

Sentence in months mean

64.29

Criminal charges percent

.70

SEC charges percent

.66

CFTC charges percent

.15

Other federal agency percent

.32

Valid number

2354

Discussion of Descriptive Statistics for Perpetrator Level From 2007 to 2016 Table 9
Table 9 indicates the demographics for Ponzi schemes that were begun from 2007 until
May 2016:
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•

Whites are 34% of perpetrators after 2007

•

Blacks are 4% of perpetrators after 2007

•

Hispanic surnames are 2% of perpetrators after 2007

•

Asians were 3% are of perpetrators after 2007

•

American Indians are less than 1% of Ponzi perpetrators after 2007

•

There was no indication of race on 57% of perpetrators after 2007

The lack of indication of race on 57% is because the individuals have not been sentenced as of
the study end, there is no means of identifying race until individuals are sentenced. Many cases
that occurred during the financial crisis have been tried or pleaded out but are yet to be
sentenced.
One case was tried and convicted in 2010, was Scott Rothstein and his law firm.
Rothstein received a 50-year sentence but does not show up in the Bureau of Prisons inmate
locater. There is no record of why this is the case, in any publicly accessible federal documents
on Rothstein. In Chuck Malkus’ book on Scott Rothstein, he indicates that Rothstein is
incarcerated but in the witness protection program. (Malkus, 2013). Rothstein was coded as
White, based on media images.
The gender percentages of perpetrators after 2007: is that males were 86% of all
perpetrators, and females were 14% of all perpetrators. There was an increase in female
perpetrators after 2007. It is likely that there may be an increase in women in White-collar
professions resulting in an increase of women perpetrators. The average age at sentencing is
48.66 years of age after 2007.
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Table 9 Descriptive Statistics for Perpetrator Level From 2007 to 2016
Statistic
Quantity in millions of dollars mean

34.83

White percent

.34

Black percent

.04

Hispanic percent

.02

Asian percent

.03

American Indian percent

.00

No race indicated percent

.57

Gender male percent

.86

Gender female percent

.14

Age at sentencing mean

48.66

Sentence in months mean

37.07

Valid number

323

Discussion of Descriptive Statistics for Perpetrator Level Before 2007, Table 10
Table 10 provides descriptive statistics for the Ponzi schemes that began before 2007.
The racial demographics for Ponzi perpetrators beginning before 2007 are:
•

Whites are 51% of perpetrators before 2007

•

Blacks are 8 % of perpetrators before 2007

•

Hispanic surnames are 2 % of perpetrators before 2007

•

Asians were 2% are of perpetrators before 2007

•

American Indians are less than 1% of Ponzi perpetrators before 2007

•

There was no indication of race on 37% of perpetrators before 2007

The gender percentages of perpetrators before 2007: is that males were 90% of all
perpetrators, and females were 10% of all perpetrators. The average age at sentencing is 50.58
years of age for those schemes before 2007. The average sentence length for schemes before
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2007 was 69.04 months. In schemes before 2007, 90%were males and 10% were female.

Table 10 Descriptive Statistics for a Perpetrators Level Before 2007
Mean
Quantity in millions of dollars mean

653.22

White percent

.51

Black percent

.08

Hispanic percent

.02

Asian percent

.02

American Indian percent

.00

No race indicated percent

.37

Gender male percent

.90

Female percent

.10

Age at sentencing mean

50.58

Sentence in months mean

69.04

Valid number*

2031

Bivariate Analysis for Scheme Level and Perpetrator Level
Discussion of Scheme Level T-Test Before and After 2007, Table 11
The T-test below compares the mean scores of the quantity of money taken in millions of
dollars, the number of perpetrators, and the length of time of the Ponzi schemes. The continuous
variables of quantity taken, and the number of perpetrators are the dependent variables. The
categorical variables of before and after 2007 are the independent variables. The quantity of
money taken is not significant at the .129 level of significance. The number of perpetrators is
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significant at the .004 Sig.2-tailed test; there were fewer perpetrators per scheme after 2007. The
length of Ponzi schemes is significant at .000 in the Sig. 2-tailed test for equality of means. This
means that after 2007 there is a difference if the number of perpetrators and the length of time of
the schemes in comparison to before those schemes that occurred before 2007.

Table 11 Scheme Level T-test Before and After 2007
t-test for Equality of means
Sig. 2-tailed

Mean difference

Quantity in millions of dollars

.129

-117.743

Number of perpetrators

.004

-.499

Length of Ponzi scheme

.000

-2.197

.204

-.027

Discussion of Perpetrator Level T-test Before and After 2007, Table 12
The T-test below compares the mean scores of the age in sentencing and the quantity of
months of the sentences of the Ponzi perpetrators. The continuous variables of age at sentencing,
and the length of sentence in months are the dependent variables measured against the in
dependent variable of before and after 2007. The categorical variables of before and after 2007
are the independent variables. The age at sentencing is significant at the .011 level in the Sig. 2tailed test for equality of means. The sentences in months is significant at the .000 level in the
Sig.2-tailed test for equality of means. There was a difference in the number of months that
perpetrators were sentenced; the sentences were lower after 2007. There was a significance in the
age of those sentenced in that after 2007 the perpetrators were 48.66 years at sentencing, as
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compared to 50.58 years before 2007. The average of sentences after 2007 were 37.07 months
and 69.04 months before 2007, (Tables 5 and 6). There was a difference after 2007 in the ages
and sentences of the perpetrators of approximately two years. The difference in the length of
sentences is explained by the Supreme Court decision U.S. v. Booker.27
Hypothesis five expected differences in the characteristics of Ponzi perpetrators after
2007. This analysis finds that there are differences in sentencing after 2007, but it is thought that
this may be a result of the U.S. v. Booker. It was found that there is a difference in age, in that the
age of Ponzi perpetrators after 2007 were marginally younger. Hence there are differences in the
categories of age and sentencing after 2007, supporting hypothesis five.

Table 12 Perpetrator Level T-test Before and After 200728
T-test for Equality of means
Sig. 2-tailed

Mean difference

Age at sentencing

.011

-1.919

Sentence in months

.000

-31.974

Discussion Scheme Level Intentional Financial Crisis Crosstabs Tables 13 & 14
Table 13, below, addresses Hypothesis one, that previously existing Ponzi schemes failed
at a greater rate during financial crisis. There were 625 schemes that did not end during the
financial crisis; they ended before 2007 or after 2010. The schemes that ended before 2007 or
after 2010 were 58.5% of all schemes within the study. Of the schemes that did end during the

27
28

US. v. Booker see page 75.
By the year the scheme started.
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financial crisis, 2007-2010, there were 444. The schemes that ended during the financial crisis
were slightly more likely to be intentional at 92.6% as opposed to 89% of those that failed at
other times. The schemes that ended within the time period of 2007-2010 were 41.5% of all
schemes within the study. Of those that ended during the financial crisis 411 or 92.6% were
intentional. Of all schemes, 90.5% or a count or 967 were intentional schemes.
The chi-square test for independence measures two pairs of categorical variables, in this
case: during the financial crisis 2007-2010; not during the financial crisis, measured against:
intentional schemes; and not-intentional schemes (Brokerage-failure and Business Failure). The
chi-square measure of significance in Table14 indicates a significance level .048, meaning the
number of schemes that ended during the financial crisis that were intentional schemes is
significant.
Cramer’s V in Table 14 measures the strength of the association between Intentional
Ponzi schemes and those that concluded during the financial crisis. The closer the findings are to
one the stronger the relationship. In this case, the Cramer’s V is .061, a weak indictor of strength
of the significance of intentional Ponzi schemes ending during the financial crisis.
Hypothesis one expected that previously existing intentional schemes would fail at a
greater rate during the financial crisis of 2007 to 2010. These findings support hypothesis one, in
that there was significance in the quantity of intentional Ponzi schemes that failed after 2007,
however it is a weak relationship.
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Table 13 Financial Crisis/ Intentional Schemes Crosstabs for 2007-2010

Schemes not
ending during
the financial
crisis

Schemes
ending during
the financial
crisis

Total

Count
% within
financial crisis
% within
intentional
% of total
Count
% within
financial crisis
% within
intentional
% of total
Count
% within
financial crisis

Not intentional
69
11%

Intentional
556
89%

Total
625
100%

67.6%

57.5%

58.5%

6.5%
33
7.4%

52%
411
92.6%

58.5%
444
100%

32.4

42.5%

41.5%

3.1%
102
9.5%

38.4%
967
90.5%

41.5%
1068
100%

Table 14 Scheme level Intentional Financial Crisis Chi-square for 2007-2010

Intentional
Valid cases

Chi Square
3.914

Financial Crisis 2007-2010
Sig.
Cramer’s V
.048
.061
1068

Sig
.048

Discussion Scheme Level Beginning 2007 to 2016 Crosstabs Table 15
Cross tabulation measures the relationships between two variables. The chi-square test
for independence below, explores the relationship between the categorical variables of the types
of Ponzi schemes: Business-failure, Brokerage-failure, Intentional, False-brokerages, affinity
fraud, and those that indicated elderly victims, are measured against the time frame of beginning
during 2007 through 2016. Each type of scheme was tested individually of those that began in
the time period from 2007-2016, the table below combines the results from all tests. The time
frame 2007 to 2016, is representative of the beginning of the financial crisis until 2016. The year
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2016 is used instead of 2010 because many of the schemes that began after 2007 did not come to
light until after 2010. The Chi-square test looks for changes beginning after 2007 as compared to
before 2007. In this case, the Brokerage-failure schemes are approaching significance at .088,
but is not quite significant as it fails to reach the .05 level. This would indicate that after 2007
there was a slight difference in Brokerage-failure schemes but not enough to be statistically
significant. This means there was a slight increase in Brokerage-failure schemes from 2007 on,
but not enough to suggest that the financial crisis may have influenced a significant number of
brokerages to become Ponzi schemes. This finding would reject null hypothesis two, that there
would be a greater quantity of Brokerage-failure schemes than intentional schemes after 2007.
There was no statistically significant association in any of the other types of Ponzi schemes after
2007.
There was no change in the indication of elderly as victims. The indication of the elderly
as victims was the same before and after 2007. Again, this cannot be a strong indicator of the
elderly as victims of Ponzi schemes because the documents do not offer a numerical ratio of
elderly victims to non-elderly victims; it only explains that the elderly were indicated in federal
documents equally before and after 2007. It is possible that elderly people are more commonly
the victims in these frauds, but it cannot be proven statistically.
Cramer’s V measures the strength of the association between each type of Ponzi scheme
and the time frame from 2007 to 2016. In all categories, the strength of the association is weak,
in that all are below the significance level of 1.0; 1.0 being a perfect relationship, indicative of a
strong significance of the chi-square. Brokerage failure approaches significance, however the
Cramer’s V indicates any significance is weak.
Hypothesis four expects to find differences in types of Ponzi schemes after 2007. The
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findings do not support that hypothesis that there are differences in Ponzi schemes that ended
after 2007. This is demonstrated by the findings of no statistical significance in all types of
schemes, with Brokerage-failure only approaching statistical significance. This is not a strong
indicator that there are differences in types of Ponzi schemes that ended after 2007.

Table 15 Crosstabs Scheme Level Beginning 2007 to 2016
From 2007 to 2016
Chi Square

Sig.

Cramer’s V

Sig.

Business-failure

1.328a

.249

.035

.249

Brokerage-failure

2.917a

.088

.052

.088

Intentional

a

.078

.780

.009

.780

False-brokerages

.117a

.732

.010

.732

Affinity fraud

2.514a

.113

.049

.113

Elderly/retirees

1.398a

.237

.036

.237

Number of valid
cases

1068

Discussion Crosstabs Perpetrator Level Beginning with 2007 to 2016 Table 16
The chi-square test below explores the relationship between the demographics of
perpetrators and those schemes that began during 2007 or thereafter. Table 16 measures the
observed frequencies of the categorical dependent variables: White, Black, Hispanic, Asian,
American Indian and no known race, against the categorical independent variable of the time
frame of during the time period of 2007-2016. Each variable was tested individually then
combined in one table for ease of reading and comparison. In this analysis, the dependent
variables are the individual demographic characteristics of the Ponzi perpetrators and the
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independent variable is the time frame of beginning 2007 and after. Race is significant at .007, in
that there was an increase in Black perpetrators after 2007 and less White perpetrators. This
means that from 2007 on there was an increase in Black perpetrators. We cannot say that the
financial crisis caused more Black perpetrators, it is more likely that reduced discrimination
provided more opportunity for Blacks to be in a position to carry out fraud. The data does not
show an increase in women as perpetrators even though it is thought women also would have
experienced less discrimination, allowing them to be in a position of trust that fosters the
environment to perpetrate a Ponzi scheme. There were no significant findings in the variables of
White, Hispanic Asian, American Indian.
Hypothesis five expects that there are differences in the characteristics of Ponzi scheme
perpetrators after 2007. The data does not support hypothesis five in the demographic categories
of race and gender.

Table 16 Crosstabs for Perpetrator Level Beginning 2007 to 2016
From 2007 to 2016
Chi-Square

Sig

Cramer’s V

Sig.

+
White

35.175a

.000

.122

.000

Black

7.169a

.007

.055

.000

Hispanic

1.359a

.244

.024

.244

.030a

.863

.004

.863

a

.858

.004

.858

No known race

59.900

a

.000

.160

.000

GenderM-1;F-0

2.288a

.515

.031

.515

Asian
American Indian

.032

Number of Valid
Cases

2354
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Discussion Ponzi Scheme Perpetrators and White-collar Crime Age Analysis
The following section describes the age of Ponzi perpetrators and compares these results
to other federal level criminal-ages. It also compares these results with other white-collar federal
level crimes and federal level crimes in general. Generally, white-collar criminals age into crime
and tend to be Caucasian. This study finds similar results to general federal data on white-collar
crimes and federal level crimes. These charts give a general picture of federal level crimes for
comparison. The federal data for years of 2015 and 2016 were used because it is the most
recently available. Previous years illustrated similar results and were therefore not included for
brevity.
The age at sentencing reported in chart 3 and describes all perpetrators in the time from
1973 until 2016. The histogram demonstrates that the bulk of Ponzi scheme perpetrators were
between the ages of 40 and 60. The mean age at sentencing for all Ponzi perpetrators is 50.48
years. In comparing to age demographics of all perpetrators to chart 4, the chart of ages of
federal offenders in all crimes sentenced in 2015, most federal level offenders are between the
ages of 21 and 40. Ponzi scheme perpetrators are a much older demographic, primarily between
the ages of 40 and 60.
Chart 4 demonstrates the age categories of all federal level crime sentences in 2015. The
majority of federal level sentences were among the age groups between the ages 21 and 40. After
the age of 40 the number of occurrences declines as compared with Ponzi scheme perpetrators.
Chart 5, uses federal sentencing data on a select group of White-collar crimes to examine
ages. In all cases except for RICO crimes, the over 50 age group had the highest scores, with
fraud cases showing that the age groups of 41-50 and over 50 were about equal and very high.
The chart shows an exceptionally high range for the 31-40 age group, that did not show up in
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other White-collar crimes or in the Ponzi analysis
Chart 3 All Ponzi Perpetrators Age at Sentencing 1973-2016

Comparison of All Federal Crimes, White-collar Crimes and Ponzi Perpetrators
The above findings are compared to the United States Sentencing Commission Overview
of Federal Criminal cases for 2015. (USSC 2016). The Sentencing commission shows a total of
71,003 cases for 2015, for all federal offenses. Of that 7,420 were fraud convictions, this is
10.5% of the total federal cases. (USSC, Overview 2016, pgs. 2 &3). Males were 86.8%; about
four points lower than all Ponzi perpetrators (Table 8, p. 205). The major gender difference in
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federal offenses is that women continue to dominate the white-collar crime of embezzlement, at
55.8%; the total cases were 342. (USSC Overview 2016 p.3). For the year 2015, the USSC data
shows that 52.7% of all federal offenders were Hispanic; the Ponzi data shows 2%, (Table 8). Of
all federal offenses, 19.8% were Black. In the Ponzi data set 7% were Black, (Table 8). The
average age of federal offenders in 2015 is 36; across all Ponzi data, it is age 50, (Table 8). The
average length of time for federal offenders in 2015 is under 5 years, less than 60 months,
whereas Ponzi perpetrators received an average of 64 months over the time period of all Ponzi
schemes, (Table 8), but after 2007 and the Booker decision, an average of 37 months, (Table 9).
The USSC reports that for all fraud cases in 2015, the average sentence was 27 months. (USSC,
Overview 2016) Ponzi case sentences were higher than general fraud sentences.

Chart 4 2015 Federal Offenders all Crimes Age at Sentencing

All Federal Crimes Age 2015
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70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
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0

The Y-axis is the quantity of offenders.
Data source: United State Sentencing Commission, 2015 Datafile, USSCFY2015
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-andsourcebooks/2015/Table06.pdf

Chart 5 Federal White-collar Crimes Ages Sentences 2015
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Federal White-collar Crime Age Sentencing 2015
Antitrust
RICO
Money Laundering
Tax
Bribery
Forgery Counterfitting
Embezzlement
Fraud
0

500
Over 50

1000
41-50

31-40

1500
21-30

2000

2500

Under 21

Data source: United State Sentencing Commission, 2015 Datafile, USSCFY2015
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-andsourcebooks/2015/Table06.pdf

Discussion of Hypotheses Outcomes
Hypothesis one: It is expected that the data would show that previously existing
intentional Ponzi schemes failed during the financial crisis and were therefore exposed. Chart 1
demonstrates that the majority of schemes failed in 2009. Table 13 shows that of all the schemes
that failed during the period of the financial crisis, 2007-2010, 92.6% were intentional schemes.
During the period of the financial crisis, there were 444 schemes that failed; of those 411 were
intentional schemes. Table 14 indicates that the schemes that were functioning before the
financial crisis, failed during the financial crisis at the .048 level of significance supporting
hypothesis one, that previously existing Ponzi schemes failed during the financial crisis of 20072010.
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Hypothesis two: It is expected to find that Brokerage-failure schemes began as a result of
the financial crisis. The Brokerage-failure schemes are approaching statistical significance at
.088, (Table 15), approaching significance but not fully reaching the .05 level of significance.
This would indicate that after 2007 there was a slight difference in Brokerage-failure schemes
but not enough to fully support the hypothesis. However, the Cramer’ V of 0.5 indicates that the
relationship is weak; a finding only approaching significance with a weak measure of association
does not fully support hypothesis two.

Hypothesis three: It is expected that there is a difference in intentional Ponzi schemes and
Brokerage-failure schemes from 2007 to 2016. Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for Ponzi
schemes before 2007 with the percentage of schemes Brokerage-failure as 5%. Compared to
those schemes from 2007 on in Table 6, there were 8% Brokerage-failure schemes. There is a
difference in that after 2007 there was an increase of 3% in Brokerage-failures. In Table 15, the
significance level .088, approaches statistical significance at the .05 level, there is a small change
in Brokerage-failure schemes after 2007. There is a difference however, the difference is not as
great as expected; there are far less Brokerage-failure schemes during this time period than
expected. This finding would reject hypothesis three, that there would be a greater quantity of
Brokerage-failure schemes than intentional schemes after 2007.

Hypothesis four: It is expected that there are differences between the types of Ponzi
schemes from 2007 to 2016. There were slight differences in the types of schemes from 2007 to
2016. Comparing the results of percentages in Tables 5 and 6, Business-failure schemes
decreased by one point; Brokerage-failures increased by three points; Intentional schemes were
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down by one point, False-brokerages increased by one point and affinity frauds decreased by
four points. In all, there are minor differences, but there were no dramatic changes between the
schemes prior to 2007 and after 2007, therefore the findings reject the hypothesis that there are
differences between the types of schemes before and after 2007.

Hypothesis five: It is expected that there are differences in the characteristics of the
Ponzi perpetrators after 2007. There were no significant differences in Ponzi perpetrators after
2007. Based on descriptive statistics of population means, the data shows that after 2007 there
were 34% Whites as compared to 49% for the entire timespan of Ponzi perpetrators, and 51% of
the perpetrators before 2007. This is explained by the many cases after 2007 are still waiting for
criminal sentencing, therefore their race is not known; 57% of those after 2007 have no known
race indication. There is a minor change in the number of perpetrators after 2007 in that the
schemes after 2007 averaged fewer perpetrators at 1.83 per schemes compared to before 2007
averaged 2.32 perpetrators per scheme. The data does not support the hypothesis that there is a
difference in Ponzi perpetrators after 2007 with regard to demographic characteristics.

Other Outcomes
Other outcomes refer to circumstances where an individual either died or is a fugitive.
Federal documents indicate if a perpetrator is a fugitive. Federal documents generally indicate
when a perpetrator has died. When a perpetrator dies before the end of a trial the charges are
dropped on that individual. On rare occasion, a federal document will indicate that a defendant
has committed suicide. The determination of suicide was made by researching those indicated as
dead in general media. Media will generally report that a defendant has committed suicide but
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not always. Some suicides were documented at taking place when an individual was charged, in
others upon conviction. There were 15 instances that were reported to be suicides, 13 that were
reported as deaths from illness or not-specified. The unspecified deaths may have been suicides
but if it was not reported as a suicide, it was recorded as a death of unknown cause in the data.
One of the more well-known suicide cases was Kenneth Wayne McLeod. McLeod had carried
on his scheme for 22 years. His victims were primarily federal and state law enforcement
officers. In 2010, five days after he had admitted his scheme to SEC officials, McLeod killed
himself. This case resulted in a United States Drug Enforcement Agency Inspector’s General
report as to how federal agents could have been fooled for more than two decades.
There were 35 cases of perpetrators who are fugitives. Generally, the fugitives do not
have a sentence on record. The fugitives are usually foreign nationals, although some are
American citizens who simply disappeared.

States; Ponzi schemes; Incorporation; Per capita Comparison
Table 17 shows each state with the quantity of Ponzi schemes per state, the number of
incorporations in that state, the state population as of the 2010 census and the number of Ponzi
schemes per capita. This table simply gives an idea of states that may have a concern with fraud.
It cannot be considered as a valid statistical analysis because the count data is all known Ponzi
schemes between 1973 and 2016. The population data is from only 2010. A more serious
comparison would take state and the number of Ponzi schemes per year, and the population per
year. Since the absolute number of schemes per year is not knowable, a valid comparison cannot
be made. Table 17 is only meant to give a suggestion of volume of schemes in each state.
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California had the largest quantity of Ponzi schemes (173); this does not mean it is the
Ponzi scheme center of the United States. California has a large population and it falls in the
range of 4.644 Ponzi schemes per million people. The national average is 3.459 Ponzi schemes
per million people.
Utah takes the prize for most Ponzi schemes per state, coming in at 14.11 schemes per
million population. The state of Utah has known it has a problem with fraud, particularly affinity
fraud, and in 2015 Utah established a registry for those convicted of White-collar felonies in the
same way that Megan’s law requires registration of pedophiles. This registry is in partnership
with the United States Department of Justice and the Securities Exchange Commission. (State of
Utah) (Protess, 2015). Reflecting back on Table 4.2, Faith-based frauds, 11 of 74 affinity-faithbased schemes were Mormons. Of those 11, six were in Utah, with one each in Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut and Texas. The state of Utah has approximately 62% of its
population self-identifying as Mormon as of 2004. (Canham, 2008).
Hawaii came in second with the second highest number of Ponzi schemes per million
people, at 9.568. This could mean many things. It could mean that there are more Ponzi schemes
per capita in Hawaii than in other states, or it could also mean that the smaller population and the
island nature enables law enforcement to catch schemes more quickly. A state by state analysis
comparing quantity of money taken per state, per capita income, and other criteria might
determine why this state has a higher number of schemes relative to other states. The relevance
here, is that the findings could have implications for regulatory agency and law enforcement
staffing.
Maine stands out as having had no federal level Ponzi schemes and no Ponzi entities
incorporated there. Its population is comparable to Hawaii, with Maine having about 30,000
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fewer people. Without a state by state comparative study there can be no assessment of why one
state would have many Ponzi schemes and another state have no federal level Ponzi schemes.
Delaware and Nevada stand out for their opaque incorporation laws. Both states have no
corporate income tax or tax on corporate shares. Delaware has a low franchise tax and Nevada
has no franchise tax. Both states do not require officers to be residents; only a registered agent is
required to receive documents; this can be an attorney hired for the purpose. Delaware does not
list the primaries in corporations, or LLCs, on public record. Both states do not require that
board members be disclosed publicly. In Delaware, it is very inexpensive to incorporate. Both
states do not require a bank account or formal meetings to be held in the state, only requiring a
registered agent address. When an entity has opened a bank account in Delaware the funds are
exempt from attachment, such as in divorce proceedings and by creditors. (Delaware, title 8).
Delaware’s laws favor companies with stockholders, such as stockholders in other states are not
subject to Delaware taxes. Delaware has a court of chancery, that is solely focused on business
law; these are judicial only; no juries. Nevada has more protections for the officers of
corporations. In Nevada corporations, can choose to indemnify all officers from all actions. This
is not the case in Delaware. As of May 2016, the end date of data collection, Delaware had no
federal level Ponzi schemes charged civilly or criminally on the federal level, yet it had 91
incorporations. The first federal level Ponzi scheme within federal websites, in Delaware, has
been charged: Matthew Krimm, April 25, 2017. Nevada had 13 schemes charged civilly and/or
criminally, and 112 incorporations. It also had a higher than average number of Ponzi schemes
per million population in that it has 4.814 schemes per capita.
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Table 17 States-Ponzi count-Incorporation-Populations
State

Total Ponzi
1973-2016

Total #
Incorporated

State Population

Ponzi Schemes

2010

Per capita
Per million

Alabama

8

0

4779736

1.674

Alaska

2

1

710231

2.816

Arizona

17

8

6392017

2.660

Arkansas

3

6

2915918

1.029

California

173

106

37253956

4.644

Colorado

28

18

5029196

5.567

Connecticut

21

14

3574097

5.876

Delaware

0

91

897934

0

D.C.

4

3

601723

6.648

Florida

103

94

18801310

5.478

Georgia

34

24

9687653

3.510

Hawaii

15

6

1360301

9.568

Idaho

8

0

1567652

5.013

Illinois

61

41

12830632

4.754

Indiana

9

6

6483802

1.388

Iowa

3

1

3046355

0.985

Kansas

7

0

2853118

2.453

Kentucky

2

0

4339367

0.461

Louisiana

6

5

4533372

1.324

Maine

0

0

1328361

0

Maryland

5

3

5773552

0.866

Massachusetts

16

8

6547629

2.444

Michigan

30

20

9883640

3.035

Minnesota

21

12

5303925

3.959

Mississippi

2

3

1967297

1.017
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Missouri

18

12

5988927

3.006

Montana

0

4

989415

0

Nebraska

4

3

1826341

2.190

Nevada

13

112

2700551

4.814

New Hampshire

2

2

1316470

1.519

New Jersey

28

21

8791894

3.185

New Mexico

3

2

2059179

1.457

New York

84

51

19378102

4.335

North Carolina

35

20

9535483

3.671

North Dakota

1

1

672591

1.487

Ohio

26

0

11536725

2.254

Oklahoma

11

7

3751351

2.932

Oregon

11

9

3831074

2.871

Pennsylvania

29

20

12702379

2.283

Rhode Island

3

1

1052567

2.850

South Carolina

9

0

4625364

1.946

South Dakota

0

1

814180

0

Tennessee

20

11

6346105

3.152

Texas

97

71

25145561

3.858

Utah

39

26

2763885

14.111

Vermont

1

1

625741

1.598

Virginia

24

11

8001024

3.0

Washington

21

7

6724540

3.123

West Virginia

1

2

1852994

.54

Wisconsin

7

5

5686986

1.231

Wyoming

1

9

563626

1.774

Puerto Rico

2

2

753182

2.655

1068

872

308745538

3.459

US population
2010
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Chapter 7 Conclusion and Implications
In answer to the research questions:
1) Did Brokerage-failure Ponzi schemes happen at a greater rate than intentional Ponzi
schemes during the financial crisis? This question was addressed with descriptive statistics
and analysis of the known population of federal level Ponzi schemes. It was determined that
Brokerage-failure schemes occurred at a much lower rate than expected, and far less than
intentional schemes, during the financial crisis and the duration of the study time frame.

2) Are Brokerage-failure Ponzi schemes different from intentional Ponzi schemes in terms of
the rate of occurrence during the study time frame? This question was addressed with
descriptive statistics for the pooled sample and the sample split by Ponzi scheme type. Chisquare and crosstabs were performed to determine the association to the time frame before
the financial crisis and from the onset of the financial crisis. It was determined that
consistently there were more intentional schemes through the entire time frame, and that
most Ponzi schemes are intentional and not due to Brokerage-failure or Business-failure.

3) How do the characteristics at the individual-level (perpetrator-level) variables differ in
relationship to all Ponzi schemes, Ponzi schemes before the financial crisis and schemes that
began from 2007 to 2016? This question was answered with descriptive statistics (split and
pooled) and bivariate tools using an individual level data set that includes information on
demographics, finances of the scheme, and punishment. It was found that the characteristics
of perpetrators varied only minimally throughout the study period as compared to the
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financial crisis. The only substantive difference is the length of sentences after 2007 were
much less than prior to 2007, perceived to be due to the Supreme Court decision on U.S. v.
Booker.

Conclusion Discussion
It is the nature of Ponzi schemes that when the economy is robust there is more money to
invest. Likewise, when the economy declines people withdraw their funds from investments to
survive. This is when many Ponzi schemes are discovered, as demonstrated in charts one and
two. Declining economies influence legitimate brokerages and businesses failure; however, it
cannot be proven from this study that this is the sole cause. There were many brokerages, hedge
funds and commodity pools that did survive the financial crisis without resorting to fraud or
going bankrupt, far too many to count.
In white-collar crime cases, there are civil proceedings and criminal proceeding. This
research has quantified the percentages of civil and criminal actions by federal agencies. This
study does not include the private civil suits between the victims and the perpetrators trying to
recover funds; there are far too many. Nor does this study include the civil cases of the receiver
trying to collect funds in clawbacks. This study does quantify descriptively the number of cases
that received charges from the SEC and CFTC in Table 4. The SEC took administrative action
in 66% of all Ponzi schemes. The CFTC took administrative action in 15% of all cases.
Criminal charges were brought in 70% of all cases, from all agencies, as of May 2016. Some
schemes may have received action in both the SEC, CFTC and criminal charges. Others may
have been both the SEC and criminal or the CFTC and criminal; some cases were just criminal.
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Some cases were initiated by the USPIS or the IRS and were solely criminal in nature. It should
be noted that the IRS and USPIS participated in the majority of investigations.
The criminal charges against the perpetrators were generally wire fraud and mail fraud.
Some were charged under general fraud charges. Many were also charged with tax evasion and
money laundering. Some were charged under the RICO Act. Civil charges through the SEC and
CFTC were many, but frequently for not being properly registered with the SEC or CFTC or for
selling unregistered securities.
This study did not see dramatic changes as expected in types of Ponzi schemes before
and after the financial crisis. However, it widened the breadth of knowledge about Ponzi
schemes that was previously unknown and quantified characteristics of Ponzi schemes and Ponzi
perpetrators. As such a new category was established for False-brokerages, a type not previously
known to exist before the study.
One shortcoming of this study, and all white-collar crime studies in general, is the study
of victimology. White-collar crimes tend to have multiple victims, often times in the thousands
or millions depending on the crime. Other types of crimes tend to have a few victims. It is
virtually impossible to study victimology in white-collar crimes. In the cases of insider trading
it is difficult to define who the victims are. In Ponzi schemes, there is generally a known
population because the victims apply for restoration of their principal investment. However, the
victims’ identities are generally not available through public information within case documents.
Ponzi schemes and other frauds tend to have specific victims. However, information on the
victims is minimally available, not allowing for surveys or even sample populations. In some
documents, the victim-investors were identified as: Investor A, Investor B, and so forth, but only
a few of all victims per case. The information provided might discuss the nature of their deposits
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that demonstrated how the fraud was committed, but the information is not in any way
comprehensive or exhaustive and is not adequate to carry out quantitative analysis. In short,
information on Ponzi victims is spotty at best.
Justification of the Research and Contributions to the Field
In general, data-driven quantified research on white-collar crime and white-collar
criminals is lacking in scholarly research. (Dabney, 2016). It is hoped that this offense-based
quantification of one specific type of white-collar crime will lay the ground work for many
studies in the future. The availability of data through federal agency websites opens the door for
producing original data sets from which social scientists can carry out statistical analysis of
white-collar offenses and perpetrators.
The significance of this specific aspect of Ponzi scheme research is understanding how
many Ponzi schemes were found in the focus time period of 2007-2010 time period that was
during the financial decline. Demonstrating that this phenomenon increased during such periods
can provide a warning for brokerage firms to make wiser decisions when the economy heads into
a declining market again. In other words, documenting that this phenomenon occurred allows
for a “lessons learned” approach for brokerages, investors and regulators.
It is important to have a scientific study identifying and differentiating types of Ponzi
schemes that are documented as having taken place, and the length of time the schemes ran.
This information provides legislators, regulators and law enforcement with a realistic overview
of this of one type of financial fraud, enabling them to make assessments on securities and
commodities legislation and its effectiveness. The Report on the Financial Crisis indicates that
regulatory changes in banking laws set the motion for the domino effect of the financial crisis.
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By determining which Ponzi schemes were discovered during the financial crisis, a dollar
quantity can be known with regard to the success or failure of legislation.
This study will make significant discoveries about Ponzi schemes available to federal law
enforcement, regulatory agencies, legislators, academia, investors and the general public. An
exhaustive study of this type of fraud has not been done. These data sets provide the basis for
continuing research in the areas of fraud, economic behavior, economic trends and regulation, as
well as more in-depth study on the variations and characteristics of Ponzi schemes and affinity
fraud. The data on criminal sentences will support future study on the relationship between age
and White-collar criminal activities. It is expected that this Ponzi scheme research will reflect
economic trends and how Congress reacts to trends by instituting regulation, as suggested by
Minsky's economic theory of financial instability.
The data sets will be used for continuing research and publications. Currently, the data
sets have been used for a working research paper on affinity fraud. This subset of Ponzi schemes
looks at the vulnerability of those within affiliation groups and how the relationship of trust is
used to perpetrate fraud. Ultimately, the data sets have been set up to carry out the research
necessary for a book on Ponzi schemes. This book will address many of the concepts presented
in this proposal more fully. The intent of this research and the book is to provide an over-all
understanding of this specific type of fraud. The goal is to provide a better understanding of
Ponzi schemes for regulators, legislators, law enforcement and academia.
Future research will look at the relationships between regulation, bull and bear markets
and fraud, using historical comparative analysis. This will take Minsky’s theory one step further
connecting the theory of financial instability to fraud and financial crimes. Secondly, the current
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research has also provided a subset of units of analysis in other countries for a cross-national
study of Ponzi schemes.
Implications for Public and Private Sector Fraud Control
Currently, the power of the SEC to require disgorgement is under consideration by the
Supreme Court. The argument is that the SEC is not authorized to require disgorgement, under
current legislation, with no time limit. The problem is, if there is a five-year time limit as is
currently under consideration, then cases that went on for much longer than five years would not
be required to give back illegally obtained funds prior to the five years. Currently, disgorged
funds go back to the original investors and to the United States Treasury. The five-year time
limit would force the SEC and CFTC to find Ponzi schemes sooner in order to return funds to
investors under the law. That is not realistic and would present an undue hardship to later
investors and allow earlier investors to walk away with the funds of later investors. The law
should be revised allowing the SEC to require disgorgement from the beginning of the fraud;
there should not be a five-year statute of limitations. The data sets have the ability to address
questions such as this, in order to determine a monetary quantity for federal agencies and
legislators. The data demonstrates the length of time of the schemes, the number of victims and
the quantity taken in each scheme. It is a certainty that those victims whose funds went to pay
earlier investors interest would feel entitled to getting their full investment back. If the
legislation only allows for a five-year limit it is likely a large percentage of victims would not get
their money back.
Congress determines the laws and holds the purse strings that enable regulators and law
enforcement to do their jobs. Regulators have mechanisms in place to monitor legally registered
entities under their jurisdiction. They cannot so easily monitor entities that do not register, either
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because the entities are intentionally operating under the radar, as it were, or because they are not
required to register with the SEC or the CFTC. If legislation is established requiring more
extensive registration and monitoring of business entities by the SEC and CFTC, there must be
an increase in hiring in the SEC and CFTC to accommodate the increase in reporting and
monitoring of all business entities. Technology can be developed to enhance regulatory
monitoring, but again, that takes funding and hiring more people that are highly skilled
technicians. Again, the bottom line is Congress prioritizing financial integrity with legislation
and funding the agencies to carry out their mandates to the fullest extent of the law.
We can suggest that regulation and deregulation influences financial trends; we might be
able to prove quantitatively that regulation and deregulation influence financial trends. We might
be able to prove that financial trends influence fraud and white-collar crimes. Regardless, there
will always be the businesses that cannot make money following laws and regulations that were
designed to prevent fraud and to keep the economy stable. Regulators and law enforcement can
only enforce the laws and regulations that are in place. When the economy is doing poorly, there
will be lobbyists that lobby for deregulation. Legislators will feel the fury of their constituents,
then will pare down the regulations. The corporations and businesses will increase their
profitability, and eventually there will be losses again; it is Minsky’s theory of financial
instability played out over and over. The part of the equation that has not been proven, but will
be pursued in future research with these data sets, is the relationship to boom-economies/bull
markets, bust-economies/bear markets and white-collar crimes.
In both the Madoff and Stanford cases there were SEC Office of Inspector’s General
(OIG) reports from David Kotz to determine the contributions that SEC employee’s actions or
inactions may have contributed to the failure to expose and bring legal action in a timely manner.
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In the case of Madoff, it was found that the SEC received sufficient information from Harry
Markopolos to proceed with a formal investigation, but they failed to do so. In the end eight
employees were disciplined but no employees were fired. In the Stanford case SEC employee
Julie Pruitt determined that Stanford was carrying out his Ponzi scheme ten years before the SEC
charged him, but her superiors would not take action. Both the Madoff and Stanford SEC-OIG
reports indicated that inadequate manpower and financial resources contributed to the SEC’s
inability to uncover these large schemes. Ponzi schemes investigations are time and manpower
intensive research requiring a high degree of experience and education; they are not quick
turnaround cases that support quantitative results suggestive of efficiency in agency
performance; it was quantity versus quality. The SEC was quite humiliated by these failures; it
is not likely these failures will be forgotten.
Regulators have mechanisms in place to monitor legally registered entities under their
jurisdiction. They cannot so easily monitor entities that do not register. This is because the Ponzi
schemes are intentionally operating under the radar, as it were, or because they are not required
to register with the SEC or the CFTC. If legislation requires more extensive registration and
monitoring of business entities by the SEC and CFTC, there must be an increase in hiring to
accommodate the increase in reporting and monitoring of all business entities. Technology can
be developed to enhance regulatory monitoring, but again that takes funding and hiring more
people and highly skilled technicians. It has been stated before, the success of preventing frauds
requires Congress prioritizing financial stability and integrity with legislation, and enabling the
agencies to carry out their mandates with appropriate funding levels.
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Sentencing
Federal sentencing procedures changed throughout the study time frame, from 1973 to
2016. The original Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual was published in 1987. It is clear that
government intervention in the form of Supreme Court decision: United States v. Booker in 2006
has influenced federal level sentencing practices by reducing sentences. However, Bernard
Madoff was sentenced to 150 years in June of 2009, he was seventy years old at the time.
Clearly a seventy-year old man could not fulfill a sentence of 150 years. If the lengthy sentence
was meant to somehow achieve vengeance for the victims, would that be worth measuring
quantitatively? More likely, the lengthy sentence was meant to deter others from committing a
Ponzi scheme. However, the data shows that seventy-nine schemes were begun after Madoff
was sentenced. Norman Schmidt received a sentence of 310 years for his Ponzi scheme in 2005,
since no one can fulfill such a sentence we have to assume that length is meant to deter. Clearly
Madoff, and Schmidt will not have the opportunity to recidivate. Considering Madoff did not
get caught by authorities but instead confessed, and the average sentence was thirty-seven
months after 2007, we can say that potential Ponzi perpetrators may believe they are not likely to
get caught and if they do get caught, the sentence will be minimal. More than likely perpetrators
may feel they are too intelligent or skilled to get caught. Sentencing length of time is not likely
to serve as a deterrent to potential Ponzi perpetrators, who believe they will not get caught.
In the private sector, banks have the responsibility for monitoring for fraud under the
Banking Act. Those insured by the FDIC are required to maintain internal controls and to
monitor for suspicious activities. JPMorgan Chase Bank received a $1.7 billion penalty for its
failure to act in the case of Bernard Madoff. (DOJ, January 7, 2014). JPMorgan is also under
criminal indictment as of January 2014, charged with failing to maintain an effective money244

laundering program and failure to report suspicious activities in the Madoff case. (DOJ p.r. 14003, 2014). JPMorgan Chase Bank admitted to the facts presented by the Department of Justice
and agreed to pay a forfeiture quantity of $1.7 billion, that is considered a penalty. (DOJ, January
6, 2014). Between 2009 and 2016, financial institutions have been assessed $12 billion in
forfeitures, fines and penalties related to money laundering, and foreign corrupt practices, and
banking violations. These funds go into the Treasury General Fund Accounts and to the
Department of Justice’s Asset Forfeiture Fund. Of the $12 billion, all but $100 million had been
collected as of 2016. (GAO 2016).
Measuring the effectiveness of any legislation regarding crime will never be completely
possible because we cannot measure crimes that might have been, but weren’t committed. The
sheer nature of the fact that we are innocent until proven guilty means we cannot speculate as to
crimes that might have been committed. In the process of carrying out this research the SEC was
contacted in an effort to find out how many cases were brought before the SEC that were
suspected of being Ponzi schemes but were not voted to be formal investigations by the
Commissioners. The answer is that the SEC does not keep publicly available data on possible
cases, only those that are considered for formal investigations.
In attempting to determine the effectiveness of Sarbanes Oxley and Dodd-Frank we can
measure for specific crimes committed such as through whistleblower awards or financial
statement frauds before and after the Acts were enacted. That still does not tell us about cases
they may have been discouraged by the laws. We cannot survey even a sampling of brokerages
to ask if laws had not been in effect to prevent financial fraud would they have carried out
specific illegal actions; no one would respond in the affirmative. We may see a difference in
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Mortgage due diligence and investment entity due diligence as measured by the types of
mortgages provided since the Dodd-Frank Act.
The Dodd-Frank Act was established as a result of the financial crisis and the failings of
federal agencies to control the subprime- mortgage derivatives markets and the failure to stop the
high-profile Ponzi schemes of Madoff and Stanford. We can see that Dodd-Frank influenced
whistleblower actions in that there have been 10,540 whistle blower tips since Dodd-Frank and
there has been a total of $142 million in financial awards since 2011. (SEC, 2017). The SEC has
received $935 million in financial remedies as a result of these tips. As a result of failures to
detect significant frauds prior to the financial crisis, section 961 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires
that senior executives within the SEC submit an annual report to Congress about the
effectiveness of its internal supervisory controls. The most recent report of 2016 reports that the
SEC met 52 of 58 intended internal controls designed to meet the agency mandates and mission
to: “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly and efficient markets and facilitate capital
formation.” (SEC). The first report was 2013, the SEC met half of the required provisions. The
GAO report is an outside federal agency auditing for efficiency of controls within the SEC. We
can take at face value that the GAO report provides a credible study of performance and integrity
within the parameters it measures. The true test of efficiency will be obvious in the next
economic bull market; we will see if the SEC and CFTC have performed as required by the
Dodd-Frank expectations, if the Dodd-Frank Act is left intact by the current administration and
Congress. If Dodd-Frank is not left intact we are likely to have means to determine Minsky’s
theory of financial instability: Dodd-Frank was enacted to curb fraudulent practices. If DoddFrank is reduced or eliminated we are likely to see economic changes and then we will see if
more frauds occur. Federal agencies can only enforce the laws that are enacted.
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Technology and the internet now allow for money to move anywhere in the world with a
key stroke. The Panama Papers has made it evident that there are clear financial advantages to
incorporating in countries other than where an individual resides or has citizenship. The
Luxembourg leaks made it clear that major corporations can incorporate in a small country such
as Luxembourg to avoid paying taxes. The legislation has to catch up with cybercrimes;
likewise, there must be funds appropriated to hire competent professionals. Cybercurrency has
made it possible to move money around the world, virtually without government monitoring.
The internet makes it easy to find investor victims anywhere in the country, or for that matter,
anywhere in the world. Technology has enabled fraud perpetrators to produce impeccable
fraudulent documents from desktop computers, printing the documents in house. The Darknet is
a cyber world where computer geeks and hackers rule the domain. This has enabled a
progression of unimaginable abuses. The future of financial law enforcement will demand that
more investigators have not just forensic accounting skills but also cyber forensic skills. FBI
uniform crime reports, (UCR), provide a wealth of information on violent and property crimes.
However, those crime rates have decreased.
In short, success in preventing, monitoring and enforcing for fraud requires that federal
agencies have laws in place that are enforceable, and that they have the resources to hire
competent people to carry out their missions and mandates. This research displays that fraud
perpetrators are not deterred by severe sentences that previous offenders have received.
Financial markets will continue to increase and decrease along with boom and bust economies.
Frauds will respond to this as well as to technical trends. How well federal agencies can keep
fraud in check depends on the laws in place and the manpower available to carry out
enforcement.
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This study is the beginning of research that monitors white-collar crimes, the economy,
technological advances that may influence fraud and other white-collar offenses, and the laws
and regulations designed to prevent and control financial fraud and white-collar crimes. With
quantitative analysis over time, legislators may have statistical data to establish more effective,
enforceable mandates and laws.
Limitations
First, the individual Ponzi schemes are subject to availability of federal documents and
being designated as Ponzi schemes. The data sets are made up of only those cases determined to
be Ponzi in nature by federal agencies, specifically using that terminology, and posted on agency
websites. The end date for collecting data was May 31, 2016. Since that time, more cases that
fit into the time frame have become available through federal documents that were not available
prior to the end date. It is unlikely that these few cases would have made a significant change in
the statistical findings; the data coding must have an end date. There are a few cases that did not
have a federal agency that designated them as a Ponzi scheme by the end date, but now
documents are available with the designation. It is likely that there are more cases that have the
qualities that meet the definition of a Ponzi scheme but have not been formally designated as
such, that have not been identified. Again, there is a presumption of innocence, and the cases
must have been designated a Ponzi scheme through the legal process as result of adequate
evidence.
Second, the data sets are limited to those perpetrators that were caught. There is no
means of knowing how many cases were known by authorities to be Ponzi schemes but
regulatory and law enforcement personnel did not have enough evidence to bring charges. There
is no way of knowing how many cases are referred to the SEC and CFTC commissions, but
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never resulted in formal investigations; that information is not public information. This study
does not suggest that the cases within are all of the Ponzi schemes, just those that there was
enough evidence to bring formal charges. For this reason, this study only uses known cases with
criminal or administrative charges and convictions.
The data are limited in that it includes only those schemes that have been brought to civil
or criminal action by federal agencies and are designated as a Ponzi scheme in federal
documents. These agencies have investigated many entities that may be currently functioning as
Ponzi schemes or were Ponzi schemes, but since the level of proof necessary for civil or criminal
charges has not been attained at this time; they are not in the public records or in this study. It is
possible that there are frauds that are Ponzi schemes in nature but were not designated as such in
federal documents. In some cases, fraudulent schemes were deemed to be Ponzi schemes in the
general media but not in federal documents. These cases were not used. Approximately 53
cases were found to have the term “lulling payments” used in federal document vocabulary,
referring to interest payments but never used the term “Ponzi” in any variation in the document;
these cases are not included in the data sets. Technically these cases are Ponzi schemes, however
the criteria for admission to this study dictates a federal agency must have used the terms: Ponzi,
Ponzi like, Ponzi payment, Ponzi-style, massive Ponzi, classic Ponzi; the exact word “Ponzi”
must be used in some way, in the text of federal level documents. One case in point was one of
the largest cases prior to Bernard Madoff. Gerald Payne and the greater Ministries International
Church was considered a Ponzi scheme by several state sources as well as the general media, in
the early 1990s. This scheme took approximately $500 million from an estimated 18,000
victims. (Fager, 2001). United States district court documents are not available through PACER
on this case, and no federal agency uses the term “Ponzi” in any fashion in their discussion of
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this case. Often times there are many appeals in these cases, as was the case with Gerald Payne,
again those documents are not always publicly accessible through PACER. On PACER, each
court supplies the information and controls their own database, therefore there is variation as to
how far back the records are available. The documents must be publicly available for inclusion in
the study.
In cases where the accused has committed suicide or died prior to criminal proceedings
the case is ended without a resolve in federal documents. However, if those cases were listed in
civil administrative proceedings or indicated an indictment or charges, they are included in the
data set. These cases were then coded as “deceased” for other outcomes. Similarly, perpetrators
that are fugitives are generally foreign nationals. In those cases, the criminal action does not go
forward to trial or conviction because the individual cannot be found.
The states have also investigated and taken criminal action on Ponzi cases. Because there
is no consistency in reporting and because state laws vary, those cases solely investigated and
brought to action on the state level are not included in this study. Furthermore, acquiring state
level court documents can be quite cost prohibitive, charging as much as $60 per document;
federal level documents are a maximum of three dollars per document. In many cases the state
agencies have also been involved in the investigations that were prosecuted as federal level Ponzi
schemes. These schemes are included in this study, because the perpetrators were charged either
civilly or criminally on the federal level. A few cases received civil federal charges but state
level criminal charges. The case must have had a civil or criminal federal designation of being a
Ponzi scheme to have been included in this study, for the sake of consistency.
Errors in federal documents were rarely found. These errors were minor and not
considered to have an effect on the outcome of the findings. For this reason, several documents
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were used in this study: civil complaints, administrative actions, criminal indictments and
sentencing documents, on a few occasions appeals documents were used. One example is in the
case of Recidivist Kurtis Keith Lowe. Lowe had committed an earlier Ponzi scheme with
Woody Keith Lowe, Robert Allen Blackburn and Jerry Lynn Rulye. (SEC L.R. 5-31-2000). The
SEC took civil action in 2002. (SEC L.R.17301-10-2002) From at least 2007-2014 Kurtis Lowe
and Robert Blackburn committed a second Ponzi scheme. The ages of Woody and Kurtis were
confused between the SEC document of 2002 and the FBI document of the 2015 criminal action
against Kurtis Lowe. This was clarified in later documents. The data set reflects the ages listed
in the BOP; SEC and FBI documents contradict one another. (SEC L.R. 16574, 2000) ((FBI P.R.
10-26-2015). In criminal convictions, the age used is that listed in the Bureau of Prisons inmate
locator data base. In civil cases, the age is indicated in SEC documents but not CFTC
documents. If a CFTC case did not have a criminal action, there is no documentation of age
available. When there is no criminal conviction, race cannot be determined.
The race, ethnicity or nationality of the perpetrators is limited by the Bureau of Prisons
data base. This federal agency website allows the inmates to self-designate their ethnicity or race.
It does not have an option for Hispanic. Also, those individuals of Indian, Pakistani or
Bangladeshi nationalities, have the option of choosing Asian or white. Thus, there were
individuals in the database that had the name of Patel but declared their ethnicity as white and
others as Asian. Many individuals may have multiple ethnicities, such as Black, Hispanic and
White. The self-designating nature of ethnicity in Bureau of Prison records is likely to be similar
in all other research methods that support individuals self-designating their race or ethnicity.
However, there should be a Hispanic option for those incarcerated on the federal level.
Likewise, the Bureau of Justice Statistics also does not use a Hispanic classification in their
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reports. A Bureau of Justice Statistics report on homicide trends in the United States of 19802008, classifies by race, gender and age, but only uses: White, Black and Other. The category of
Race-Other is defined as: “Other race includes American Indian, Native Alaskan, Asians, Native
Hawaiians, and other Pacific Islanders.” (DOJBJS, November 2011, p. 3).
The top 25 Ponzi schemes taking over $400 million were looked at for the primary
offender’s comments to the judge in their sentencing statement. This was an effort to determine
the possible remorsefulness, or any admission of intent to keep up with the American Dream, to
demonstrate strain theory. Only a few of these documents were publicly available. The court is
not required to make them available to the public. Each court district determines what it will
make accessible, as does each judge. In some cases, the convicted may have made an oral
statement to the court. In those cases, the transcripts of the sentencing hearing may or may not
have been typed into full documents; they may have remained in the court reporter’s
stenographic notes until someone requested they be typed. Still, there is no requirement to make
those documents public. If these documents were consistently available, the research might have
measured for strain theory, using defendant’s sentencing memorandum to the court.
A Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), request was submitted to the SEC to request
information on cases that may have been brought before the commission, but were not
determined to be worthy of a formal investigation. The purpose of this was to attempt to
compare how many cases make it to full formal investigation against those that did not have
probable cause. This was to satisfy any question of schemes that exist but were not brought to
legal action, such as the Madoff case. Again, due process protects the rights of those who are
innocent. These records are not a matter of public record; hence the SEC does not provide this
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information publicly. Only those cases that the SEC and CFTC Commissions determine to be
formal investigations are a matter of public record.
Ethical Considerations
The data collected for this research was acquired from publicly available federal
documents. All information used in this study is a matter of public record. No perpetrators or
victims have been directly contacted or interviewed. As such, an Institutional Review Board
(IRB) exemption has been received. Any references to individuals are only those stated in public
records.
Continuing Research
Federal and state agencies now provide a wealth of information on brokerages, financial
institutions and corporations. The availability of this information allows continuous monitoring
of business and financial market entities. This research will continue to monitor for Ponzi
schemes and Ponzi perpetrators, so that when the next major, or minor, financial crisis occurs,
the data will be available to measure for trends, and to reflect on the effectiveness of laws and
regulations.
The SEC added an archival link that includes administrative actions between 1960 and
1995. Each document must be searched through individually for the term “Ponzi.” It is likely
that a few more cases will be found, but again, the criteria are that federal agencies must use the
term: “Ponzi” to be included in the data sets. Those civil actions determined to be Ponzi
schemes could then be searched for in DOJ and PACER; however, PACER does not have
information available back to 1960; the court documents would have to be acquired through
formal requests and may prove quite costly.
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Scientific study of victimology in Ponzi schemes is virtually impossible, even for
descriptive statistics. To some degree qualitative analysis can be performed going through all
case documents using content analysis, interpreting what little information is available on
victims. The one suggestion this study would make to federal agencies is to provide more
information on victims; without violating their right to privacy. It is thought that knowing more
about victims, how they were acquired, and how they were deceived, might allow for greater
preventative measures.
The most needed research associated with the victims of Ponzi schemes is on the social
connections that have enabled the victimization. This would be the most significant contribution
that could be made to preventing Ponzi schemes. The SEC and CFTC have a wealth of
information available to the public in an effort to prevent the public from being victimized. The
SEC has a search engine that allows investors to search for appropriate registration by brokers;
FINRA also has Brokercheck and the NFA also has a search engine, that allow searching for
individuals and businesses. But there is nothing that can prevent people from being victimized
by their own church members, pastor, friends or relatives. The social tool of trust is powerful
and the prime key that enables victimization in Ponzi schemes.
It is likely that deregulation in securities markets designed to foster increased economic
activities will in all likelihood increase the economic wellbeing of the nation. It is also likely
that with increased discretionary income resulting from a bullish economy, individuals will want
to invest those surplus funds. It is suggested that there will be a new wave of Ponzi schemes, an
eventual financial decline and then again, many Ponzi scheme failures. It is predicted that
Minsky’s theory of financial stability will play out again over the next few years, depending on
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regulatory actions. To support or disprove this prediction, information on Ponzi schemes and
other financial crimes will continue to be collected.
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Appendix A Scheme Variables
Variable Name

Variable Description

Value/Range

Type of
variable

Money

The quantity of money taken in the
scheme

$138 thousand - $
65 billion

Continuous

Company

Name of entity

none

Nominal

Years

The time span in operation

1973-2016

Continuous

2007-2010

During the financial crisis

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

Registered

Ever legally registered as broker

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

Registered year

Legally registered as broker in 2006

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

Year Ponzi began

Year Ponzi began

1973-2016

Continuous

Duration

The count of years in operation

1 to 31 years

Continuous

Location

The state indicted prosecution

FIPS code

Categorical

Location-Country
Incorporation

Country of incorporation

U.N. country code Categorical

Location incorporation State(s) Ponzi was incorporated
state

FIPS code

Categorical

Manner and means

Faith based

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

Manner and means

Technologically based

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

Manner and means

Real estate based

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

Manner and means

Mortgage based

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

Manner and means

Securities based

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

Manner and means

Commodities based

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

Manner and means

FOREX based

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

Manner and means

Promissory Note based

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

Manner and means

Oil/gas based

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

Manner and means

Minerals based

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

Manner and means

Prime bank based

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

Manner and means

Insurance based

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

Manner and means

Other investment tools based

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

Manner and means

Other means

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

Affinity Victims

Affiliation indication

none

Nominal

Victims elderly

Elderly/retiree/senior citizen indicated

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

Affinity

Type of scheme

(0) Other

Categorical
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(1) Affinity fraud
Intentional

Type of scheme

(0) Other
(1) Intentional

Cryptocurrency

Type of scheme

(0) Other
Categorical
(1) Cryptocurrency

Business-failure

Type of scheme

(0) Other
(1) Businessfailure

Brokerage-failure

Type of scheme

0) Other
Categorical
(1) Broker Failure

False Brokerage

Type of scheme

0) Other
(1) False Broker

Categorical

Feeder-fund

Type of scheme

(0) Other
(1) Feeder-fund

Categorical

Broker-Dealer
Federal Registration

Type of scheme

(0) Other
(1) Broker-dealer

Categorical

Registered dealer

Type of investment entity

(0) Other
(1) Dealer

Categorical

Investment Adviser

Type of investment entity

(0) Other
(1) Investment
Adviser

Categorical

Hedge fund

Type of investment entity

(0) Other
(1) Hedge fund

Categorical

Real estate Broker

Type of broker license

(0) Other
(1) Real estate
broker

Categorical

Quantity of Victims

Quantity of victim-investors

3-300,000

Continuous
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Categorical

Categorical

Perpetrator Variables
Variable name

Variable description

Value Range

Type of
Variable

Company Name

Name of each scheme

none

Nominal

Perpetrator Name

Name of each perpetrator

none

Nominal

White

Race

(0) Other
(1) White

Categorical

Black

Race

(0) Other
(1) Black

Categorical

Hispanic

Race

(0) Other
(1) Hispanic

Categorical

Asian

Race

(0) Other
(1) Asian

Categorical

American Indian

Race

(0) Other
(1) American Indian

Categorical

Perpetrator Gender

Gender of each perpetrator

1 = male 0 = female Categorical

Primary

Is the perpetrator the main agent

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

Age

The age at sentencing

19-85

Continuous

Sentence length

The months of the sentence

0-3960

Continuous

Clergy

The primary a religious leader

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

Attorney

The perpetrator is an attorney

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

CPA

The perpetrator is an accountant

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

BTIA

Perpetrator was a licensed Broker,
0-no/1-yes
Trader or Investment Advisor at some
point

Categorical

Other profession

Indicates all other professions

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

Previous felony

Convicted of previous felony

0-no/1-yes

Categorical

Previous Securities/
Previous federal securities or
Commodities violation commodities violation

0-no/1-yes

Dichotomous

Other Outcomes

Suicide
Death
Probation
Fugitive

Nominal

Outcomes other than criminal prison
sentences or civil regulatory actions
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Appendix B. Glossary of Terms

Accredited Investor: An investor treated under the Securities Act of 1933 as being
knowledgeable and sophisticated in financial matters. (Garner, Black’s Law).
Administrative Law Judge: “The Commission’s Office of Administrative Law Judges consists
of independent judicial officers who conduct hearings and rule on allegations of securities
violations in cases initiated by the Commission. When the commission initiates a public
administrative proceeding, it refers the cases to the Office, where it is assigned to an
individual Administrative Law Judge(ALJ). The ALJ then conducts a public hearing that
is similar to a non-jury trial in the federal courts. Just as federal judge can do, an ALJ
issues subpoenas, rules on motions, and rules on the admissibility of evidence. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the parties submit proposed findings of the fact and
conclusions of the law. The ALJ prepares an initial decision that includes factual
findings and legal conclusions that are a matter of public record. Parties may appeal an
initial decision to the Commission, which can affirm, reverse, modify set aside or remand
for further proceedings. Appeals from Commission action are to a United States Court of
Appeals.” (SEC.gov/whatwedo)
Affiliation: Individuals who self-identify with a group, such as by nationality, ethnicity, by
religious groups, profession, sexual orientation, including physical characteristics such as being
deaf.
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Affinity fraud: “Affinity fraud refers to investment scams that prey upon members of
identifiable groups, such as religious or ethnic communities, the elderly or professional groups.”
(SEC) The members of the group self-identify with the affiliation.
Bond: A debt security, similar to an I.O.U. When a buyer purchases a bond, they are lending
money to the issuer. In return for the loan, the issuer promises to pay the buyer a specified
interest rate during the life of the bond and to repay the principal when it matures. (SEC).
Broker: An agent who specializes in stocks, bonds, commodities or options and must be
registered with the Sec where securities are traded. (Downes and Goodman). (Must pass exams
and be registered with SEC or CFTC).
Cash Commodity: “The physical or actual commodity as distinguished from the futures
contract, sometimes called spot commodities or actuals.” (CFTC).
Cease and Desist Order: “A court or an agency's order prohibiting a person from continuing a
particular course of conduct.” (Garner, Black’s Law).
Charge: “A formal accusation of an offense as a primary step to prosecution.” (Garner, Black’s
Law). This is the action taken by the Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's.
Clawbacks: A provision in law or contract that limits or reverses a payment or distribution for
specified reasons.
Commodity: (1) a commodity, as defined in the Commodity Exchange Act, includes the
agricultural commodities enumerated in Section 1a (9) of the Commodity Exchange Act.
(CFTC). Products that fall under this title are: agricultural products, metals, petroleum, gasoline,
heating oil, and natural gas. (Etzel).
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Commodity pool: “An investment trust, syndicate or similar form of enterprise operated for the
purpose of trading commodity futures or option contracts. (CFTC) “By combining funds with
other investors, individuals can obtain access to a larger range of investments and size of trade
then by doing their own trading. Commodity pools are similar to mutual funds” (Etzel).
Complaint: “The initial proceeding that starts a civil action and states the basis for the court's
jurisdiction, the basis for the plaintiff's claim and the demand for relief.” (Garner, Black’s Law).
This is sometimes followed with an amended complaint, that adds additional facts, thereby
replacing the initial complaint. These are the initial charges brought by the SEC and CFTC.
There are also criminal complaints issued by the Department of Justice.
Cryptocurrencies: Also, known as Bitcoin or cybercurrencies. Digital currencies that hold no
physical intrinsic value and no fiat value. There is no country or agency issuing a physical object
that holds value. Because there is no centralized agency there is no means of regulation,
monitoring or enforcement of value or movement. (Downes & Goodman).
Currency: “An item (such as a coin, government note, or banknote) that circulates as a medium
of exchange.” (Garner, Ed. Black’s Law).
Dealer: “Any person or company in the business of buying and selling securities for his or her
own account, through a broker or otherwise.” (FINRA) (Must pass exams and be registered).
An individual or a firm acting as a principal in securities or commodities transactions. (Downes
& Goodman).
Disgorgement: The act of giving up illegally obtained funds acquired in a Ponzi scheme by legal
compulsion. (Garner, Blacks Law). This may be determined by an administrative judge or a
criminal judge. Generally, this has been used where there is not a criminal conviction but instead
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sanctions such as barring an offender from trading stocks or commodities or being associated
with any business that does. The criminal action is: restitution.
Feeder fund: An investment entity that contributes funds to a larger or umbrella fund or
investor. In the case of Ponzi schemes there may be many feeder finds contributing to a larger
Ponzi scheme. The feeder fund may be a secondary Ponzi scheme or a legitimate registered
investment entity that may or may not know that the umbrella entity is a Ponzi scheme.
Flip or flipping real-estate: An individual or group of individuals buys a real estate property for
very low with the intent of selling it very quickly at a profit. Sometimes they buy foreclosures for
cash then immediately turn it around and sell to someone with a mortgage.
Futures or Futures contract: “An agreement to purchase or sell a commodity for delivery in
the future: (1) at a price that is determined initiation of the contract; (2) that obligates each party
to the contract to fulfill the contract at a specific price; (3) that is used to assume or shift price
risk; and (4) that may be satisfied by delivery or offset.” (CFTC).
Futures Commission Merchants: “Individuals associations, partnerships, and trusts that solicit
or accept orders for the sale or purchase of any commodity for future delivery on or subject to
the rules of any exchange and that accept payment from or extend credit to those whose orders
are accepted. (CFTC).
Hedge fund: “A private investment fund or pool that trades and invests in various assets such as
securities, commodities, currency and derivatives on behalf of its clients, typically wealthy
individuals.” (CFTC).
Incorporation: “The formation of a legal corporation.” (Garner, Black’s Law).

262

Indictment: “The formal written accusation of a crime, made by a grand jury and presented to a
court for prosecution against an accused person.” (Garner, Black’s Law).
Injunction: “A court order commanding or preventing action. to get an injunction, the
complainant must show that there is no plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law and that an
irreparable injury will result unless the relief is granted.” (Garner, Black’s Law). This action is
often taken by the SEC or the CFTC to prevent a schemes funds from being moved.
Investor: A buyer of a security, commodity, future, bond, promissory note, real-estate or other
product with an expectation of profit.
Investment Adviser: “An investment adviser is a firm or an individual that, for compensation,
engages in the business of advising others to the value of securities or as to the advisability of
investing in, purchasing or selling securities. An investment adviser can also be a firm or
individual that, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues analysis or reports
concerning securities.” (SEC).
LLC- Limited Liability Company. A company statutorily authorized in certain states that is
characterized by limited liability.
LLP-Limited Liability Partnership- A partnership where some or all partners have limited
liability. One partner is not liable for a negligent act committed by another partner.
Mutual Fund: “The common name for an open-end investment company. Mutual finds pool
money from many investors and invest the money in stocks, bonds, short term money-market
instruments or other securities. Mutual finds issue redeemable shares that investors buy directly
from the fund or through a broker for the fund instead of from other investors.” (SEC).
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Options: “Options are contracts giving the purchaser the right, but not the obligation, to buy or
sell a specified quantity of a commodity,” (CFTC), or security in the securities market “at a fixed
price within a specific period of time, regardless of the market price instrument. (SEC)
Penalty: A monetary fine imposed by an administrative judge for violations in Ponzi schemes.
This is generally in addition to disgorgement or restitution, and can be ordered in a civil or
criminal action.
Plea: “An accused person's formal response of 'guilty', 'not-guilty' or no 'contest' to a criminal
charge.” (Garner, Black’s Law). In many schemes, the perpetrators have pleaded guilty or nocontest to the federal charges.
Ponzi: A Ponzi scheme is an investment fraud that pays existing or earlier investors with funds
collected from later investors. Ponzi perpetrators promise to invest the funds, yet that is not done.
A common mark of a Ponzi scheme is guaranteed high interest rates. No legitimate investment
can guarantee a profit at any level, low or high.
Primary or Principal: The agent in a company or fraud scheme who is the initiator of the
company or fraud scheme. In federal complaints, this is the first name listed and is generally
indicated as the principal or primary in a Ponzi scheme.
Principal: In investing, “the basic amount invested, exclusive of earnings.” (Downes and
Goodman).
Prime Bank Instrument: In these frauds, the perpetrator says that they are working with major
banks, international banks they have approval of the Federal reserve, the world Bank, but there is
no legitimacy to these claims. This is a term that applies to many types of banking frauds: Prime
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bank debentures; Prime bank guarantees; High yield trading; Standby letters of credit;
Guaranteed bank notes.
Principle: “A basic rule or law.” (Garner, Black’s Law)
Probation: “A court imposed criminal sentence that, subject to conditions, releases a convicted
person into the community rather than prison.” (Garner, Black’s Law). In a few cases convicted
Ponzi scheme participants have received probation instead of a prison sentence.
Promissory Note: “promissory notes are a form of debt that companies use to raise money. They
typically involve investors loaning money to company in exchange for a fixed quantity of
periodic income.” (SEC). Although legitimate promissory notes are an appropriate investment,
some fraudsters use this as a mechanism to defraud investors, it is a common term used in Ponzi
schemes.
Pyramid scheme: In the classic pyramid scheme, participants attempt to make money solely
recruiting new participants. (SEC). Also, known as multi-level marketing schemes. Each level
of participant makes a profit on those they bring into the scheme, with revenues tricking upward
to previous participants. This is differentiated from a Ponzi schemes in that in a Ponzi scheme all
funds go through the primary perpetrator and are then redistributed, with later investor funds
being distributed to earlier investors.
Qualified Investor: An investor who is and individual and has an investment portfolio worth at
least $5 million, or a company that that owns or manages investments worth at least $25 million.
Sometimes referred to as an accredited investor.
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Registered Brokerage/ Broker-Dealer:
FINRA: “Firms registered with FINRA or a national securities exchange that acts as
securities dealers or brokers, or performs both functions.” (FINRA).
SEC: “An individual who acts as an intermediary between a buyer and seller, usually
charging a commission to execute trades.” (SEC).
CFTC: “A person paid a fee or commission for executing buy or sell orders for a customer.
In commodity futures trading, the term may refer to: (1) A floor broker, a person who
actually executes orders on the trading floor. (2) Account executive or associate person,
the person who deals with customers in the offices of futures commission merchants. (3)
the futures commission merchant.” (CFTC).

Registered Investment Adviser: “Any person or firm that: (1) for compensation; (2) is engaged
in the business of; (3) providing advice, making recommendations, issuing reports, or furnishing
analyses on securities, either directly or through publications. A person or firm must satisfy all
three elements to be regulated under the Advisers Act.” (SEC) (Must be registered with the SEC
and state of practice).
Restitution: Compensation for loss; especially full or partial compensation paid by a criminal to
a victim, not awarded in civil trial for tort, but ordered as part of a criminal sentence or as a
condition of probation.
Sanction: “A penalty or coercive measure that results from failure to comply with a law, rule or
order.” (Garner, Black’s Law). In most cases, the perpetrators of Ponzi schemes receive the civil
sanction from an administrative judge, requiring that they not trade or have contact with anyone
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who trades in the stock or commodities markets. It is likely that they are barred from trading or
investing for life.
Security: “An investment instrument such as a stock or bond.” (SEC). “An instrument that
signifies ownership position in a corporation (a stock), a creditor relationship with a corporation
or a government body (a bond), or rights to ownership such as those represented by an option,
subscription right or subscription warrant.” (Downs and Goodman).
Sentence: “The judgment that a court formally pronounces after finding a criminal defendant
guilty; the punishment imposed on a criminal wrongdoer.” (Garner, Black’s Law)
Stock: an instrument that signifies an ownership position (called an equity) in a corporation, and
a claim on its proportional share in the corporation's assets and profits. (SEC).
Swap: “The statutory definition of swap is detailed and comprehensive, though certain
agreements, contracts, and transactions are excluded by definition. It includes, for example,
interest rate swaps, commodity swaps, currency swaps, equity swaps.” This includes: “foreign
currency options, commodity options, non-deliverable forwards in foreign exchange, crosscurrency swaps, forward rate agreements, contracts for differences, options to enter into swaps
and forward swaps.” (CFTC).
Swap Data Repository: The Dodd-Frank Act required these financial entities to be registered
with the CFTC. These entities “collect and maintain information and records” of conditions and
terms of financial transactions that fall under the domain of the CFTC's regulatory responsibility.
Swap Dealer: Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFTC requires those who carry out trades in
swaps that exceeds $3 billion in a twelve-month period must be registered with the CFTC.
(CFTC).
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Transfer Agent: A transfer agent as defined in section3(a) (25) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 as: “any person who engages on behalf of an issuer of securities or on behalf of itself as
an issuer of securities in, among other things, countersigning securities upon issuance,
monitoring securities issuances to prevent the unauthorized issuance of securities, and recording
the issuance, transfer, and cancellation of securities.
Viatical: “An agreement in which an investor buys a life insurance policy from a policy holder
with a terminal disease with a life expectancy of less than two years at a substantial discount
from the death benefit. (Downes and Goodman).
Warrant: “A type of security generally issued together with a bond or preferred stock that
entitles the holder to buy a proportionate quantity of common stock at a specified price, usually
higher than the market price at the time of issuance.” (Downes and Goodman).
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Appendix C Securities License Series
1 Registered Representative
2 Non-member general securities
3 National commodities and futures exam
4 Registered options principal exam
5 Interest rate options
6 Investment company and variable contracts products representative exam
7 General securities representative exam
9 and 10 General securities exam
11 Assistant representative-order processing
12 NYSF Branch manager
14 Compliance official exam
17 United Kingdom securities representative
21 NYSE Front line specialist
22 Direct participation program limited representative
24 General securities principal exam
25 NYSE Trading assistant
26 Investment company and variable contracts products principal exam(IP)
27 Financial and operations principal exam
28 Introducing broker-dealer financial and operations principal exam
30 NFA branch manager exam
31 Futures managed funds exam
32 Limited futures exam
34 Retail off-exchange FOREX exam
37 Canada securities representative exam
39 Direct participation program principal (DP)
42 Registered Options representative exam
50 Municipal advisor representative
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51 Municipal securities representative
53 Municipal securities principal exam
55 Equity trader exam
56 Proprietary trader exam
57 Securities trader exam
62 Corporate securities representative
63 Uniform securities State laws
65 NASAA Investment adviser law
66 NASAA Uniform combined state law
72 Government securities representative
79 Investment banking representative
82 Private securities offerings representative
86 and 87 Research analyst exam
91 FDIC Safety and soundness
92 FDIC Compliance
93 FDIC Division of resolutions and receivership technical evaluation
99 Operations professional exam
PC AMEX Put & call exam
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Appendix D Congressional Acts

The Mail Fraud Act of 1872
The first legislation to be passed in reaction to fraud was the Federal Mail Fraud Act of 1872.
The laissez-faire economics practices of nineteenth century United States enabled a wide variety
of frauds. The postal service enabled frauds to take place from a distance. To stem the tide of
increasing frauds perpetrated through the postal service, Congress established the Mail Fraud Act
of 1872, making it a federal offense to commit fraud through the United State Postal Service.
The United States Postal Service Investigative Agents (USPS), are the second longest established
federal investigative unit, to that of the United States Federal Marshals. The United States Postal
Service is involved in most investigations because they perpetrators often use the mail to carry
out their frauds; in some cases, the USPS is the agency that identifies the fraud.
Taxing Illegal Gains
In 1927, the Supreme Court ruled that earnings from boot legging and other criminal activities
had to be reported and that the perpetrators were required to pay taxes on illegally gained funds.
This opened the door for prosecutions and enabled federal authorities to prosecute based on tax
evasion when they could not prove other criminal activity. If individuals were legally earning
money they would have documentation to prove the funds were legally obtained. Today, many
fraud perpetrators are caught through fraudulent tax documents. At times, it is the Internal
Revenue Service, (IRS) that identifies the scheme; the IRS is involved in many investigations.
The Banking Act of 1933, Glass-Steagall
The Banking Act of 1933 more commonly known as Glass-Steagall, was established in response
to the 1929 stock market crash. It was thought that one of the primary reasons for the crash was
risky financial transactions between commercial banks and investing in the stock market. Hence,
the intent of this act was a legal block between commercial banks and investment banks. This
prevented investment banks from using commercial depositor’s funds for investments. Thus, if
the financial institution made a bad investment and lost money, the average bank client did not
lose their funds. This, and the empowering of the Federal Reserve Bank ended the era of laissezfaire economics in America.
Securities Act of 1933
This Act came about directly in response to the Great Depression, it defined terms used in the securities
industry. It required securities to be registered with the SEC and that investors receive significant
information about investments that are securities offered for public sale. It also prohibited any kind of
misrepresentation fraud or deceit and clearly defined what those actions are. This Act has been
amended many times since adding to it as securities markets change.

This Act primarily had two purposes: To require that potential investors receive information
about securities being offered for public sale and to enact laws that prevent fraud and deception
in securities investing. Most Ponzi perpetrators are charged under one or more of the sections in
this Act.
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934
This Act resulted from the Stock market crash of October 1929 and was an addition to the
Securities Act of 1933. It established the Securities Exchange commission, enabling the agency
to regulated the securities industry. It also required brokers, dealer and investment companies,
known as brokerages to be This Act established the Securities and Exchange Commission
enabling this federal agency to monitor, regulate and take legal actions in securities markets. This
was amended in 1964.
The Commodities and Futures Exchange Act of 1936
This Act authorized the Commodities Futures Exchange Commission allowing it to develop regulations,
and to regulate commodities and futures markets. Those perpetrators using foreign currency or
commodities are charged with violations under this Act. This Act like the Securities Exchange Act, was
enacted to provide an agency with regulatory responsibilities over the commodities markets.
“This Act regulates the trading of commodity futures in the United States.” “Under this Act, the
CFTC has authority to establish regulations that are published in title 17 of the code of Federal
Regulations.” (CFTC).

The commission itself is made up of five presidential appointees. These appointees have
staggered of five years each. There can be no more than three appointees from one political
party at any time.
The Investment Company Act of 1940
This Act defined and classified investment companies It determined reporting and auditing
requirements for investment companies. Those entities that fit the definition of an investment
company are required to register with the SEC. This requires all investment advisers to register
with the SEC. This is designed to protect the public from fraudsters and Con artists. As such,
legitimate investment advisers are a matter of public record, searchable through the SEC and
FINRA. These entities must maintain a portion of their assets for investors who want to take
their funds. This means a certain percentage must be held in cash so that investors can take their
principle when they want. This Act also requires that investment companies disclose their
investing policies and practices to their investors. In short this means they cannot say they are
investing in one thig while they are really investing in a riskier venture. The one shortcoming of
this Act is that 3 ( c ) (1) allowed that entities with under 100 investors were not required to
register; this allowed hedge-funds to avoid registering and monitoring to some degree. This
loophole was closed in 2005.
Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950
This Act insured that member depository institutions depositor’s funds would be protected. If a
bank was failing the customer’s funds in the bank would be guaranteed by the United States
Government through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). This Act was to prevent
the runs on banks that occurred during the depression when people wanted to get their money out
before the financial institution collapsed. During the Great Depression, fully functioning
financial institutions collapsed because their customers panicked and pulling out their funds in
mass; the banks had loaned out some of those funds and could not give everyone their money.
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Fraud by Wire, Radio or Television: The Wire Fraud Act of 1952
With electricity, phones, radios and televisions commonly available by the 1950s, frauds
committed using phone lines, television and radio became a problem. Congress responded with
the Wire Fraud Act of 1952. Together with the Mail Fraud Act, the majority of charges filed
against Ponzi perpetrators fall under these two Acts. The technology developed, the frauds
developed, then Congress developed laws to combat the frauds. Crimes using the internet fall
under the jurisdiction of the Wire Fraud Act. All Ponzi perpetrators use phones, and now usually
the internet, allowing the majority of perpetrators to be charged under this Act.
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977
The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 was established to encourage banks to support loans
in low-income and moderate-income neighborhoods. Before this it was very difficult for lower
income families to get mortgages. Fanny Mae was established in 1938 to help supply affordable
loans to home buyers. Freddie Mac was established in 1970 for the same purpose. Today, they
are both shareholder owned, functioning under congressional charters, meaning government
sponsored entities, owned by stock holders. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission report
concluded that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgages endured losses just as the entire
mortgage market did, but their mortgages did not default as severely as the rest of the mortgage
markets. (FCIC, 2011, pg xxvi). The FCIC determined that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were
followers in the losses, not the leaders of the losses: not a contributing cause to the Financial
crisis. Regardless, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were put into conservatorship by congress in
September of 2008.
Federal Deposit Insurance Improvement Act, 1991
In the 1980s The United States experienced the savings and loan crisis. Money markets had
appeared as an investment product in the late 1970s. When this happened peopled removed their
money form savings accounts and put the funds in money market accounts where they could earn
higher interest rates. The interest rates on savings and loans were regulated by the federal
government, but money market interest rates were unregulated; people earned greater interest in
money market accounts. The interest rates being paid were so high and then underlying assets
were tied to loans with low interest rates; the thrifts did not have the cash flow available to
supply the demand of those removing their funds form the savings accounts. This was one
contributing cause of many savings and loans collapses at this time. The federal government
intervened in these bank failures with bail-outs; this is when the term “too big to fail” was first
used. (FCIC 2011, p. 37). This Act was designed to limit the use of taxpayer funds to rescue
financial institutions. The economic principle of moral hazard suggests that when one entity
knows that another entity will take responsibility for their financial mistakes, the original entity
is not punished for its failure, but instead rewarded. If financial institutions make bad decisions
and the federal government bails them out, it only encourages financial institutions to make bad
financial decisions. Pontell also refers to this as “gambling resurrection” meaning the savings
and loans knew the federal government would bail them out if they failed, so they took on risky
investments in the hope of success. (Pontell 2005).
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999
This Act was enacted in 1999 and is also referred to as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act for its
authors. It repealed the Glass-Steagall Act, allowing financial institutions to integrate functions.
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The most significant aspect of this Act is that it allowed financial holding companies with in
financial institutions. This enabled large financial institution to spread their risk over several
subsidiaries. It opened the door for investing in the subprime-mortgage derivatives that were the
primary cause of the financial collapse. More simply, it allowed investment banks and
commercial-retail banks to merge their practices.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is also known as the Public Company Accounting Reform and
Investor Protection Act in the Senate, and the Corporate and Auditing Accountability and
Responsibility Act. It was enacted in reaction primarily to the illegal actions of Enron and Arthur
Andersen accounting failure in the Enron failure. Enron and WorldCom filed for bankruptcy in
2001 and 2002. In both cases the companies there had been improper accounting covering up
losses; they were cooking the books in the billions of dollars.
Prior to this was the dot-com internet bubble from 1995-2001. In part, the Y2K problem, the
belief that computer programs would fail at the stroke of midnight in the year 2000, all
contributed to a boom in technology. The sky did not fall in 2000; it was business as usual, but
the economy did fall and was then worsened by the terrorist attacks on 9/11, 2001. There had
been a boom economy triggered by overvalued technology stocks. The actual failure of the
economy had several causes. The Congress reacted to Enron, WorldCom and Arthur Anderson’s
failure with Sarbanes-Oxley to require integrity in public corporations and accounting practices.
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006
Prior to the Financial Crisis, Congress had established the Credit Rating Reform Act. This Act
required the SEC to establish guidelines for the ratings agencies so that the ratings have validity.
The problem with the ratings agencies is that it is the companies they rate who pay a fee to be
rated, to the ratings agencies; a conflict of interest. The ratings agencies failed to give honest
ratings prior to the financial collapse, contributing to a false sense of security among investors.
With the 2006 Act, ratings agencies are required to report on marketing practices, to disclose
rating methodologies, honest disclosure of performance statistics. More simply they are required
to provide credible reports and to be forthright about the relationship with the companies they
rate. This was enacted prior to the financial crisis, yet ratings agencies still failed to provide
credible mortgage backed securities ratings.
Fraud Enforcement Recovery Act of 2009
This Act was in response to the many frauds, specifically mortgage frauds, and the major Ponzi
schemes that had taken place. The Bernard Madoff and Allan Stanford schemes took in billions
from victims, leaving the impression that regulations were ineffective and the federal agencies
were not fulfilling their responsibilities. This Act provided federal agencies with more legal
tools and funding for staffing to aggressively investigate financial crimes. This Act made it a
federal crime to over-value real estate property. It redefined the term “financial institution” to
include mortgage businesses.
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Appendix E. Federal Securities and Commodities Regulations

The following is a collection of the most used regulations in securities and commodities
cases. These are the most common stated in documents but it is an exhaustive representation of
all regulations and laws used in charges against Ponzu perpetrators.

15U.S.C. § 78j Manipulative and deceptive devices
It shall be unlawful for any person or indirectly, by use of any means instrumentality of
interstate commerce or the mails, or of any facility or any national securities exchange(a) (1) To effect a short sale, or to use or employ any stop-loss order in connection with
the purchase or sale, of any security other than a government security, in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply to securities futures products.

(b)To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on
a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities-based
swap agreement, any manipulation or deceptive or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
( c ) (1) To effect, accept or facilitate a transaction involving the loan or borrowing of
securities in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest for the protection of investors.
15U.S.C. § 80a-3 Definition of an Investment company
(1) When used in this subchapter, ‘‘investment company’’ means any issuer which—
(A) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in
the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities;
(B) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing face-Quantity certificates
of the installment type, or has been engaged in such business and has any such certificate
outstanding; or
(C) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning,
holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire investment securities
having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of such issuer’s total assets
(exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis.
(2) As used in this section, ‘‘investment securities’’ includes all securities except (A)
Government securities,
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(B) securities issued by employees’ securities companies, and
(C) securities issued by majority-owned subsidiaries of the owner which
(i) are not investment companies, and
(ii) are not relying on the exception from the definition of investment company in
paragraph (1) or (7) of subsection (c) of this section.

17CFR 275.203A-1Eligibility for SEC registration:
Switching to or from SEC registration
(a) Eligibility for SEC registration of mid-sized investment advisers. If you are an investment
adviser described in section 203(A)(a)(2)(B) of the Act (15U.S.C. 80b-31(a)(2)(B)):
(1) Threshold for SEC registration and registration buffer. You may, but are not required
to register with the Commission if you have assets under management of at least
$100,000,000 but less than $110,000,000 and you need not withdraw your
registration unless you have less than $90,000,000 of assets under management. (2)
Exceptions. This paragraph(a) does not apply if:
(i)
You are an investment adviser to an investment company registered
under the Investment Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C.80a) or to a company
which has elected to be a business development company pursuant to
section 54 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (U.S.C. 80a-54),
and has not withdrawn the election; or
(ii)
You are eligible for exemption described in §275.203A-2 of this
chapter.

17 CFR 275.206(4)-8- Pooled investment vehicles
(a) Prohibition. It shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act, practice or course
of business within the meaning of section 206(4) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80b-6(4) for any
investment adviser to a pooled investment vehicle to:
(1) Make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, to any investor or prospective investor in the pooled investment
vehicle; or
(2) Otherwise engage in any act, practice, or course of business that is fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative with respect to any investor or prospective investor in the pooled
investment vehicle.
(b) For the purpose of this section “pooled investment vehicle” means any investment company
as defined in section 3(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940(15 U.S.C.80a-3(a)) or any
company that would be an investment company under section 3(a) of that Act but for the
exclusion provided from that definition by either section 3(c)(1) or section 3(c)(7) of that Act
(15U.S.C 80a-3(c)(1) or (7)
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18 U.S.C. §152 Concealment of Assets; false oaths and claims; bribery
A person who—
(1) Knowingly and fraudulently conceals from custodian, trustee, marshal or other officer of
the court charged with the control or custody of property, or, in connection with a case
under title 11, from creditors or the United States Trustee, any property belonging to the
estate of a debtor;
(2) Knowingly and fraudulently makes a false oath or account in or in relation to any case
under title 11;
(8) after filing of a case under title 11 or in contemplation thereof, knowingly and
fraudulently conceals, destroys, mutilates, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any recorded
information, (including books, documents, records, and papers) relating to the property or
financial affairs of the debtor;
(Title 11 is the Bankruptcy code. Many Ponzi perpetrators file for bankruptcy before or
after the scheme is exposed. They often times hide assets, lie about assets, send them to
offshore accounts, transfer funds to relatives or other entities).

18 U.S.C. § 1341 Frauds and Swindles
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means or fraudulent pretenses, or promises, or to sell,
dispose of, loan exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply or furnish or procure for
unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or
anything represented to be intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article,
for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any
post office authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent
or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or
thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or
takes receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, shall be fined under this titel or
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
(18 U.S.C. § 1341 Mail fraud Statute was originally enacted in 1872 This was the
first federal statute enacted to combat the mail service being used to perpetrate
fraud. This law is one of the most used laws in charging Ponzi perpetrators.)

18 USC§ 1341 Mail Fraud
“An act of fraud using the U.S Postal service, as in making false representations through the
mail to obtain an economic advantage.” (Garner, Black’s Law)

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
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promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or
furnish
or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other
article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or
spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to
do, places in any
post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be
sent
or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or
thing
whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes
or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by
mail or
such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be
delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined
under
this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the violation occurs in relation
to,
or involving any benefit authorized, transported, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or
paid in
connection with, a presidentially declared major disaster or emergency (as those terms are
defined in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122)), or affects a financial institution, such person shall be
fined not more than$1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. (GPO)

18 USC§ 1343 Fraud by wire, radio or televisions.
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television
communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures,
or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the violation occurs in relation to,
or involving any benefit authorized, transported, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or
paid in connection with, a presidentially declared major disaster or emergency (as those
terms are defined
in section 102of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42
U.S.C. 5122)), or affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than
$1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.”
AMENDMENTS
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1990—Pub. L. 101–647 substituted ‘‘30’’ for ‘‘20’’ before ‘‘years’’.
1989—Pub. L. 101–73 amended section generally, restating former subsec. (a) and
striking
out former subsec.(b) which defined ‘‘federally chartered or insured financial
institution’’.
Prior to amendment, subsec. (a) read as follows: ‘‘Whoever knowingly executes, or
attempts
to execute, a scheme or artifice—‘‘(1) to defraud a federally chartered or insured
financial
institution; or‘‘(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities or other
property owned by or under the custody or control of a federally chartered or insured
financial institution by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.’’
(GPO)

18 USC§ 1344 Bank fraud
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to
execute, a scheme or artifice—(1) to defraud a financial institution; or(2) to obtain any
of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, or under the
custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises; shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or
imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
AMENDMENTS
1990—Pub. L. 101–647 substituted ‘‘30’’ for ‘‘20’’ before ‘‘years’’.
1989—Pub. L. 101–73 amended section generally, restating former subsec. (a) and
striking
out former subsec.(b) which defined ‘‘federally chartered or insured financial
institution’’.
Prior to amendment, subsec. (a)read as follows: ‘‘Whoever knowingly executes, or
attempts
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to execute, a scheme or artifice—‘‘(1) to defraud a federally chartered or insured
financial
institution; or‘‘(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities or other
property owned by or under the custody or control of a federally chartered or insured
financial institution by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.’’
(GPO)

18 USC§ 1348 Securities and commodities fraud
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice—
(1) to defraud any person in connection with commodity future delivery, or any option on
a commodity, or any security of an issuer with a class of securities registered under
section 12 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ( 15 U.S.C. 78) or that is
required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (
15 U.S.C 78o(d);or
(2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, any
money or property in connection with the purchase or sale of any commodity for
future delivery, or any option on a commodity for future delivery, or any security of
an issuer with a class of securities registered under section 12 of securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l) ot that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d))

18 USC§ 1349Attempt and conspiracy (to commit fraud)
Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this chapter shall be subject
to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object
of the attempt or conspiracy.

18 USC § 1957 Money Laundering Engaging in monetary transactions in property derived
from specified unlawful activities.
(a) Whoever, in any of the circumstances set forth in subsection (d), knowingly engages
or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater
than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity, shall be punished as provided in
subsection (b).
(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the punishment for an offense
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under this section is a fine under title 18, United States Code, or imprisonment for not more than
ten years or both. If the offense involves a pre-retail medical product (as defined in section 670)
the punishment for the offense shall be the same as the punishment for an offense under section
670 unless the punishment under this subsection is greater. (2) The court may impose an
alternate fine to that imposable under paragraph (1) of not more than twice the amount of the
criminally derived property involved in the transaction.
(c) In a prosecution for an offense under this section, the Government is not required to
prove the defendant knew that the offense from which the criminally derived property was
derived was specified unlawful activity.
(d) The circumstances referred to in subsection(a) are—(1)that the offense under this
section takes place in the United States or in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States; or (2) that the offense under this section takes place outside the United States
and such special jurisdiction, but the defendant is a United States person (as defined in section
3077 of this title, but excluding the class described in paragraph (2)(D) of such section).
(e) Violations of this section may be investigated by such components of the Department
of Justice as the Attorney General may direct, and by such components of the Department of the
Treasury as the Secretary of the Treasury may direct, as appropriate, and, with respect to
offenses over which the Department of Homeland Security has jurisdiction, by such components
of the Department of Homeland Security as the Secretary of Homeland Security may direct, and,
with respect to offenses over which the United States Postal Service has jurisdiction, by the
Postal Service. Such authority of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, and the Postal Service shall be exercised in accordance with an agreement which shall
be entered into by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Postal
Service, and the Attorney General.
(f) As used in this section— (1) the term ‘‘monetary transaction’’ means the deposit,
withdrawal, transfer, or exchange, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of funds or a
monetary instrument (as defined in section 1956(c)(5) of this title) by, through, or to a financial
institution (as defined in section 1956 of this title), including any transaction that would be a
financial transaction under section 1956(c)(4)(B) of this title, but such term does not include any
transaction necessary to preserve a person’s right to representation as guaranteed by the sixth
amendment to the Constitution; (2) the term ‘‘criminally derived property’’ means any property
constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense; and (3) the terms
‘‘specified unlawful activity’’ and ‘‘proceeds’’ shall have the meaning given those terms in
section 1956 of this title.
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18 USC § 1962 Prohibited Activities Racketeering
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in
which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United
States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of
such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase
of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of
controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not
be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the
members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering
activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate
to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in
fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest
in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
(Added Pub. L. 91–452, title IX, §901(a), Oct. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 942; amended Pub. L. 100–690,
title VII, §7033, Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4398.)

26: USC § 7201 Tax evasion; Attempt to evade or defeat taxes
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by
this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be
guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000
($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together
with
the costs of prosecution. (Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 851; Pub. L.97–248, title III, §
329(a),
Sept. 3, 1982, 96 Stat.618.)
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AMENDMENTS
1982—Pub. L. 97–248 substituted ‘‘$100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation)’’ for
‘‘$10,000’’. EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1982 AMENDMENT Section 329(e) of Pub. L. 97–248
provided that: ‘‘The amendments made by this section [amending this section and sections 7203,
7206, and 7207 of this title] shall apply to offenses committed after the date of the enactment of
this Act [Sept. 3, 1982].’’

28 U.S.C. 2462 Time for commencing proceedings.
Except as otherwise provided by Act or Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the
enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be
entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued if,
within the same period, the offender or the property is found within the United States in order
that proper service may be made thereon.

SA1933-5a Securities Act of 1933 5
SEC. 5. (a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly— (1) to make use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security
through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or (2) to carry or cause to be carried
through the mails or in interstate commerce, by any means or instruments of transportation, any
such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale. (b) It shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly— (1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to carry or transmit any prospectus
relating to any security with respect to which a registration statement has been filed under this
title, unless such prospectus meets the requirements of section 10; or (2) to carry or cause to be
carried through the mails or in interstate commerce any such security for the purpose of sale or
for delivery after sale, unless accompanied or preceded by a prospectus that meets the
requirements of subsection (a) of section 10. (c) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of
any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to such
security, or while the registration statement is the subject of a refusal order or stop order or (prior
to the effective date of the registration statement) any public proceeding or examination under
section 8. (d) LIMITATION.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, an emerging
growth company or any person authorized to act on behalf of an emerging growth company may
engage in oral or written communications with potential investors that are qualified institutional
buyers or institutions that are accredited investors, as such terms are respectively defined in
section 230.144A and section 230.501(a) of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, or any
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successor thereto, to determine whether such investors might have an interest in a contemplated
securities offering, either prior to or following the date of filing of a registration statement with
respect to such securities with the Commission, subject to the requirement of subsection (b)(2).
(e) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 3 or 4, unless a registration statement meeting the
requirements of section 10(a) is in effect as to a security-based swap, it shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell, offer to buy or purchase or
sell a security- based swap to any person who is not an eligible contract participant as defined in
section 1a(18) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(18)).

SA1933-17a Fraudulent Interstate Transactions
SEC. 17. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities (including
security-based swaps) or any security-based swap agreement (as defined in section 3(a)(78) of
the Securities Exchange Act) by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly—
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, to publish,
give publicity to, or circulate any notice, circular, advertisement, newspaper, article, letter,
investment service, or communication which, though not purporting to offer a security for sale,
describes such security for a consideration received or to be received, directly or indirectly, from
an issuer, underwriter, or dealer, without fully disclosing the receipt, whether past or prospective,
of such consideration and the amount thereof.
(c) The exemptions provided in section 3 shall not apply to the provisions of this section.
(d) The authority of the Commission under this section with respect to security-based
swap agreements (as defined in section 3(a)(78) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) shall be
subject to the restrictions and limitations of section 2A(b) of this title.

SEA1934-15a Registration and Regulation of Brokers and Dealers
SEC. 15. (a)(1) It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer which is either a person other than a
natural person or a natural person not associated with a broker or dealer which is a person other
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than a natural person (other than such a broker or dealer whose business is exclusively intrastate
and who does not make use of any facility of a national securities exchange) to make use of the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transactions in, or to
induce or attempt to in duce the purchase or sale of, any security (other than an exempted
security or commercial paper, bankers’ acceptances, or commercial bills) unless such broker or
dealer is registered in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
(2) The Commission, by rule or order, as it deems consistent with the public interest and
the protection of investors, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt from paragraph (1) of
this subsection any broker or dealer or class of brokers or dealers specified in such rule or order.
(b)(1) A broker or dealer may be registered by filing with the Commission an application
for registration in such form and containing such information and documents concerning such
broker or dealer and any persons associated with such broker or dealer as the Commission, by
rule, may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors. Within forty-five days of the date of the filing of such application (or within such
longer period as to which the applicant consents), the Commission shall—
(A) by order grant registration, or
(B) institute proceedings to determine whether registration should be denied. Such
proceedings shall include notice of the grounds for denial under consideration and
opportunity for hearing and shall be concluded within one hundred twenty days of
the date of the filing of the application for registration. At the conclusion of such
proceedings, the Commission, by order, shall grant or deny such registration. The
Commission may extend the time for conclusion of such proceedings for up to
ninety days if it finds good cause for such extension and publishes its reasons for
so finding or for such longer period as to which the applicant consents.
The Commission shall grant such registration if the Commission finds that the requirements of
this section are satisfied. The order granting registration shall not be effective until such broker
or dealer has become a member of a registered securities association, or until such broker or
dealer has become a member of a national securities exchange, if such broker or dealer effects
transactions solely on that exchange, unless the Commission has exempted such broker or dealer,
by rule or order, from such membership. The Commission shall deny such registration if it does
not make such a finding or if it finds that if the applicant were so registered, its registration
would be subject to suspension or revocation under paragraph (4) of this subsection.
(2)(A) An application for registration of a broker or dealer to be formed or organized
may be made by a broker or dealer to which the broker or dealer to be formed or organized is to
be the successor. Such application, in such form as the Commission, by rule, may prescribe, shall
contain such information and documents concerning the applicant, the successor, and any
persons associated with the applicant or the successor, as the Commission, by rule, may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. The
grant or denial of registration to such an applicant shall be in accordance with the procedures set
forth in paragraph (1) of this subsection. If the Commission grants such registration, the
registration shall terminate on the forty-fifth day after the effective date thereof, unless prior
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thereto the successor shall, in accordance with such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe, adopt the application for registration as its own.
(B) Any person who is a broker or dealer solely by reason of acting as a municipal
securities dealer or municipal securities broker, who so acts through a separately identifiable
department or division, and who so acted in such a manner on the date of enactment of the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, may, in accordance with such terms and conditions as the
Commission, by rule, prescribes as necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for the
protection of investors, register such separately identifiable department or division in accordance
with this subsection. If any such department or division is so registered, the department or
division and not such person himself shall be the broker or dealer for purposes of this title.
(C) Within six months of the date of the granting of registration to a broker or dealer, the
Commission, or upon the authorization and direction of the Commission, a registered securities
association or national securities exchange of which such broker or dealer is a member, shall
conduct an inspection of the broker or dealer to determine whether it is operating in conformity
with the provisions of this title and the rules and regulations thereunder: Provided, however, That
the Commission may delay such inspection of any class of brokers or dealers for a period not to
exceed six months.
(3) Any provision of this title (other than section 5 and sub- section (a) of this section)
which prohibits any act, practice, or course of business if the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce is used in connection therewith shall also prohibit any
such act, practice, or course of business by any registered broker or dealer or any person acting
on behalf of such a broker or dealer, irrespective of any use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce in connection therewith.
(4) The Commission, by order, shall censure, place limitations on the activities,
functions, or operations of, suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months, or revoke the
registration of any broker or dealer if it finds, on the record after notice and opportunity for
hearing, that such censure, placing of limitations, suspension, or revocation is in the public
interest and that such broker or dealer, whether prior or subsequent to becoming such, or any
person associated with such broker or dealer, whether prior or subsequent to becoming so
associated—
(A) has willfully made or caused to be made in any application for registration or report
required to be filed with the Commission or with any other appropriate regulatory agency
under this title, or in any proceeding before the Commission with respect to registration,
any statement which was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it
was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or has omitted to state in
any such application or report any material fact which is required to be stated therein.
[58]
(B) has been convicted within ten years preceding the filing of any application for
registration or at any time thereafter of any felony or misdemeanor or of a substantially
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equivalent crime by a foreign court of competent jurisdiction which the Commission
finds—
(i) involves the purchase or sale of any security, the taking of a false oath,
the making of a false report, bribery, perjury, burglary, any substantially
equivalent activity however denominated by the laws of the relevant
foreign government, or conspiracy to commit any such offense; (ii) arises
out of the conduct of the business of a broker, dealer, municipal securities
dealer municipal advisor,, [59] government securities broker, government
securities dealer, investment adviser, bank, insurance company, fiduciary,
transfer agent, nationally recognized statistical rating organization, foreign
person performing a function substantially equivalent to any of the above,
or entity or person required to be registered under the Commodity
Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) or any substantially equivalent foreign
statute or regulation; (iii) involves the larceny, theft, robbery, extortion,
forgery, counterfeiting, fraudulent concealment, embezzlement, fraudulent
conversion, or misappropriation of funds, or securities, or substantially
equivalent activity however denominated by the laws of the relevant
foreign government; or (iv) involves the violation of section 152, 1341,
1342, or 1343 or chapter 25 or 47 of title 18, United States Code, or a
violation of a substantially equivalent foreign statute. [60]
(C) is permanently or temporarily enjoined by order, judgment, or decree of any
court of competent jurisdiction from acting as an investment adviser, underwriter,
broker, dealer, municipal securities dealer municipal advisor,, [61] government
securities broker, government securities dealer, security-based swap dealer, major
security-based swap participant, transfer agent, nationally recognized statistical
rating organization, foreign person performing a function substantially equivalent
to any of the above, or entity or person required to be registered under the
Commodity Exchange Act or any substantially equivalent foreign statute or
regulation, or as an affiliated person or employee of any investment company,
bank, insurance company, foreign entity substantially equivalent to any of the
above, or entity or person required to be registered under the Commodity
Exchange Act or any substantially equivalent foreign statute or regulation, or from
engaging in or continuing any conduct or practice in connection with any such
activity, or in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. [62]
(D) has willfully violated any provision of the Securities Act of 1933, the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Investment Company Act of 1940, the
Commodity Exchange Act, this title, the rules or regulations under any of such
statutes, or the rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, or is unable
to comply with any such provision. [63] (E) has willfully aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, or procured the violation by any other person of
any provision of the Securities Act of 1933, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Commodity Exchange Act, this title,
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the rules or regulations under any of such statutes, or the rules of the Municipal
Securities Rulemaking Board, or has failed reasonably to supervise, with a view to
preventing violations of the provisions of such statutes, rules, and regulations,
another person who commits such a violation, if such other person is subject to his
supervision. For the purposes of this subparagraph
(E) no person shall be deemed to have failed reasonably to supervise any other
person, if— (i) there have been established procedures, and a system for applying
such procedures, which would reasonably be expected to prevent and detect,
insofar as practicable, any such violation by such other person, and (ii) such
person has reasonably discharged the duties and obligations incumbent upon him
by reason of such procedures and system without reasonable cause to believe that
such procedures and system were not being complied with. [64]
(F) is subject to any order of the Commission barring or suspending the right of
the person to be associated with a broker, dealer, security-based swap dealer, or a
major security based swap participant;
(G) has been found by a foreign financial regulatory authority to have—
(i) made or caused to be made in any application for registration or report
required to be filed with a foreign financial regulatory authority, or in any
proceeding before a foreign financial regulatory authority with respect to
registration, any statement that was at the time and in the light of the
circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with respect to
any material fact, or has omitted to state in any application or report to the
foreign financial regulatory authority any material fact that is required to
be stated therein;
(ii) violated any foreign statute or regulation regarding transactions in
securities, or contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded
on or subject to the rules of a contract market or any board of trade; (iii)
aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, or procured the violation
by any person of any provision of any statutory provisions enacted by a
foreign government, or rules or regulations thereunder, empowering a
foreign financial regulatory authority regarding transactions in securities,
or contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded on or
subject to the rules of a contract market or any board of trade, or has been
found, by a foreign financial regulatory authority, to have failed
reasonably to supervise, with a view to preventing violations of such
statutory provisions, rules, and regulations, another person who commits
such a violation, if such other person is subject to his supervision; or
(H) is subject to any final order of a State securities commission (or any agency or
officer performing like functions), State authority that supervises or examines
banks, savings associations, or credit unions, State insurance commission (or any
agency or office performing like functions), an appropriate Federal banking
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agency (as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C.
1813(q))), or the National Credit Union Administration, that—
(i) bars such person from association with an entity regulated by such
commission, authority, agency, or officer, or from engaging in the business
of securities, insurance, banking, savings association activities, or credit
union activities; or
(ii) constitutes a final order based on violations of any laws or regulations
that prohibit fraudulent, manipulative, or deceptive conduct.
(5) Pending final determination whether any registration under this subsection
shall be revoked, the Commission, by order, may suspend such registration, if
such suspension appears to the Commission, after notice and opportunity for
hearing, to be necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors. Any registered broker or dealer may, upon such terms and conditions
as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors, withdraw from registration by filing a written notice of
withdrawal with the Commission. If the Commission finds that any registered
broker or dealer is no longer in existence or has ceased to do business as a broker
or dealer, the Commission, by order, shall cancel the registration of such broker or
dealer.
(6)(A) With respect to any person who is associated, who is seeking to become
associated, or, at the time of the alleged misconduct, who was associated or was
seeking to become associated with a broker or dealer, or any person participating,
or, at the time of the alleged misconduct, who was participating, in an offering of
any penny stock, the Commission, by order, shall censure, place limitations on the
activities or functions of such person, or suspend for a period not exceeding 12
months, or bar any such person from being associated with a broker, dealer,
investment adviser, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent,
or nationally recognized statistical rating organization, or from participating in an
offering of penny stock, if the Commission finds, on the record after notice and
opportunity for a hearing, that such censure, placing of limitations, suspension, or
bar is in the public interest and that such person—
(i) has committed or omitted any act, or is subject to an order or finding,
enumerated in subparagraph (A), (D), or (E) of paragraph (4) of this
subsection; (ii) has been convicted of any offense specified in
subparagraph (B) of such paragraph (4) within 10 years of the
commencement of the proceedings under this paragraph; or
(iii) is enjoined from any action, conduct, or practice specified in
subparagraph
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(C) of such paragraph (4). (B) It shall be unlawful—
(i) for any person as to whom an order under subparagraph (A) is in effect,
without the consent of the Commission, willfully to become, or to be,
associated with a broker or dealer in contravention of such order, or to
participate in an offering of penny stock in contravention of such order;
(ii) for any broker or dealer to permit such a person, without the consent of
the Commission, to become or remain, a person associated with the broker
or dealer in contravention of such order, if such broker or dealer knew, or
in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, of such order; or
(iii) for any broker or dealer to permit such a person, without the consent
of the Commission, to participate in an offering of penny stock in
contravention of such order, if such broker or dealer knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known, of such order and of such
participation.
(C) For purposes of this paragraph, the term ‘‘person participating in an offering
of penny stock’’ includes any person acting as any promoter, finder, consultant,
agent, or other person who engages in activities with a broker, dealer, or issuer for
purposes of the issuance or trading in any penny stock, or inducing or attempting
to induce the purchase or sale of any penny stock. The Commission may, by rule
or regulation, define such term to include other activities, and may, by rule,
regulation, or order, exempt any person or class of persons, in whole or in part,
conditionally or unconditionally, from such term.
(7) No registered broker or dealer or government securities broker or
government securities dealer registered (or required to register) under
section 15C(a)(1)(A) shall effect any transaction in, or induce the purchase
or sale of, any security unless such broker or dealer meets such standards
of operational capability and such broker or dealer and all natural persons
associated with such broker or dealer meet such standards of training,
experience, competence, and such other qualifications as the Commission
finds necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors. The Commission shall establish such standards by rules and
regulations, which may—
(A) specify that all or any portion of such standards shall be applicable to
any class of brokers and dealers and persons associated with brokers and
dealers;
(B) require persons in any such class to pass tests prescribed in accordance
with such rules and regulations, which tests shall, with respect to any class
of partners, officers, or supervisory employees (which latter term may be
defined by the Commission’s rules and regulations and as so defined shall
include branch managers of brokers or dealers) engaged in the
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management of the broker or dealer, include questions relating to
bookkeeping, accounting, internal control over cash and securities,
supervision of employees, maintenance of records, and other appropriate
matters; and
(C) provide that persons in any such class other than brokers and dealers
and partners, officers, and supervisory employees of brokers or dealers,
may be qualified solely on the basis of compliance with such standards of
training and such other qualifications as the Commission finds appropriate.
The Commission, by rule, may prescribe reasonable fees and charges to
defray its costs in carrying out this paragraph, including, but not limited to,
fees for any test administered by it or under its direction.
The Commission may cooperate with registered securities associations and
national securities exchanges in devising and administering tests and may require
registered brokers and dealers and persons associated with such brokers and
dealers to pass tests administered by or on behalf of any such association or
exchange and to pay such association or exchange reasonable fees or charges to
defray the costs incurred by such association or exchange in administering such
tests.
(8) It shall be unlawful for any registered broker or dealer to effect any transaction
in, or induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security (other than
or [65] commercial paper, bankers’ acceptances, or commercial bills), unless such
broker or dealer is a member of a securities association registered pursuant to
section 15A of this title or effects transactions in securities solely on a national
securities exchange of which it is a member.
(9) The Commission by rule or order, as it deems consistent with the public
interest and the protection of investors, may conditionally or unconditionally
exempt from paragraph (8) of this subsection any broker or dealer or class of
brokers or dealers specified in such rule or order.
(10) For the purposes of determining whether a person is subject to a statutory
disqualification under section 6(c)(2), 15A(g)(2), or 17A(b)(4)(A) of this title, the
term ‘‘Commission’’ in paragraph (4)(B) of this subsection shall mean
‘‘exchange’’, ‘‘association’’, or ‘‘clearing agency’’, respectively.
(11) [66] BROKER/DEALER REGISTRATION WITH RESPECT TO
TRANSACTIONS IN SECURITY FUTURES PRODUCTS.—
(A) NOTICE REGISTRATION.—
(i) CONTENTS OF NOTICE.—Notwithstanding paragraphs (1)
and (2), a broker or dealer required to reg ister only because it effects transactions
in security futures products on an exchange registered pursuant to section 6(g)
may register for purposes of this section by filing with the Commission a written
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notice in such form and containing such information concerning such broker or
dealer and any persons associated with such broker or dealer as the Commission,
by rule, may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors. A broker or dealer may not register under this paragraph
unless that broker or dealer is a member of a national securities association
registered under section 15A(k).
(ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECTIVENESS.—Such registration shall be effective
contemporaneously with the submission of notice, in written or electronic
form, to the Commission, except that such registration shall not be effective if
the registration would be subject to suspension or revocation under paragraph
(4).
(iii)

(iv)

SUSPENSION.—Such registration shall be suspended immediately if
a national securities association registered pursuant to section 15A(k)
of this title suspends the membership of that broker or dealer.
(iv) TERMINATION.—Such registration shall be terminated
immediately if any of the above stated conditions for registration set
forth in this paragraph are no longer satisfied. (B) EXEMPTIONS
FOR REGISTERED BROKERS AND DEALERS.—A broker or
dealer registered pursuant to the requirements of subparagraph (A)
shall be exempt from the following provisions of this title and the rules
thereunder with respect to transactions in security futures products: (i)
Section 8. (ii) Section 11. (iii) Subsections (c)(3) and (c)(5) of this
section. (iv) Section 15B. (v) Section 15C. (vi) Subsections (d), (e), (f
), (g), (h), and (i) [67] of section 17. (12) [68] EXEMPTION FOR
SECURITY FUTURES PRODUCT EXCHANGE MEMBERS.— (A)
REGISTRATION EXEMPTION.—A natural person shall be exempt
from the registration requirements of this section if such person— (i)
is a member of a designated contract market registered with the
Commission as an exchange pursuant to section 6(g); (ii) effects
transactions only in securities on the exchange of which such person is
a member; and (iii) does not directly accept or solicit orders from
public customers or provide advice to public customers

7 U.S.C.§1a (11) Commodity pool operator
(A) In general
The term “commodity pool operator” means any person—
(i) engaged in a business that is of the nature of a commodity pool, investment
trust, syndicate, or similar form of enterprise, and who, in connection therewith,
solicits, accepts, or receives from others, funds, securities, or property, either
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directly or through capital contributions, the sale of stock or other forms of
securities, or otherwise, for the purpose of trading in commodity interests,
including any—
(I) commodity for future delivery, security futures product, or swap;
(II) agreement, contract, or transaction described in section 2(c)(2)(C)(i) of
this title or section 2(c)(2)(D)(i) of this title;
(III) commodity option authorized under section 6c of this title; or
(IV) leverage transaction authorized under section 23 of this title; or

(ii) who is registered with the Commission as a commodity pool operator.
(B) Further definition
The Commission, by rule or regulation, may include within, or exclude from, the
term “commodity pool operator” any person engaged in a business that is of the
nature of a commodity pool, investment trust, syndicate, or similar form of
enterprise if the Commission determines that the rule or regulation will effectuate
the purposes of this chapter.
(12) Commodity trading advisor
(A) In general
Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the term “commodity trading
advisor” means any person who—
(i) for compensation or profit, engages in the business of advising others, either
directly or through publications, writings, or electronic media, as to the value of
or the advisability of trading in—
(I) any contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery, security futures
product, or swap;
(II) any agreement, contract, or transaction described in section 2(c)(2)(C)(i)
of this title or section 2(c)(2)(D)(i) of this title 1
(III) any commodity option authorized under section 6c of this title; or
(IV) any leverage transaction authorized under section 23 of this title;

(ii) for compensation or profit, and as part of a regular business, issues or
promulgates analyses or reports concerning any of the activities referred to in
clause (i).
(iii) is registered with the Commission as a commodity trading advisor; or
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(iv) the Commission, by rule or regulation, may include if the Commission
determines that the rule or regulation will effectuate the purposes of this chapter.
7 U.S.C.§1a(28) Futures commission merchant
(A) In general

The term “futures commission merchant” means an individual, association, partnership,
corporation, or trust—
(i) that—
(I) is—
(aa) engaged in soliciting or in accepting orders for—
(AA) the purchase or sale of a commodity for future delivery;
(BB) a security futures product;
(CC) a swap;
(DD) any agreement, contract, or transaction described in section 2(c)(2)(C)(i) of this title or
section 2(c)(2)(D)(i) of this title;
(EE) any commodity option authorized under section 6c of this title; or
(FF) any leverage transaction authorized under section 23 of this title; or
(bb) acting as a counterparty in any agreement, contract, or transaction described
in section 2(c)(2)(C)(i) of this title or section 2(c)(2)(D)(i) of this title; and
(II) in or in connection with the activities described in items (aa) or (bb) of
subclause (I), accepts any money, securities, or property (or extends credit in lieu
thereof) to margin, guarantee, or secure any trades or contracts that result or may result
therefrom; or
(ii) that is registered with the Commission as a futures commission merchant.
(B) Further definition

The Commission, by rule or regulation, may include within, or exclude from, the term
“futures commission merchant” any person who engages in soliciting or accepting orders
for, or acting as a counterparty in, any agreement, contract, or transaction subject to this
chapter, and who accepts any money, securities, or property (or extends credit in lieu
thereof) to margin, guarantee, or secure any trades or contracts that result or may result
therefrom, if the Commission determines that the rule or regulation will effectuate the
purposes of this chapter.
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Appendix F Fraudulent Document Examples

Copy of a Madoff’s monthly statement to an investor

A Madoff Account statement from the Dubinsky report prepared for Irving Picard, Madoff Trustee
Source: http://wallstreetonparade.com/2013/10/lessons-from-the-madoff-account-statements/
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US v. Charles Leif Erickson Case 4:16-cr-40010-TSH Document 3-2 Filed 09/01/15 Page 13 of 21
The following table outlines a series of fictitious TradeStation account statements for
ERICKSON TradeStation Account for Victim#3 created by ERICKSON and provided to
Victim#3:
Fictitious
Statement Date

Fictitious
Statement Balance

April 30, 2013
June 3, 2013
June 28, 2013
Aug 2, 2013
Sept 3, 2013
Sept 26, 2013
Oct 31, 2013
Nov 29, 2013
Dec 23,2013
Jan 28, 2014
Mar 31,2014
Apr 1, 2014
May 30, 2014
July 1, 2014
July 30, 2014
Sept. 9, 2014
Oct 1, 2014

$278,729.24
$280,045.42
$311,285.30
$385,937.42
$388,265.72
$467,451.24
$455,405.48
$4709,970.24
$575,295.42
$635,342.24
$739,723.36
$850,000.42
$850,000.36
$850,000.12
$850,000.48
$1,227,429.36
$1,175,000.36

Actual TradeStation
Statement Date
March 29,2013
April 30,2013
May31, 2013
June 28, 2013
July 31,2013
August 30, 2013
Sept 30, 2013
Oct 31, 2013
Nov 29, 2013
Dec 31, 2013
Jan 31, 2014
Mar 31, 2014
Apr 30, 2014
May 30, 2014
June 30, 2014
July 31, 2014
August 29, 2014
Sept 30, 2014
Oct 31, 2014

Actual TradeStation
Balance
$20,722.30
$42,000.84
$1,244.34
$1,137.34
$1,030.34
$923.34
$816.34
$709.34
$602.34
$495.34
$618.34
$404.34
$897.34
$790.34
$683.34
$576.34
$469.34
$362.34
$855.34

Pertinent Financial Wire:
On March w23,2013, victim #3 endorsed a check for $150,000 to ERICKSON with the memo:
“loan/investment.” ERICKSON sent a corresponding wire transfer from his UniBank account #
XXX5567 to JP Morgan Chase (1 Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York, NY)
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Appendix G Research Documents Examples
In the case of Brian Keith Miller, a very common name, information had to be confirmed
through PACER. This uses DOJ/FBI documents and PACER below:
The bold underlined below demonstrates information used when there were two individuals with the
same name. This document was matched with the docket for case: 3:12-cr-00041-TWP-CCS-1 entry 23 to
confirm information (Acquired through PACER).

FBI Knoxville Division
Knoxville • Press Releases • 2012 • Brian Keith Miller Sentenced to Serve 80 Months in Prison for Wire
Fraud Scheme

1. Brian Keith Miller Sentenced to Serve 80 Months in Prison for Wire Fraud Scheme
Ponzi Scheme Used to Dupe Victims in Maryville Community
U.S. Attorney’s Office

•

Eastern District of Tennessee (865) 545-4167

November 19, 2012

KNOXVILLE, TN—Brian Keith Miller, 47, of Maryville, Tennessee, was sentenced on
November 19, 2012, by the Honorable Thomas W. Phillips, U.S. District Court Judge, to serve
80 months in federal prison, to be followed by five years of supervised release. He was also
ordered to pay $1,425,018.21 in restitution to 22 victims, including $142,771 in unpaid federal
income taxes to the Internal Revenue Service.
Miller was indicted in March 2012 and pleaded guilty in July 2012 to wire fraud, money
laundering, and filing false federal income tax returns. The guilty pleas and sentence stemmed
from Miller’s execution of a scheme to dupe victims in the Maryville community into entrusting
over $1,000,000 to him, purportedly to invest in various ventures that Miller touted would
provide the victims with substantial returns. Instead of investing the victims’ funds provided to
him as promised, however, Miller converted the funds to his own personal use and benefit.
Further, Miller used some of the victims’ money to make payments to other investors and lull his
victims into believing that the investments were legitimate. Miller’s victims included friends,
fellow churchgoers, and members of his extended family.
During the sentencing hearing, three of Miller’s victims gave statements in which they urged the
court to impose the maximum sentence allowed by law against Miller. U.S. Attorney William C.
Killian stated, “This sentence sends a strong message to fraudsters like Brian Miller that might
dare to undertake sophisticated schemes to defraud citizens out of their retirement funds, college
tuition funds, and life savings that their schemes will result in federal prosecution and long
prison sentences.”
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Agencies involved in this investigation included the Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation
Division and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Matthew T. Morris, Assistant U.S. Attorney,
represented the United States.

DOJ FBI retrieved from: https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/knoxville/press-releases/2012/brian-keithmiller-sentenced-to-serve-80-months-in-prison-for-wire-fraud-scheme

Live Database
U.S. District Court - Eastern District of Tennessee (Knoxville)
CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:12-cr-00041-TWP-CCS-1
Case title: USA v. Miller

Date Filed: 03/20/2012
Date Terminated: 11/21/2012

Assigned to: District Judge Thomas W
Phillips
Referred to: Magistrate Judge C Clifford
Shirley, Jr

Defendant (1)
Brian Keith Miller
TERMINATED: 11/21/2012

represented by Bobby E. Hutson , Jr
Federal Defender Services of Eastern
Tennessee, Inc. (Knox)
800 South Gay Street
Suite 2400
Knoxville, TN 37929-9714
865-637-7979
Fax: 865-637-7999
Email: bobby_hutson@fd.org
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: Public Defender or
Community Defender Appointment
Laura E Davis
Federal Defender Services of Eastern
Tennessee, Inc. (Knox)
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800 South Gay Street
Suite 2400
Knoxville, TN 37929-9714
865-637-7979
Fax: 865-637-7999
Email: Laura_Davis@fd.org
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: Public Defender or
Community Defender Appointment

Pending Counts

Disposition

[18:1343] Wire Fraud and Forfeiture
Allegations
(1)

80 months as to Counts One and Four,
and 36 months as to Count Nine, to be
served concurrently. 5 years supervised
release with five years as to Count One,
three years as to Count Four, and one
year as to Count Nine, to be served
concurrently. Restitution of $
1,426,118.21 and Special assessment of
$300.00.

[18:1957] Money Laundering and
Forfeiture Allegations
(4)

80 months as to Counts One and Four,
and 36 months as to Count Nine, to be
served concurrently. 5 years supervised
release with five years as to Count One,
three years as to Count Four, and one
year as to Count Nine, to be served
concurrently. Restitution of $
1,426,118.21 and Special assessment of
$300.00.

[26:7206(1)] Filing False Tax Return
(9)

80 months as to Counts One and Four,
and 36 months as to Count Nine, to be
served concurrently. 5 years supervised
release with five years as to Count One,
three years as to Count Four, and one
year as to Count Nine, to be served
concurrently. Restitution of $
1,426,118.21 and Special assessment of
$300.00.
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Highest Offense Level (Opening)
Felony

Terminated Counts

Disposition

[18:1343] Wire Fraud and Forfeiture
Allegations
(2-3)

dismissed

[18:1957] Money Laundering and
Forfeiture Allegations
(5-8)

dismissed

[26:7206(1)] Filing False Tax Return
(10)

dismissed

Highest Offense Level (Terminated)
Felony

Complaints

Disposition

None

Plaintiff
USA

represented by Matthew T Morris
U S Department of Justice (Knox USAO)
Office of U S Attorney
800 Market Street
Suite 211
Knoxville, TN 37902
865-545-4167
Email: matt.morris@usdoj.gov
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
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Date Filed

#

Docket Text

03/20/2012

1

SEALED MOTION to Seal by USA. (RLK) (Entered: 03/21/2012)

03/20/2012

2

SEALED ORDER granting 1 SEALED MOTION to Seal filed by USA. Signed by
Magistrate Judge C Clifford Shirley on March 20, 2012. (RLK) (Entered:
03/21/2012)

03/20/2012

3

SEALED INDICTMENT as to Brian Keith Miller charging counts 1 - 10.
(Attachments: # 1 Criminal Cover Sheet)(RLK) (Entered: 03/21/2012)

03/26/2012

Case unsealed as to Brian Keith Miller. (DCP) (Entered: 03/26/2012)

03/26/2012

CASE SEALED as to Brian Keith Miller (DCP) (Entered: 03/26/2012)

03/26/2012

4

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge C Clifford Shirley:
Initial Appearance as to Brian Keith Miller held on 3/26/2012, Arraignment as to
Brian Keith Miller (1) Count 1-3,4-8,9-10 held on 3/26/2012 Attorney Laura
Davis and Bobby Hutxon for Brian Keith Miller present. Not guilty plea entered.,
Added attorney Laura E Davis,Bobby E. Hutson, Jr for Brian Keith Miller., ( Plea
Agreement due by 5/15/2012., Jury Trial set for 5/23/2012 09:00 AM in
Courtroom 4 - Knoxville before District Judge Thomas W Phillips., Pretrial
Conference set for 5/15/2012 02:00 PM in Courtroom 3B - Knoxville before
Magistrate Judge C Clifford Shirley.) (Tape #FTR)Defendant Released on
Conditions. (DCP, ) (Entered: 03/27/2012)

03/26/2012

5

CJA 23 Financial Affidavit by Brian Keith Miller executed and approved by
Magistrate Judge C Clifford Shirley on 3/26/2012. (DCP, ) (Entered: 03/27/2012)

03/26/2012

6

ORDER APPOINTING FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER as to Brian Keith Miller. Signed
by Magistrate Judge C Clifford Shirley on 3/26/2012. (DCP, ) (Entered:
03/27/2012)

03/26/2012

7

ORDER Setting Conditions of Release as to Brian Keith Miller (1) Personal
Recognizance Bond. Signed by Magistrate Judge C Clifford Shirley on 3/26/2012.
(DCP, ) (Entered: 03/27/2012)

03/26/2012

8

ORDER ON DISCOVERY AND SCHEDULING as to Brian Keith Miller. Signed by
Magistrate Judge C Clifford Shirley on 3/26/2012. (DCP, ) (Entered: 03/27/2012)

03/27/2012

Case unsealed as to Brian Keith Miller. (DCP, ) (Entered: 03/27/2012)
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03/27/2012

9

ORDER to Unseal Case as to Brian Keith Miller. Signed by Magistrate Judge C
Clifford Shirley on 3/27/2012. (DCP, ) (Entered: 03/27/2012)

03/29/2012

10

NOTICE OF PRETRIAL CONFERENCE as to Brian Keith Miller. A pretrial
conference is hereby scheduled before C. Clifford Shirley, Jr., United States
Magistrate Judge, to commence on May 15, 2012 at 2:00 p.m., in the magistrate
judge's courtroom. (DCP, ) (Entered: 03/29/2012)

05/08/2012

11

PRETRIAL ORDER as to Brian Keith Miller. This case will be set for trial before the
Honorable Thomas W. Phillips and a jury, to commence at 9:00 a.m. on May 23,
2012. Signed by Magistrate Judge C Clifford Shirley on 5/8/2012. (DCP, )
(Entered: 05/08/2012)

05/10/2012

12

Arrest Warrant Returned Executed on 3/26/12 in case as to Brian Keith Miller.
(JAN, ) (Entered: 05/14/2012)

05/14/2012

13

PLEA AGREEMENT as to Brian Keith Miller (Morris, Matthew) (Entered:
05/14/2012)

06/06/2012

NOTICE OF HEARING as to Brian Keith Miller : Change of Plea Hearing set for
6/12/2012 at 9:30 AM in Courtroom 4 - Knoxville, before District Judge Thomas
W Phillips. (RLK) (Entered: 06/06/2012)

06/13/2012

NOTICE OF HEARING as to Brian Keith Miller : Change of Plea Hearing set for
7/13/2012 at 9:30 AM in Courtroom 4 - Knoxville, before District Judge Thomas
W Phillips. (RLK) (Entered: 06/13/2012)

07/13/2012

14

Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Thomas W Phillips:
Change of Plea Hearing as to Brian Keith Miller held on 7/13/2012. Guilty Plea
entered by Brian Keith Miller as to Counts 1, 4, and 9. Sentencing set for
10/22/2012 at 9:30 AM in Courtroom 4 - Knoxville, before District Judge
Thomas W Phillips. (Court Reporter Netta Kocuba)Defendant Released on
Conditions. (RLK) (Entered: 07/13/2012)

08/08/2012

15

SUPPLEMENT to 13 Plea Agreement Errata/Correction by USA (Morris,
Matthew) (Entered: 08/08/2012)

09/05/2012

NOTICE OF Sentencing hearing as to Brian Keith Miller RESET for 10/29/2012 at
1:30 PM (from 10/22/12) in Courtroom 4 - Knoxville before District Judge
Thomas W Phillips. (ADA) (Entered: 09/05/2012)
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10/04/2012

16

10/10/2012

NOTICE OF NO OBJECTIONS to Presentence Investigation Report by USA as to
Brian Keith Miller (Morris, Matthew) (Entered: 10/04/2012)
NOTICE OF Sentencing hearing as to Brian Keith Miller RESET for 11/19/2012 at
1:30 PM (from 10/29/12) in Courtroom 4 - Knoxville before District Judge
Thomas W Phillips. (ADA) (Entered: 10/10/2012)

11/05/2012

17

SENTENCING MEMORANDUM by USA as to Brian Keith Miller (Morris, Matthew)
(Entered: 11/05/2012)

11/06/2012

18

MOTION for Leave to File Document Under Seal by Brian Keith Miller. (Davis,
Laura) (Main Document 18 replaced on 11/7/2012 to remove blank page)
(ADA). (Entered: 11/06/2012)

11/06/2012

19

(refiled as 21 )SEALED Proposed Sealed Document by Brian Keith Miller re: 18
MOTION for Leave to File Document Under Seal (Davis, Laura) Modified on
11/7/2012 (ADA). (Entered: 11/06/2012)

11/07/2012

20

ORDER granting defendant's 18 Motion for Leave to File sentencing
memorandum and motion for non-guidelines Under Seal as to Brian Keith Miller
(1). Signed by District Judge Thomas W Phillips on 11/7/12. (ADA) (Entered:
11/07/2012)

11/07/2012

21

SEALED Sentencing memorandum and MOTION for non-guidelines by Brian
Keith Miller. (ADA) (Entered: 11/07/2012)

11/16/2012

22

Letter from victim re sentencing (ADA) (Entered: 11/16/2012)

11/19/2012

23

Minute Entry for Sentencing held before District Judge Thomas W Phillips on
11/19/2012 for Brian Keith Miller (1) as to Count(s) 1, 4, 9; 80 months as to
Counts One and Four, and 36 months as to Count Nine, to be served
concurrently. 5 years supervised release with five years as to Count One, three
years as to Count Four, and one year as to Count Nine, to be served
concurrently. Restitution of $ 1,426,118.21 and Special assessment of $300.00.
Count(s) 10, 2, 3, 5-8, dismissed. (Court Reporter Netta Kocuba)Defendant
Released on Conditions. (ADA) (Entered: 11/19/2012)

11/21/2012

24

JUDGMENT as to Brian Keith Miller; 80 months as to Counts One and Four, and
36 months as to Count Nine, to be served concurrently. 5 years supervised
release with five years as to Count One, three years as to Count Four, and one
year as to Count Nine, to be served concurrently. Restitution of $ 1,426,118.21
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and Special assessment of $300.00. Count(s) 10, 2-3, 5-8, dismissed. Signed by
District Judge Thomas W Phillips on 11/20/12. (ADA) (Entered: 11/21/2012)
11/27/2012

25

AMENDED JUDGMENT as to Brian Keith Miller; 80 months as to Counts One and
Four, and 36 months as to Count Nine, to be served concurrently. 5 years
supervised release with five years as to Count One, three years as to Count
Four, and one year as to Count Nine, to be served concurrently. Restitution of $
1,426,118.21 and Special assessment of $300.00. Count(s) 10, 2-3, 5-8,
dismissed. Signed by District Judge Thomas W Phillips on 11/26/12.
(amendements noted by *) (ADA) (Entered: 11/27/2012)

03/26/2013

26

Judgment Returned Executed on 3/12/13 by delivering Brian Keith Miller to FPC
Montgomery at Maxwell AFB. (ADA) (Entered: 04/02/2013)

The following case of James Tyson Jr (Operation Waxhouse) is a scheme that included
multiple forms of fraud, of which the Ponzi aspect was only one. It was a Ponzi schemes that had
60 victims and 92 perpetrators. This document lists the names and professions of all of the
perpetrators charged and the docket number allowing for researching each individual. All
perpetrators received some sentence.
Department of Justice
U.S. Attorney’s Office
Western District of North Carolina

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Wednesday, April 24, 2013

Nine More Members Of Racketeering Enterprise Indicted On Investment Fraud,
Mortgage Fraud And Related Charges
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United States Attorney Anne M. Tompkins Western District Of North Carolina
Two Others To Plead Guilty On Related Charges
A Total of 92 Defendants Have Been Charged To Date in Operation Wax House
CHARLOTTE, N.C. – A federal superseding indictment unsealed today in U.S. District Court charged
nine additional defendants in Charlotte and elsewhere with racketeering, investment fraud,
mortgage fraud, bank bribery and money laundering, announced the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the
Western District of North Carolina. This latest round of criminal charges resulting from Operation
Wax House, a mortgage fraud investigation which began in the Western District of North Carolina in
2007, brings the total number of defendants charged to date to 92, of which 66 have pleaded guilty.
John A. Strong, Special Agent in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Charlotte Division,
Jeannine A. Hammett, Special Agent in Charge of the Internal Revenue Service, Criminal
Investigation (IRS-CI) and Elaine Marshall, North Carolina Secretary of State join the U.S.
Attorney’s Office in making today’s announcement.
The superseding federal racketeering indictment was returned by a federal grand jury sitting in
Charlotte on April 18, 2013 and remained sealed until today. The superseding indictment adds nine
defendants to the existing charges, bringing to 26 the total number of individuals currently charged
as part of a criminal organization (the “Enterprise”) that operated principally in the cities of
Charlotte and Waxhaw, N.C., and stole more than $75 million from investors and mortgage lenders.
According to allegations contained in the unsealed indictment:
The Enterprise, which operated from about 2005 through 2012, engaged in an extensive pattern of
racketeering activities, consisting of investment fraud, mortgage fraud, bank fraud, money
laundering and distribution of illegal drugs. Members of the Enterprise also bribed bank officials. In
the investment fraud portion of the racketeering activities, the co-conspirators targeted professional
athletes and doctors as well as their personal and professional acquaintances and convinced them to
invest in a series of sham corporations controlled by the Enterprise. For example, members of the
Enterprise told potential investors that one of the sham corporations, PEI, was a commodities
trading company that would broker deals for the supposed export-import of various commodities
like rice-trading and gold and diamond mining in Africa. In truth and fact, instead of investing the
victims’ money as promised, the Enterprise used the funds obtained through PEI to support its
members’ lifestyles and to make Ponzi-style payments to other victims. The co-conspirators stole
over $27 million from more than 50 investor victims, including monies that the investor victims were
induced to obtain as loans from financial institutions.
The Enterprise’s mortgage fraud operations involved acquiring luxury homes in neighborhoods in
Charlotte and Waxhaw. One member of the Enterprise would agree with a builder to purchase a
property at the “true price.” The Enterprise would then arrange for a buyer to purchase the property
at an inflated price. In most circumstances, the buyer would agree to purchase the property in his or
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her own name and sign whatever documents were necessary, in exchange for a hidden monetary
kickback. The builder would sell the property at the inflated price, the lender would make a mortgage
loan on the basis of that inflated price, and the difference between the inflated price and the true
price would be extracted at closing by the Enterprise.
The vast majority of the houses purchased as part of the Enterprise’s mortgage fraud operations
subsequently fell into foreclosure, resulting in losses of hundreds of thousands of dollars in most
instances. Over the course of the conspiracy, members of the Enterprise purchased four condos in
one building for inflated prices, resulting in an aggregate loss on those units of approximately $2
million.
Members of the Enterprise also engaged in bank bribery conspiracies, by bribing bank employees to
cash checks received from fraudulent mortgage transactions carried out by the Enterprise, and to
deposit checks in a manner designed to further conceal the true distribution of the proceeds, and to
supply false letters of credit in the names of local banks in an attempt to obtain financing from other
financial institutions. In one instance a bank employee was paid a $55,000 bribe for preparing and
providing a false letter of credit.
The racketeering activities of the Enterprise also included distribution of illegal drugs. For example,
members of the Enterprise transported truckloads of marijuana from Texas and elsewhere to North
Carolina, using companies utilized in both the drug trafficking and mortgage fraud operations and
trucks controlled by members of the Enterprise and others.
Defendants added in this superseding indictment are:
• William Brown, 34, of Matthews, N.C. is charged with racketeering conspiracy and mortgage fraud.
Role: Promoter and buyer. Status: In custody, pending release on conditions, following arrest and
initial appearance.
• Benjamin Clarke, 40, of Smyrna, Ga. is charged with mortgage fraud. Role: Buyer. Status: Released
following arrest and initial appearance.
• Frank DeSimone, 40, of Charlotte is charged with racketeering conspiracy, securities fraud, wire
fraud to defraud investors and money laundering. Role: Promoter. Status: To appear for an initial
appearance pursuant to a summons.
• Lorie Dooley, 48, of Washington, D.C. is charged with racketeering conspiracy, mortgage fraud and
bank bribery. Role: Promoter. Status: To appear for an initial appearance pursuant to a summons.
• James E. Fink, 43, of Waxhaw is charged with racketeering conspiracy and mortgage fraud. Role:
Builder. Status: To appear for an initial appearance pursuant to a summons.
• Ralph Johnson, 35, of Charlotte is charged with racketeering conspiracy and mortgage fraud. Role:
Promoter. Status: In custody.
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• Denetria Myles, 41, of Charlotte is charged with racketeering conspiracy and mortgage fraud. Role:
Promoter. Status: To appear for an initial appearance pursuant to a summons.
• Matthew Newland, 39, of Coralville, Iowa is charged with racketeering conspiracy and mortgage
fraud. Role: Promoter and seller. Status: Released following arrest and initial appearance.
• Nazeere Saddig, 40, formerly of Charlotte is charged with racketeering conspiracy and mortgage
fraud. Role: Promoter and buyer. Status: Fugitive.
• Additionally, Steve Jones, 44, of Waxhaw, previously charged with securities fraud, wire fraud to
defraud investors and money laundering conspiracy has now also been charged with racketeering
conspiracy. Role: Promoter. Status: To appear pursuant to a summons.
Today, the U.S. Attorney’s Office also announced charges filed against two additional promoters in
the mortgage and investment fraud scheme. They acknowledge taking part in the conspiracy and
have agreed to plead guilty. They are:
• Waylon Long, 40, of Texas is charged with mortgage fraud conspiracy and money laundering
conspiracy. Role: Promoter. Status: To appear for initial appearance upon a summons.
• Melvin Moye, 34, of Charlotte is charged with investment or securities and mortgage or bank fraud
conspiracy. Role: Promoter. Status: Pleaded guilty and is awaiting sentencing.
Additionally, the U.S. Attorney’s Office announced that three of the original 17 defendants who were
charged with racketeering conspiracy have pleaded guilty to those racketeering charges. They are:
• Travis Bumpers, 36, of Charlotte pleaded guilty to racketeering conspiracy to commit securities
fraud, mortgage fraud, wire fraud and money laundering conspiracy. Role: Promoter. Status: In
custody pending sentencing.
• Victoria Hunt, 36, of Rockville, Maryland, pleaded guilty to racketeering conspiracy, securities
fraud, mortgage fraud, wire fraud to defraud investors, and money laundering. Role: Leader and
promoter. Status: On house arrest pending sentencing.
• Purnell Wood, 41, of Holly Springs, N.C. pleaded guilty to racketeering conspiracy to commit
mortgage fraud and money laundering. Role: Promoter. Status: Released pending sentencing.
The conspiracy to participate in the racketeering activities charge carries a maximum term of 20
years in prison and a $250,000 fine or twice the gross profits or other proceeds. The securities fraud
charge carries a maximum term of 20 years in prison and a $250,000 fine. The bank fraud charge
carries a maximum term of 30 years in prison and a $1 million fine. The wire fraud charge carries a
maximum term of 20 years in prison and a $250,000 fine. The money laundering conspiracy charge
carries a maximum term of 20 years in prison and a $500,000 fine or twice the amount of criminally
derived proceeds. And, the bank bribery conspiracy charge carries a maximum term of five years in
prison and a $250,000 fine.
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An indictment is merely an allegation, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law. In addition, the guilty plea of any other
person is not relevant to the guilt of any indicted person.

Operation Wax House in the Western District of North Carolina is being handled by the Charlotte
Division of the FBI, the Criminal Division of the IRS for the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task
Force, and the Securities Division of the North Carolina Secretary of State. The prosecution for the
government is being handled by Assistant United States Attorneys Kurt W. Meyers and Maria K.
Vento and Special Assistant United States Attorney Kevin M. Harrington.
The President’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force includes representatives from a broad
range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general, and state and local law
enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement
resources. The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with
state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and
effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending
and financial markets, and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes. For more information on
the task force, visit www.stopfraud.gov.
The names and case numbers of the all the defendants charged to date in Operation Wax House are
listed below, organized by their alleged role in the scheme.
Attorneys and Paralegals
Crawford/Mallard, Michelle 3:11cr374
Gates, Christine 3:09cr100
Norwood, Kelli, 3:09cr162
Rainer, Demetrius 3:08cr239/241
Smith, Troy, 3:08cr264
Bank Insiders
Brown, Jamilia, 3:10cr124
Eason, Danyelle, 3:10cr116
Henson, Vic. F., 3:10cr124
Jackson, Mitzi, 3:11cr374
Ramey, Bonnie Sue, 3:10cr124
Builders and Sellers
Fink, James, 3:11cr374; 3:12cr239
Jackson, Jennifer, 3:09cr241
Smith, Kelvis, 3:12cr238
Viegas, Jeffrey, 3:12cr298
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Wittig, Mark, 3:12cr335
Wood, Gary, 3:09cr208
Facilitators and Financiers
Hickey, Denis, 3:09cr103
McClain, Landrick, 3:10cr124
Mitchell, Ann Tyson, 3:12cr239
Panayoton, Sherrill, 3:11cr176
Taylor, Alicia Renee, 3:10cr124
Wilson, Willard, 3:09cr161
Buyers
Banks, Arketa, 3:12cr297
Hillian, Kirk, 3:12cr83
Mathis, Charles, 3:10cr1
Mobley, Sarena, 3:10cr124
Moore, George, 3:12cr337
Richards, Dan, 3:10cr119
Smith, Kevin, 3:12cr341
Tyler, Glenna, 3:11cr200
Vaughn, Mary, 3:12cr329
Wallace, Jamaine, 3:12cr330
Wellington, William, 3:12cr333
Notary Public
Willis, Anthony, 3:09cr218
Appraiser
Darden, Clinton 3:10cr108
Mortgage Brokers
Bradley, Bonnette, 3:12cr299
Clarke, Linda, 3:10cr120
Flood, Ericka, 3:10cr124
Goodson-Hudson, Crystal, 3:12cr339
Mahaney, Robert, 3:12cr34-0
Scagliarini, Coley, 3:11cr374
Staton, Walter, 3:10cr113
Vaughn, Danielle, 3:12cr329
Williams, Marcia, 3:12cr334
Williams, Sean, 3:12cr336
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Woods, Joseph, 3:09cr178
Real Estate Agents
Belin, Chris, 3:11cr374
Clark, Christina, 3:09cr44
Lee, Shannon, 3:12cr338
Pasut, Holly Hardy, 3:12cr331
Wolf, Nathan Shane, 3:12cr239
Wood, Gary, 3:09cr208
Promoters
Amini, Ramin, 3:12cr239
Barnes, Vonetta Tyson, 3:12cr239
Brown, William, 3:12cr239
Bumpers, Travis, 3:12cr239
Carr, Stephen, 3:10cr124
Clarke, Benjamin, 3:12cr239
Clarke, Reuben, 3:10cr120
Coleman, Gregory, 3:10cr118
DeSimone, Frank, 3:12cr239
Dooley, Lorie, 3:12cr239
Hitchcock, Jimmy, 3:11cr374
Hubbard, Glynn, 3:12cr239
Hunt, Victoria, 3:12cr239
Hunter, Toby, 3:12cr239
Johnson, Ralph, 3:12cr239
Jones, Steven, 3:12cr239
Jones, Tyree, 3:10cr230
Long Waylon, 3:12cr239
Marshall, Michael, 3:07cr283
McDowell, John, 3:12cr239
McPhaul, Elizabeth, 3:10cr114
Mehr, Kurosh, 3:12cr239
Mitchell, Ann Tyson, 3:12cr239
Moye, Melvin, 3:12cr239
Myles, Denetria, 3:12cr239
Newland, Matthew, 3:12cr239
Perry, John Wayne, Jr., 3:12cr239
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Perry, Kim, 3:10cr25
Phillips, Rick, 3:10cr115
Saddig, Nazeere, 3:12cr239
Sharreff-El, Drew, 3:10cr124
Sherald, Kiki, 3:10cr117
Simmons, Aaron, 3:09cr240
Snead, Todd, 3:10cr124
Staton, Lisa, 3:10cr113
Thorogood, Donte, 3:12cr239
Tyson, Carrie, 3:12cr239
Tyson, James, Jr. 3:12cr239
Tyson, James, Sr., 3:12cr239
Wellington, Phillip, 3:12cr332
Wood, Purnell, 3:12cr239
Retrieved from: https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdnc/pr/nine-more-members-racketeeringenterprise-indicted-investment-fraud-mortgage-fraud-and
__________________________________________________________________
Edward Gray
The following case of Edward Gray demonstrates cross-referencing using SEC, BOP and PACER
court docket to identify information on the perpetrator. The SEC documents identify that Gray is
incarcerated and that it is a Ponzi scheme. The first is a litigation release and the second is a digest
issue. The third item is the Bureau of Prisons listing that shows the prisoner number which is also
indicated in the top right corner of the crim9inal docket. The Docket also show the charges and the
sentence. In plea bargains it is also indicated in the docket report acquired through PACER. Item
18 of the docket report indicates that Edward Gray pleaded guilty. The SEC complaint provides the
greatest detailed information on cases; it is not included here due to length.

U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission
Litigation Release No. 18301 / August 21, 2003
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. METROPOLIS HOLDINGS, LLC and
EDWARD GRAY, United States District Court for the Eastern District of California,
Fresno Division, Civil Action No. F-03-5538
SEC SEEKS CIVIL CONTEMPT SANCTIONS AGAINST EDWARD GRAY AND METROPOLIS
HOLDINGS FOR VIOLATING FEDERAL COURT'S ORDER TO PROVIDE ACCOUNTING
The Securities and Exchange Commission announced that on July 14, 2003, the United States
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District Court for the Eastern District of California ordered defendants Edward Gray of Fresno,
California, and his company, Metropolis Holdings, LLC, to show cause why they should not be
held in contempt for failing to account for the funds that they raised from eleven investors
worldwide in a fraudulent investment scheme. The Court simultaneously entered a preliminary
injunction freezing Gray and Metropolis's financial assets for the duration of the case, including
approximately $1.4 million held in ten accounts identified by the Commission. Gray is currently
in custody in a related criminal prosecution brought by the United States Attorney for the Eastern
District of California.
The Commission filed a complaint against Gray and Metropolis on May 1, 2003, alleging that
the defendants raised $5.1 million by selling interests in a non-existent "Asset Management
Program" from July to November 2002. Gray lured investors by offering high returns on their
investment and promising that investors' funds would be protected by insurance. Instead of
investing the money and purchasing insurance, however, Gray dissipated approximately $2
million on personal items, including a new car and jewelry, and on expenditures for unrelated
business projects. Account statements indicate that Gray also withdrew hundreds of thousands of
dollars in cash, which to date the Commission has not been able to trace. Immediately upon the
filing of the complaint, the Court ordered the defendants to account for all of the investors' funds.
When Gray and Metropolis failed to comply, the Court entered the July 14 order to show cause
why they should not be held in contempt.
Gray and Metropolis have not responded to the complaint. As a result, the Commission has filed
a motion for a default judgment, which is currently scheduled to be heard by the Court on
September 8, 2003. In the motion, the Commission has asked the Court to find that Gray and
Metropolis violated the antifraud and registration provisions of the federal securities laws,
specifically Sections 5(a), 5(c) and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. The Commission has further
requested that the Court order defendants to return the proceeds of their fraud to the investors
and pay civil penalties, and enter permanent injunctions prohibiting them from committing future
violations of the securities laws.
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18301.htm

SEC news Digest Issue 2003-89 May 9, 2003
SEC SUES FRESNO HOME BUILDER FOR RUNNING $5 MILLION PONZI SCHEME
On May 1, the Commission charged Edward Gray of Fresno, California, and
his company, Metropolis Holdings, LLC, with defrauding investors out of
several million dollars since July 2002. According to the Commission's
complaint, Gray raised $5.1 million from investors worldwide by offering
interests in a non-existent "Asset Management Program." Gray instead
pocketed the money, using investor funds to, among other things, buy a
new car and travel to Europe. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California has issued an order freezing all assets
held by Gray and Metropolis.
In

a

complaint filed May 1, the Commission alleges that Gray, a Fresno
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home builder, told investors that he would use their funds to invest in
a
$100
million
"Leased Asset Management Instrument"
promising
substantial returns. He further claimed to have obtained an insurance
policy guaranteeing the safety of their investments. The Commission's
complaint alleges that Gray's representations were entirely false. Gray
did not put any money into the supposed investment instruments, nor did
he procure any sort of insurance protecting investor funds.
Rather,
Gray deposited investor funds into a standard brokerage account,
withdrawing hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash for himself.
The
Commission further alleges that Gray spent tens of thousands of dollars
of investor funds on trips to Europe, New York, and Las Vegas, a car,
jewelry, computers and electronics, and other personal items.
In addition, the Commission's papers show that, upon learning of its
investigation, Gray lied to the Commission about the whereabouts of
investor funds. Even after agreeing to freeze investor funds pending
the Commission's investigation, Gray attempted to wire funds from an
account he had concealed from the Commission into his lawyer's bank
account.
Based on the evidence, the Court issued an order temporarily
freezing all of Gray's and Metropolis' funds, requiring an accounting,
and prohibiting Gray and Metropolis from destroying documents.
The Commission's complaint charges Gray and Metropolis with violating
the antifraud and registration provisions of the federal securities
laws, specifically Sections 5(a), 5(c) and 17(a) of the Securities Act
of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule
10b-5 thereunder. The complaint seeks permanent injunctions prohibiting
future violations of the securities laws, disgorgement, and civil
penalties. [SEC v. Metropolis Holdings, LLC and Edward Gray, USDC EDCA,
Fresno Division, Civil Action No. F-03-5538] (LR-18128)

Retrieved from: https://www.sec.gov/news/digest/dig050903.txt
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Bureau of Prison Inmate Finder
•
•

Find By Number
Find By Name

1 Result for search Edward Gray, Num: 61309-097, Sex: Male

Released On: 08/29/2008

Search
Clear
Form

U.S. District Court
Eastern District of California - Live System (Fresno)
CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:03-cr-05222-OWW-1
Case title: USA v. Gray

Date Filed: 05/22/2003
Date Terminated: 12/08/2003

Magistrate judge case number: 1:03-mj-02188

Assigned to: Senior Judge Oliver W.
Wanger

Defendant (1)
Edward Gray
TERMINATED: 12/08/2003
also known as

represented by Edward Gray
61309-097 (BOP prisoner number)
FCI-SH3
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Edward Grey
TERMINATED: 12/08/2003

Federal Correctional Institute
P O Box 6000
Sheridan, OR 97378
PRO SE
Victor Manuel Chavez
Federal Defender (FRS)
2300 Tulare Street
Suite 330
Fresno, CA 93721
(559) 487-5561
Fax: (559) 487-5950
Email: victor_chavez@fd.org
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: Public Defender or
Community Defender Appointment
Woodrow Edgar Nichols , Jr
Law Office Of Woodrow Nichols
2141 Tuolumne
Suite O
Fresno, CA 93721
559-228-3125
Fax: 559-442-1567
Email: woodrownichols@aol.com
TERMINATED: 11/19/2003
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: Retained

Pending Counts

Disposition

18:1343.F and 2 - WIRE FRAUD AND
AIDING AND ABETTING
(1-2)

DISMISSED

18:1343.F and 2 - WIRE FRAUD AND
AIDING AND ABETTING
(3)

54 months custody as to each count to
be served CONCURRENTLY, 36 months
supervised release, $500.00 penalty
assessment, $2,280,032.00 restitution;
special conditions of supervision; CA
institution recommended; appeal rights
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waived; dfts pro perty to be returned to
Mr Nichols
18:1343.F and 2 - WIRE FRAUD AND
AIDING AND ABETTING
(4)

DISMISSED

18:1343.F and 2 - WIRE FRAUD AND
AIDING AND ABETTING
(5)

54 months custody as to each count to
be served CONCURRENTLY, 36 months
supervised release, $500.00 penalty
assessment, $2,280,032.00 restitution;
special conditions of supervision; CA
institution recommended; appeal rights
waived; dfts pro perty to be returned to
Mr Nichols

18:1343.F and 2 - WIRE FRAUD AND
AIDING AND ABETTING
(6-7)

DISMISSED

18:1343.F and 2 - WIRE FRAUD AND
AIDING AND ABETTING
(8)

54 months custody as to each count to
be served CONCURRENTLY, 36 months
supervised release, $500.00 penalty
assessment, $2,280,032.00 restitution;
special conditions of supervision; CA
institution recommended; appeal rights
waived; dfts pro perty to be returned to
Mr Nichols

18:1343.F and 2 - WIRE FRAUD AND
AIDING AND ABETTING
(9)

DISMISSED

18:1343.F and 2 - WIRE FRAUD AND
AIDING AND ABETTING
(10)

54 months custody as to each count to
be served CONCURRENTLY, 36 months
supervised release, $500.00 penalty
assessment, $2,280,032.00 restitution;
special conditions of supervision; CA
institution recommended; appeal rights
waived; dfts pro perty to be returned to
Mr Nichols
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18:1343.F and 2 - WIRE FRAUD AND
AIDING AND ABETTING
(11-12)

DISMISSED

18:1343.F and 2 - WIRE FRAUD AND
AIDING AND ABETTING
(13)

54 months custody as to each count to
be served CONCURRENTLY, 36 months
supervised release, $500.00 penalty
assessment, $2,280,032.00 restitution;
special conditions of supervision; CA
institution recommended; appeal rights
waived; dfts pro perty to be returned to
Mr Nichols

18:1956-4999.F and 2 - MONEY
LAUNDERING AND AIDING AND
ABETTING
(14-27)

Dismissed

18:1957-7600.F and 2 - MONEY
LAUNDERING AND AIDING AND
ABETTING
(28-33)

Dismissed

18:982.F CRIMINAL FORFEITURE
(34)

Dismissed

Highest Offense Level (Opening)
Felony

Terminated Counts

Disposition

None

Highest Offense Level (Terminated)
None

Complaints

Disposition
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18 USC 1343 and 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) WIRE
FRAUD AND MONEY LAUNDERING [
1:03-m -2188 ]
Date Filed

05/08/2003

#

Docket Text

1

COMPLAINT by Clayton Wible, FBI agent,
naming Edward Gray (1) count(s) cmp [ 1:03m -2188 ] (old) (Entered: 05/09/2003)
ARREST Warrant issued for Edward Gray by
Magistrate Judge Dennis L. Beck bail set at
NO BAIL [ 1:03-m -2188 ] (old) (Entered:
05/09/2003)

05/08/2003

05/08/2003

2

APPLICATION by plaintiff USA to seal case [
1:03-m -2188 ] (old) (Entered: 05/09/2003)

05/09/2003

3

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to unseal
case by USA as to Edward Gray [ 1:03-m 2188 ] (old) (Entered: 05/09/2003)

4

ORDER by Magistrate Judge Sandra M.
Snyder motion to unseal case by USA [3-1]
GRANTED (cc: all counsel) [ 1:03-m -2188 ]
(old) (Entered: 05/09/2003)

5

MINUTES before Magistrate Judge Sandra
M. Snyder RE: first appearance first
appearance of Edward Gray Attorney W
Nichols present on special appearance ,
preliminary exam set for 11:00 5/23/03 for
Edward Gray detention hearing set on 11:00
5/14/03 for Edward Gray both hearing
before Magistrate Snyder ctrm 4 C/R A
Alvarez [ 1:03-m -2188 ] (hl) (Entered:
05/12/2003)

05/14/2003

6

MINUTES before Magistrate Judge Sandra
M. Snyder RE: detention detention hearing
continued to 10:00 5/16/03 before
Magistrate Snyder ctrm 5 for Edward Gray
C/R A Alvarez, No Interpreter [ 1:03-m -2188
] (hl) (Entered: 05/15/2003)

05/14/2003

7

ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant
Edward Gray by attorney Woodrow Edgar

05/09/2003

05/09/2003
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Nichols Jr [ 1:03-m -2188 ] (hl) (Entered:
05/15/2003)
8

EXHIBITS FOR BAIL HEARING by plaintiff USA
[ 1:03-m -2188 ] (wh) (Entered: 05/19/2003)

05/16/2003

9

MINUTES before Magistrate Judge Sandra
M. Snyder detention hearing held on
5/16/03 as to defendant Edward Gray Dft
ORDERED DETAINED [ 1:03-m -2188 ] (wh)
(Entered: 05/19/2003)

05/16/2003

10

ORDER of Detention of Edward Gray by
Magistrate Judge Sandra M. Snyder [ 1:03-m
-2188 ] (wh) (Entered: 05/19/2003)

05/16/2003

11

EXHIBITS FOR BAIL HEARING by plaintiff USA
[ 1:03-m -2188 ] (wh) (Entered: 05/19/2003)

05/16/2003

12

SEALED document ( ) [ 1:03-m -2188 ] (old)
(Entered: 05/19/2003)

13

INDICTMENT by US Attorney Stanley A
Boone Counts filed against Edward Gray (1)
count(s) 1-13, 14-27, 28-33, 34 (rcf)
(Entered: 05/23/2003)

14

MINUTES before Magistrate Judge Sandra
M. Snyder RE: arraginment dft Edward Gray
arraigned; not guilty plea entered; Attorney
W Nicholas present status hearing set for
1:30 6/9/03 before Judge Wanger ctrm 2 for
Edward Gray C/R A Alvarez, No Interpreter
(hl) (Entered: 05/27/2003)

15

MINUTES before Judge Wanger RE: 6/9/03
Hrg status conference CONTINUED (for
further status conference) to 1:30 7/14/03
before OWW for dft Edward Gray , XT
started for dft Gray start date: 6/9/03 end
date: 7/14/03 C/R P Smith; Interpreter
NONE (jh) (Entered: 06/10/2003)

16

MINUTES before Judge Oliver W. Wanger
RE: status conf status hearing held on
7/14/03 as to deft Edward Gray pretrial
motions filing ddl set for 8/11/03 for Edward
Gray; Govt's response due 9/2/03; in-court
hearing on the motions set for 1:30 9/8/03

05/16/2003

05/22/2003

05/23/2003

06/09/2003

07/14/2003

319

before Judge Wanger ctrm 2 for Edward
Gray , excludable XE started for Edward Gray
start date: 7/14/03 end date: 9/8/03 C/R P
Crawford, No Interpreter (hl) (Entered:
07/15/2003)

08/11/2003

LODGED stipulation to extension of date of
hrg of motions by defendant Edward Gray
(jh) (Entered: 08/12/2003)

08/12/2003

17

STIPULATION AND ORDER by Judge Wanger
to extension of date of hearing of motions
[0-0] GRANTED dft's motions filing ddl
EXTENDED to 8/25/03; govt's response filing
ddl EXTENDED to 9/16/03; hrg RESET for
1:30 9/29/03 before OWW for dft Edward
Gray; dft waives all time between 8/11/03
and 9/22/03 (cc: all counsel) - (jh) (Entered:
08/13/2003)

08/27/2003

18

MEMORANDUN OF PLEA Agreement as to
Edward Gray (plk) (Entered: 08/28/2003)

John and Marian Morgan
The following are Bureau of Prison entries for convicted perpetrators in a Ponzi scheme.
In this case the inmate numbers are in order helping to identify all of those in the scheme. This is
sometimes the case when the perpetrators are sentenced together. In this case the husband and
wife committed the fraud. This demonstrates how surnames are not a good indicator of race.
MARIAN I MORGAN

Register Number: 74212-083
Age:

62

Race:

Asian

Sex:

Female
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Located at: Coleman Medium FCI
Release Date: 01/31/2039

JOHN S MORGAN
Register Number: 74210-083
Age:

58

Race:

White

Sex:

Male

Located at: Orlando RRM
Release Date: UNKNOWN

The following Bureau of Prisons entry is for Patricia Roszkowski. This is a classic
example of how surnames are not an accurate indicator of race:

PATRICIA ROSZKOWSKI
Register Number: 95738-022
Age:

53

Race:

Asian

Sex:

Female

Released On: 02/11/2015
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